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The five essays in this dissertation deal with microeconometric models of individual
labour market behaviour. Individual decision makers try to behave optimally, given the
constraints they face. The stochastic specification of the models is such that a close link
with the behavioural relation derived from the economic models is maintained. Different
models of the labour market are studied, ranging from static models of labour supply,
which explain the labour supply decision at a given point in time, to models in which
transitions between different labour force states are incorporated. The static models can
be subdivided into models that are neo-classical and models in which the individual is
faced by demand side restrictions. In four of the five essays, we use estimation by sim-
ulation methods. Estimation by simulation methods is useful if either multidimensional
probability integrals appear in the likelihood function, or the region of integration is
defined only implicitly, or integrals with integrands that are costly to evaluate appear.
The five studies, chapters 2 through 6 in this thesis, all start with an introduction of
their own. Therefore, this introductory chapter is kept brief and emphasis is placed on
the common aspects and interrelations between the separate papers.
In chapter 2, a method of simulated scores (MSS) estimator for models with limited
dependent variables is considered. Three variants of the MSS method are applied to a
simple neo-classical labour supply model that consists of a wage equation and a labour
supply function. The simplicity of the model enables the estimation of the model by
maximum likelihood (ML) and the comparison of the ML estimator with the MSS esti-
mators. To investigate the performance of the estimators, the methods are applied to
Monte Carlo data. The MSS estimators turn out to perform in a satisfactory manner,
even with a limited number of drawings. When applying the methods of estimation to
real data, considerable differences between the parameter estimates obtained by different
models, as well as the estimates of wage and participation elasticities are revealed. This
is attributed to the oversimplification of the economic model.
In chapter 3 one of the MSS methods described in chapter 2 is applied to a more
sophisticated neo-classical model of labour supply. This model is a utility consistent
static labour supply model with flexible preferences, a non-linear and possibly non-convex
budget set and a wage equation. Three random error terms are included to represent
respectively optimiaation and reporting errors, stochastic preferences, and heterogeneity
in wages. Coherency conditions on parameters and supports of error distributions are
3
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imposed for all observations. The complexity of the model makes it impossible to write
down the integration region of the probability of participation explicitly. As a solution
to this problem, frequency simulators can be used to simulate participation probabilities.
The most generally applicable frequency simulator is the simple frequency simulator, but
by exploiting specific properties of the model at hand, simulators that are combinations of
simple frequency simulators and smooth simulators may be employed. The properties of
the estimation method adopted are first investigated by using Monte Carlo data. After
that the model is estimated for Dutch data. The approach is compared with various
simpler alternatives proposed in the literature. It turns out that both in the Monte
Carlo data and in the real data the various estimation methods yield very different
results. Moreover, since the MSS estimation method yields good results for the Monte
Carlo data, it is suggested that the simplifications adopted in the literature may have
generated considerable biases.
The labour supply models specified in chapters 2 and 3 are neo-classica,l in the sense
that no allowance is made for structural differences between observed labour supply and
optimal labour supply. In reality, the decision maker is often faced byjob constraints and
hours contraints. In the literature, a series of articles has appeared which deal with the
behaviour of individuals who are faced by hours constraints in a static context. (Dickens
and Lundberg (1985), Tummers and Woittiez (1991), Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn
(1990)). In these models, individuals receive a random number of job offers (possibly
zero) at a given point in time, which all have the same gross wage rate, but which may
differ in the number of weekly working hours. The job offer which yields the highest level
of utility is chosen and its utility level is compared with the utility of non-participation,
after which the participation decision is made. To provide a link with job search theory,
in chapter 4 this type of model is extended by allowing the wage rate to vary across job
offers as well. Moreover, the probability of receiving a job offer is made dependent on
individual characteristics. The estimation results reveal that it may be desirable to use,
apart from data on labour supply and wages, information that is related to the number
of job offers that has been received. The recommended alternative approach is to extend
the model by assuming that job offers arrive sequentially over time instead of arriving
at a given point in time. In the estimation of this extended model, the availability of
data on unemployment duration is required.
In chapter 5 elaborates this approach on. The standard job search model, in which
a job is characterized by a wage rate only, is extended by assuming that job offers are
characterized by both wage and number of working hours, which arrive jointly from
a job offer distribution. The model allows for unobserved heterogeneity in preferences
and arrival rates. Two specificatíons are considered which differ with respect to the
way labour supply enters the model. The first model is neo-classical in the sense that
once a job offer has arrived, the individual can determine optimal hours by himself. In
the second model job searchers are offered fixed packages of wages and working hours.
Residual analysis reveals that the latter model outperforms the first. Simulation methods
are used to integrate out unobserved heterogeneity.
In chapter 6 an empirical job search model is presented in which the individual decision
maker can determine his job offer arrival rate by varying the intensity of search. The
availability of several indicators of search intensity allows us to identify cost of search
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parameters and to examine the effectiveness of search in terms of labour force state
duration. The model describes the behaviour of unemployed and employed individuals.
Three types of labour market transitions may occur: transitions from unemployment into
employment, job to job transitions and transitions from employment into unemployment.
Apart from the search intensity indicators, data on unemployment duration and job
tenure are used in the estimation of a structural model of job search.
A brief summary and evaluation of the various results is given in chapter 7.
Chapter 2
The joint estimation of a non-linear
labour supply function and a wage
equation using simulated response
probabilities
2.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates the applicability of estimation methods for labour supply
models which make use of simulators for the response probabilities. The methods of
estimation usually applied, like maximum likelihood and the method of moments, make
use of the probabilities of individuals participating in the labour force. If the labour
supply model is non-linear and if one wants to incorporate the tax and social security
system, thereby assuming that the budget constraints of the individuals are non-convex,
the calculation of the participation probabilities may be impossible and there is probably
no other way to estimate the model other than making use of simulated moments types
of estimators.
McFadden (1989) presents a method of simulated moments estimator for the multino-
mial response model. The attractiveness of the method is that the number of replications
which is used to simulate the response probabilities can be kept fixed to any positive
integer without destroying the consistency property of the estimator. In a short time
an extensive literature has blossomed in which this approach has been extended and
refined. The emphasis has been on computational accuracy and speed in the evaluation
of multi-dimensional probabilities, often under normality or closely related assumptions
and linearity. See Hajivassiliou (1992) for an overview.
The method of simulated moments estimator, however, is in its simplest form only
suitable for discrete response data, whereas in labour supply models the data are usually
of a mixed discrete-continuous nature, giving information on whether or not individuals
are working and if so, how many hours. Furthermore, any realistic utility consistent
model will entail non-linearities and non-normality, so that the various refinements men-
tioned will not be applica,ble. Therefore, we want to set up estimation by simulation
methods for the mixed discrete-continuous type of model that one typically finds in
7
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labour supply analysis.
Different routes can be followed. The most straightforward way is to replace the
response probabilities in the likelihood function by simulators, thereby simulating the
likelihood function. It can be inferred from Gouriéroux and Montfort (1989) that this
method of simulated maximum likelihood (SML) is not consistent for an arbitrary, fixed
number of replications to simulate the response probabilities. Lerman and Manski (1981)
show that a similar method for the multinomial response model may require huge num-
bers of replications. To circumvent this problem an alternative is to use the method of
simulated scores (MSS) which is based on the simulation of the vector of scores of the
log-likelihood function. As in McFadden (1989), the point of departure is the property
of the likelihood function that under weak regularity conditions the expectation of the
score vector equals zero at the true parameter value. This score vector will be replaced
by a simulated score vector. An estimator can be obtained by mínimizing the length of
the simulated score. The score vector will be simulated in such a way that the property
of having a zero expectation at the true parameter value carries over to the simulated
score vector. There is no uniyue way to achieve this and therefore we will propose and
compare three difFerent methods of estimation. The method of simulated scores is also
used by Hajivassiliou (1989).
The methods of estimation will be applied to the joint estimation of a labour supply
function, non-linear in the wage rate, and a wage equation. In this application, we
assume a linear budget constraint. This is a rather simple model and in fact it can be
estimated by maximum likelihood, using numerical integration. The main purpose of the
application is to gain insight into the practical properties of the MSS methods. Hence,
we have chosen a model simple enough so that ML is feasible and we can compare the
performance of the MSS estimators with ML. In chapter 3 one of the MSS estimators
is applied to a much more complicated model with random preferences and non-convex
budget constraints. In that model ML is not feasible.
We will present Monte Carlo results as well as real data estimates. In the Monte
Carlo study different MSS estimators are compared with each other as well as with ML
and SML with a limited number of replications.
The order of presentation is as follows: In the next section we set out the basic
model where labour supply is a(possibly non-linear) function of the wage rate and
non-labour income. Errors in the wage equation are additive and their nature remains
unspecified. In section 2.3 different simulators for the score vector are proposed, each of
them generating an alternative method of estimation. Attention is paid to the statistical
properties of the methods. In Section 2.4 the properties of these estimators and of ML
are first investigated by means of some Monte Carlo experiments. Next, the estimators
are applied to the analysis of labour supply of Dutch females.
The general finding is that the MSS estimators perform quite well, though of course
slightly below ML, whereas simulated ML may perform poorly. We conclude that the
MSS estimators proposed present viable routes for the estimation of utility consistent
labour supply models.
2.2. THE BASIC MODEL 9
2.2 The basic model
Our point of departure is a two-equation model consisting of a labour supply equation
and a log-wage equation.
h;, - h(wn, l~n; Q) f En (2.1)
log(wn) - w(~n,0) f un (2.2)
h;, is observed and equals the number of hours worked by individual n if the n-th
individual is working; h;, is unobserved if the n-th individual is non-working,
hn - hn if hn 1 0 (2.3)
hn-0ifhnCO (2.4)
where hn is the actual number of hours worked by individual n, wn is the after-tax
real wage rate which will be unobserved for a non-working individual, ~Cn is non-labour
income, ~n is a vector of observable characteristics of individual n, ,Q is a parameter
vector with dimension 1, r~ is a vector of parameters with dimension q, En and un are
random disturbances with expectation 0 and covariance matrix
z~ - QE ~eu
2
~cu ~u
and joint probability density function f(En, 7ln), independent across observations. For
ease of notation we introduce the dummy variable dn with
dn-lif hn GO (2.5)
dn-0ifh;,~0 (2.6)
We start by deriving the joint probability density function of hn and wn
given xn and ~cn. First, an expression for the joint density of h;, and wn has to be found.
Using the 1-1 transformations En - hn - h(wn, pn; (i) and un - log(wn) - w(xn; r~), we
can employ the joint density of En and un to get the density function g`(hn, w,y) of h;,










9j(hnf wn ) - f(hn - h(wn~ ftni Q)~ iog(wn) - w(~ni r1)),~ (2.7)
n
-00 ~ hn ~ 00
OGwnGoo
From this we can derive the mixed discrete-continuous probability density
function of hn and wn, g(hn, wn~xn, ~cn, B) where B contains the parameters of Q, r~ and
the upper triangular or, equivalently, the lower triangular elements of E.
( P h~ ~ OI2ne ni B) lf hn - 0
glhniwnlxni~n~e) -
g'(~Lniwnl~n~~n~e) lf hn i O,O C wn G 00
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where
P(hn C O~xn, F~n, B) - f~ fo 9'(h, w~~n, Frn, B)dhdw (2.8)o ~
For ease of notation this probability will be denoted by Pn(B) or by Pn. The wage w is
integrated out because for non-working individuals we have no observations on the wage
rate. We shall denote the probability of working 1- Pn(B) by Pn(B) or simply by Pn.
We assume that our sample is ordered in such a way that the observations 1 to N~ refer
to non-working individuals and the observations Nl -~ 1 to N are working individuals.
We now formulate the log-likelihood function of the model.
L(Bl ~n, iln, wn, hn, n- 1, ..., N) -
N1 N
~ ln Pn(9) f~ ln 9`(hnr wn ~~n, l~n, B) (2.9)
n-1 n-Ni}1
This is differentiated with respect to B to derive the first order conditions for a maximum
aL(B) N~ a ln Pn(e) N a in g~(hn, wnl~n, ~n, e)




where BM~ is the maximum likelihood estimator of B.
Alternatively, we can rewrite the derivative of the log-likelihood function as
aL(B) - alnPn(B) aing'(hn,wn~xn,pn,B) j
aB -~[dn aB f (1 -
dn) ae J (2.12)
where dn is the dummy variable introduced above.
Let Bo be the true parameter value. It is easy to show that if the supports of hn and wn
do not depend on 8,
E (aL(Bo)~ - 0
l ae (2.13)
which is the result of the fact that the expectation of the derivative of the log-density
function with respect to B at the true parameter value equals zero. In fact, the first order
derivative of the log-likelihood function divided by the sample size can be looked upon
as a moment estimator of
E~aln 9(h, w~~, F~, a)~ (2.14)ae
evaluated at the parameter value 9.
A procedure which is often followed in estimating this type of model is a two-step
procedure. First, the wage equation is estimated using data on working individuals.
The resulting estimates of the parameter vector p and the characteristics x of the non-
working individuals are used to construct a proxy for the wage variables of the non-
working individuals. Second, this constructed data-set is used to estimate the labour
supply function, using Tobit-like methods. This method will in general yield inconsistent
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estimates, particularly for non-linear labour-supply functions. A correct procedure would
be to estimate the model simultaneously. A drawback of simultaneous estimation of the
model is the difficulty in calculating the response probabilities analytically whenever
the model is non-linear, whereas numerical approximation can be expensive and time-
consuming. Our purpose is to develop estimation methods for models of the type (1.1)-
(1.2) that allow for simultaneous estimation also if the function h is quite complicated (as
for instance in the case, where h represents the outcome of utility maximization under a
non-linear and non-convex budget constraint). To this end we make use of simulators for
the response probabilities like the ones proposed by McFadden (1989). However, unlike
the method used in his paper, we shall not restrict ourselves to the discrete response
model. We will employ a discrete-continuous type of estimation method. The property
(2.13) will be used to develop a method of simulated moments type of estimation. We
want to replace the response probabilities in (2.12) by simulators and we want to do that
in such a way that property (2.13) carries over to the simulated score vector. Then an
estimator can be found by minimizing the length of the simulated score vector.
2.3 Estimation
Three ways of simulating the score of the log-likelihood function are considered. The
first method replaces the discrete part of the score by an expression with an instrument
matrix and a simulator for the response probability of non-working individuals. The
disadvantage of this method is that the consistency of the estimator will depend on the
choice of the matrix of instruments. This is due to the fact that the expectation of the
simulated score, evaluated at the true parameter value Bo, does not equal zero, unless a
specific form for the matrix of instruments is chosen, which makes use of a consistent
estimator for Bo. So, in order to get a consistent estimator, we need a consistent estimator
obtained from a different estimation procedure. Therefore, the first method is only useful
to increase efficiency of the first round estimator obtained by one of the next two methods.
The second method of estimation also uses a matrix of instruments. The estimator will be
consistent, irrespective of the choice of the instruments. To simulate the score, simulators
of the response probabilities and their derivatives are needed for each individual, both
non-working and working. A second estimation round can be performed to increase
the efficiency of the estimators, using an updated version of the matrix of instruments.
This method directly extends Mc Fadden's (1989) estimation method for the discrete
response model, by adding a continuous component to his objective function. The third
method does not rely on a matrix of instruments. Only simulators of the derivatives of
the response probabilities are required.
2.3.1 Method 1
We rewrite the first order derivative of the log-likelihood function in the following
way.
áL(9) 81n g Y(hne wnl~ne ~nr B)
áB - ~ [dnZn(1
- P„) f (1 - dn) ae (2.15)
n-1
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~
where Z„ :- ae (2.16)
Pn(1 - Pn)
Now the vector Zn is replaced by an arbitrary vector of instruments Zn, which does not
depend on B. The resulting expression is
a~BB) - n~ LdnZn(1 - Pn) ~(1 - dn)óln9rt(hn~~~ ~~n~Fln~e)1 (2.17)
where the superscript 1 refers to the number of the method. Calculating thJe expectation




- ~ ~PnZn(1 - Pn) f~n~ (2.18)
(with Pn - 1- Pn) which in general doesn't equal zero. However, if we construct Zn in
such a way that
aP„
plirra(Zn) - ae at Bo (2.19)P„(1 - Pn)
we see that at the true parameter value Bo the simulated score has asymptotic mean
equal to zero.
The response probability Pn(B) in expression (2.17) is replaced by a frequency sim-
ulator or by a so called smooth unbiased simulator kn(B, vR) where vR is a vector of R
drawings from some distribution which does not depend on B. The simulator is unbiased
if it has the property
E(kn(BovR)) - Pn(B) (2.20)
A smooth unbiased simulator can be constructed in the same way as in Monte Carlo
importance sampling, see e.g. Hammersley and Handscomb (1964). Take a density
function y(h, w) with support coinciding with the bounds of the integrals in expression
(2.8) for P,,. The response probability can be rewritten as:
Pn(B) - f~ f o T(h, w~xn, pn, e)7(h, w)dhdw (2.21)
o ~
with
T(h, w~xn, Í~n, e) -
9~(h,,),(h~,~) n, B) (2.22)
,
For every n, R random vectors (h~,,n), w~T,n)) are drawn from the density function y(h, w),
independently across observations and not depending on the parameter vector B. By
averaging over the drawings a simulator is obtained:
R
kn(e, vR) - R~ T(htT,n) ~ w(T,n) ~~n, f~n, e) (2.23)
r-i
where vR consists of the drawings (h~,.,,,), w~r,,,)). The function r(., .~., ., .) is the so called
weight functíon which corrects for the fact that we are drawing random numbers from
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the distribution with density function ry(., .) instead of the true distribution with density
function g'(., .~., ., .). If ry(., .) and g'(., .~., . , .) coincide the weight function is identically
equal to 1. In our application, described in the next section, we will actually use a
slightly different way of simulating the response probabilities by exploiting the normality
assumptions and the assumed linearity of the log-wage equation. Therefore, we don't
have to choose a density function ry(h, w). However, in more complica.ted applications,
as in chapter 3, weight functions are necessary.
As indicated by McFadden (1989), a simulator for the derivatives of Pn can be con-
structed in a similar way. An unbiased simulator m(B, vR) of the derivatives of Pn is
T12n(B,vR) -
1 ~ aT(h~r,n)iw(r,n)~~nii~nee)
(2.24)- R r-1 ae
For the simulation of ( 2.17) we only need kn. The simulated score is:
KR(B) -~ LdnZn(1 - kn(B,vR)) f(1 -dn)aing'(hn,~e ~~n,l~n,e)1 (2.25)n-1 J






where the matrix of instruments has to be based on the following formula, evaluated in
the true parameter point (or at least at a consistent estimate of it):
mn(B~vRZ) ( )zn - kn(a,vRz)(i - kn(e,vRz))
2.28
where mn(B, vRZ ) is an unbiased simulator of the derivatives of Pn(B), and vRZ are drawn
independently of the vR which are used in minimizing sN(9). The number of drawings to
simulate the vector of instruments is denoted by RZ to indicate that it is not necessarily
equal to R, the number of drawings used to construct kn(B, vR) in (2.25). The reason
for ptesenting this method of estimation is that the asymptotic variance of this method
is lower than the aymptotic variance of the methods presented in the next two subsec-
tions, which will be explained in section 2.3.4. Therefote, a two-step procedure could
be followed: First, obtain a consistent estimate by applying one of the other estimation
methods and second, use the estimates to construct the vector of instruments in (2.28)
and apply method 1 to increase the efficiency of the estimates.
We are interested in the error we make by replacing the score vector by a simulator.
Therefore, the simulated score in (2.25) is rewritten as the sum of the true score in (2.15)
and a simulation residual. aL




RESI - ~ dn7.n(Pn - kn) -~ ~ dn(Zn - Zn)(1 - kn) (2.30)
n-1 n-1
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For ease of notation the arguments are omitted. The first term of (2.30) can be rewritten
as
1 N R
R ~ ~ dnZn(Pn - knr)
n-7r-1
(2.31)
where knr is the r-th term of k,,. By increasing the number of drawings R this term will
tend to zero. In the second term, the vector Zn appears which is a non-linear function of
the simulators. Because the two factors in this term are independent by construction, we
concentrate on Z„ - Z,,. If Z„ is constructed in a proper way, i.e. by using a consistent
estimate for B, then
plimRZy~(Zn - Z„) - 0 (2.32)
so, by taking the number of drawings to construct the vector of instruments large enough
the second term can also be made arbitrarily small. The variance of the simulation
residual determines the loss of efficiency caused by using the simulated score instead
of the true score vector. In the next subsection we discuss how the variance of the
simulation residual can be influenced by the number of drawings R.
Since the derivation of the asymptotic distribution is equivalent for the three estima-
tors we will treat the asymptotic properties of the estimators at the end of this section.
2.3.2 Method 2
In order to obtain the second method of estimation we rewrite the score of the
log-likelihood function as
óL á in g" (h n, 1Un ~x,,, ~e,,, B) 81n Pn
aB - ~ {Z„(dn
- Pn) ~ (1 - d„) [
ae - ae ] }
(2.33)
with Z„ defined as above. The first component of this expression equals the score of the
log-likelihood of the binary response model. If we replace the vector Zn by an arbitary
vector of instruments Zn, independent of B, the expectation of the resulting expression,
conditional on Zn, equals zero at the true parameter value Bo.
To simulate P„(B) we use the simulator k„(B, vR) defined above. The problem is how
to simulate aáé". To see why this is a problem we rewrite this expression as
a ln Pn 1 ÓPn
(2.34)
8B - P„ 8B
It is not difficult to construct unbiased simulators of P„ and ~, as we have shown
before. However, if we use their simulators k„(B, vR) and rrc„(9,vR) to simulate aáé ~
we don't get un unbiased simulator.
m,,,(6, vR) ó ln Pn
E ` kn(B,vR) ~ 8B
(2.35)
So, the expectation of the simulated score evaluated at Bo won't equal zero. It is not
clear how to get an unbiased simulator of aáé . In order to solve this problem, we will
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simulate (1 - dn) a áé~ instead of a áé ~
E I(1 - dn) a ae n, - aBn
(2.36)
We now replace (1 - dn)a áé" byL B. As a result, the original score vector is replaced
by
aI. aln9`(hniwn~~niílnie) aPn
áe - ~ ~zn(dn - Pn) ~ (1- dn) ae - áe ~ (2.37)
Inserting the simulators for the response probabilities and their derivatives in this ex-
pression gives the simulated score:
~Ǹ a1n9~1~niwnl~ni~n~e)
KR(B) - L ~Zn(dn - ~n(ei vR)) ~ (1 - dn) ae - ~n(Bi 17R)
n-1
(2.38)
The estimation procedure becomes: Choose instrument vectors Zn and minimize the
length of the simulated score.
min IfR(B)'ICR(9)e
(2.39)
We can increase the efl'iciency of the estimator by rerunning the procedure using the
updated vectors of instruments, as described in the preceding subsection.
Again we are interested in the simulation residual. First, ( 2.33) with Zn replaced by
Zn is compared with (2.38). Then the following residual is obtained:
R ~ ~ ~Zn(Pn - ~nr) - 1 ~nr - ( 1 - dn) a ao n ~~
(2.40)
n-1 r-1 L l
This is the simulation residual corresponding to the comparison of the moments estimator
(Zn replaced by Zn) with the simulated moments estimator. The dummy variable can
be rewritten as
dn - Pn -{- vn (2.41)
with E(vn) - 0
and Var(vn) - Pn(1 - Pn)
Inserting this in the residual gives:
1 N R aPn N a ln Pn
R ~` ~ [Zn(Pn - kn') - {mnr - aB }] - ~ vn ae (2.42)n-1r-1 n-1
The variance of the first term of ( 2.42) can be reduced by increasing the number of
drawings R. Suppose that Var[Zn(Pn - knr) -{ircnr - B }~ - ~n, conditional on the
instruments Zn. This variance does not depend on r because the drawings are i.i.d.
Then the variance of the first term is R~n 1 ~n. With fixed N, increasing R to infinity
results in reducing this variance to zero. The second term is the error which is caused
by the fact that ( 1 - dn)a áé is simulated by a simulator for aB . The expectation of
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this term equals zero, whereas the variance equals ~n1 P„Pnaáé a aB~ . This term of
the simulation residual cannot be influenced by the number of drawings. Therefore, this
term leads to inefficiency, also for large R.
To compare the efficiency of the method of simulated moments estimator to the
maximum likelihood estimator, also the term involving the difference between Zn and
Zn has to be taken into account. The simulation residual then becomes:
l á ln PnRESZ - R ~ ~ [Zn(Pn - knr) - {mnr - aBn ~J }~(Zn-Zn)(dn-kn)-~ ~n aBn-1r-1 n-1 n-1
(2.43)
Here the same observations can be made as for method 1.
2.3.3 Method 3
As opposed to the first two methods of estimation, we don't rewrite the score of the
log-likelihood function in a form involving instrument vectors Zn. Instead, we immedi-
ately replace the discrete part of the score by a simulator. In analogy with the preceding
method, we replace dna~P~ b ~. This ields the ex ressionae y ae y p
C7B3 - n-' [ an}(1
- dn)a9x(hn~
~~~n~l~n~ e)~ (2.44)
The derivative of the probability is replaced by its simulator mn(9, vR), which leads to
the following expression for the simulated score:
KR(B) - ~ [mn(B,vn) f ( 1 -dn)a9~(hn,
~~~n,l~nee)1 (2.45)
n-] J
The estimation procedure becomes
min KR(B)~K3(B) (2.46)
We compare this method of simulating the score with the method described in the
preceding subsection. Because Pn - 1- Pn, we find that
8Pn aPn
(2.47)áe - -áe
The same relation holds for their simulators:
mn(e, vR) - -17Ln(B, vR)
Inserting this in the simulated score, we obtain
(2.48)
KR - ~ (1- d )a9'(h niwn lxn,I~nie) - yit (B v`R) (2.49)
[ n ~B n ~ ,R-1
This is exactly the second component of the simulated score of inethod 2. Obviously, by
replacing the derivative of the log-response probability by a simulator for the derivative
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of the response probability, some information is lost and aae3 and the second component
of a82 become indistinguishable. Method 2 has the intuitively appealing property that
it includes the minimization of the distance between the binary response indicator dn
and its theoretical expectation Pn. The simulation residual for method 3 can be found
in the same way as for method 2 and is given by
1 N R óPn N óIn Pn
RES3 - R ~ ~ [mnr - 88 ] - ~ vn áB
(2.50)
n-1r-1 n-1
The residual contains the same error which is not influenced by the number of drawings
R as method 2.
2.3.4 Asymptotic distribution of the estimators
In the preceding subsections we presented three ways to simulate the first order
derivatives of the log-likelihood function. The simulated score vectors of inethods 2 and
3 satisfy the property that their expectation, evaluated at the true parameter vector Bo,
equals zero, whereas the probability limit of the simulated score of inethod 1 equals zero
at the true parameter value 9o if the vectors of instruments are constructed in a proper
way. Therefore, the length of the expectation of the simulated score is minimized at
the true parameter value Bo. It is intuitively clear that if we minimize the length of the
simulated score, the resulting parameter vector BR at which minimization takes place,
will converge to the true parameter value Bo, or, equivalently, 9R will be a consistent
estima.tor of Bo.
We assume that
~Ká(Bo) ~Y N(~, Váo), i- 1, ..., 3 (2.51)
with VRO some positive definite symmetric matrix. Below, we explain that this assump-
tion can be justified on the basis of central limit arguments. Using this assumption and
the consistency of BR, apart from usual regularity assumptions on the parameter space
and the like, it is possible to show ( see, for example, Pakes and Pollard ( 1989)) that
~(9R - Bo) ~Y N(fi,(P'~I")-lI"~V~r'(I"~I")-1) (2.52)
1 a( a~~ Bo )where I"~ - plzrrcN
8B
(2.53)
We will now comment on the assumed normality of the simulated score. The expectation
of the simulated score, conditional on the instruments, equals zero at 9o for i- 2, 3. It
was shown that the simulated score could be written as the sum of the true score vector
and a simulation residual. It is well-known that under general conditions the distribution
of the true score vector divided by the square root of the sample size converges to a
normal distribution. The assumed independence across observations and the fact that the
simulators are constructed using independent random drawings can be used to apply the
Lindeberg-Feller central limit theorem to prove the normality of the simulation residuals
(conditional on the instruments) divided by the square root of the sample size. The
distribution of the simulated score then converges to the sum of two normal distributions
18 CHAPTER 2. NON-LINEAR LABOUR SUPPLY AND WAGE EQUATION
which is in turn a normal distribution. We can do the same for method 1, but not without
recalling that the instruments have to be constructed such that (2.19) is satisfied.
Using the expression of the asymptotic covariance matrix and the results of the analy-
sis of the simulation residuals in the preceding subsections it is possible to analyse the
efficiency of the estimators by comparing the asymptotic covariance matrices of the
simulation estimators with the asymptotic covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood
estimator. It is a well-known result that
v „ (BML - BO) ~y N(0~ ~ML) (2.54)





To clarify the relationship of the covariance matrix of the ML-estimator with the asymp-
totic covariance matrix of the simulation estimators we rewrite f21NL as
~ML - (rMLrML)-1rMLVMLrML(rMLrML)-1 (2.57)
where
a(aLBa 1
rML - plimN l aB 1--B (2.58)
which is the equivalent of (2.53), and
1 N 8Ln(Bo) aLn(eo)
VML - PIimN ~ í3B 8B' (2.59)n-1
Recall that V,yL - B. For method 1, if the instruments are constructed properly and if
the number of drawings to construct the instruments tend to infinity rl' and r1NL are
equivalent. Then the efficiency comparison reduces to comparing V,yL with VR for this
method. The difference between these matrices is given by the covariance matrix of the
simulation residuals. In section 2.3.1 it has been derived that this variance disappears
if R tends to infinity. Therefore, we can conclude that if the matrix of instruments
is constructed on the basis of (2.28) and if both the number of drawings to construct
this matrix and the number of drawings to simulate the response probabilities tend to
infinity, the covariance matrix of the method 1 estimator and the covariance matrix of the
maximum likelihood estimator are asymptotically equal. Of course, this result has only
theoretical meaning because the reason why we construct these simulation estimators is
to be able to keep the number of drawings fixed and small.
To examine the efiiciency of inethod 2 it has to be noted first that because of replace-
ment (2.36), the simulated score KR(6) does not tend to the true score if N is fixed and
R tends to infinity. Therefore, we first need to establish the relation between r1NL and
r2'. From (2.33) and (2.37) it is readily established that
r2' - rML -
i N aP az' a 81-" ~ i a~ aY-plimN ~n-i [(Zn - Zn) aé } áB (dn - Pn) ~ Un ae f~ aé aé, (2.60)
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from which only the first three terms equal zero if the instruments are constructed such
that (2.19) is satisfied, i.e. according to formula (2.28) with drawings tending to infinity.
From the analysis of the simulation residuals it becomes clear that if the matrix of
instruments is constructed according to (2.28) with drawings tending to infinity, and if
the response probabilities and their derivatives are simulated with R tending to infinity
as well, the asymptotic variance of the score of the likelihood function, evaluated in a
consistent estimator is exceeded by X, where
1 N ó1nPnVlnPn,x- prZr~ (N ~ PnPn ae ae~ ~ (2.s1)` n-t
which was derived in section 2.3.2. The same expression can be derived for method 3.
Finally, to estimate the covariance matrix we calculate
S2R - (I"~i")-tI"~VRi"(i"~i")-t (2.62)
with
1 a(a~. ÍBó) )
r' - N á-é~- (2.s3)
N
Vá - N ~ IfnR(eR)KnR(BR)~ (2.64)
where the index n indicates the n-th component of the simulated score. Expression (2.64)
can be calculated by simulation.
2.4 Monte Carlo and empirical application
We will now illustrate the properties of the various estimators by making specific
assumptions about the form of the labour supply function and the log-wage equation.
We then compare the estimation methods by using Monte Carlo methods and then by
estimating the specification for a sample of 849 married female individuals, drawn in
1985. We'll assume that the preferences of the individuals are described by a utility
function introduced by Hausman and Ruud (1984), which implies a labour supply func-
tion quadratic in the wage rate and linear in non-labour income. The wage equation
is assumed to be log-linear. The disturbances of the labour supply function and the
log-wage equation are assumed to be normally distributed.
The specific form of the labour supply function under the assumption of a linear
budget constraint becomes:
h(wn~ F~n, Q) -~a -f F~~~a -1- wnQa
with 1F~n - Qt -1- Ftn -F wnQs ~- 2wnia
(2.65)
(2.66)
Inserting the expression for ~;, in the labour supply function and reparameterizing gives:
h(wn, F~n, ~) -~1 f I~n~2 ~ TUn~3 ~ 2~wn~4 with (2.67)
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al - Y3 } Qll'2
az - Qz
~3 - F'21~3 } Q4
~4 - Q2N4
The log-wage equation becomes:
u
log wn - ~ 7~~2n~ ~ 7Ln
;-1
where
~ ~nl - 1 for all n,
~ ~nz -
log of number of persons in individual n's family,
~ ~na -
the number of children with age below 6 of individual n,
~ xn4 - log-age of individual n,
(2.68)
~ 2n5 t0 2n8
are dummy indicators for the level of educa,tion of individual n,
where xns is the lowest level of education (educl),
xns is the second lowest education level (educ2) etc.
For the highest education level, no dummy indicator is included
~ xn9 and xnlo
are indicators for the type of education received,
xn9 is a dummy indicator for non-technical and non-commercial types of education
(secl),
xnlo is a dummy indicator for semi-technical and semi-commercial types of educa-
tion (sec2).
For technical and commercial types of educa.tion no dummy indicator is included,
z
~ ~nll - ~n4
~ here wn is the after tax hourly wage rate; labour supply will be measured in hours
per week
Thus, the complete model reads
1 ( )
hn -~1 f~naz -~ wna3 f 2wnaq f En 2.69
ll
log wn - ~ rlixni f un (2.70)
j-1
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e„ and u„ are jointly normally distributed with
`unI NN"0~'E~
(2.71)
z~ - ~E ~euz
~EU ~u
(2.72)
h„ - h;, lf hn ~ 0 (2.73)
h„ - 0 if hn C 0 (2.74)
We now derive an expression for the response probabilities and their derivatives.
Under the normality assumptions the joint probability density function of h„ and wn is
9(hn,wnl~n,~n,e) -
Pn(B) if hn - 0
1 ~E ~-1 exp {-1 I hTM - h(wr~,1~~, ~) 1 ~-I ( hn -
h(wn, Fzn, a)





~ h~eXp (rl ~n -f- ouv), Izn, cr] f pQEv 1 1 zPn(B) - f ~ ~- ~ 2~ exp {-2v }dv (2.77)
00 ` Q~lu
with
~EU 2 2 2
P--,aE~,.-~E(1-P )
QcQu
and where ~(.) is the standard norma] distribution function.
We have written the double integral in a form with the well-known function ~(.) and
an integral over the standard normal variable v. As a result we only need to simulate
the second integral over v. Because the standard normal distribution function doesn't
depend on the parameters, we don't have to choose a weighting density function as
described for the general case in the preceding section. To simulate the probability Pn
we can simply draw from the standard normal distribution and compute the expression
under the integral sign.
We obtain the following expression for the smooth unbiased simulator of P,,.
kn(e, vit) -~~~ I-
h~eXp (~l ~n ~ Q„~ r), Í~n, a~ f P~Eynr ~
(2.78)
r-1 ` e~u
where the v;,, are independent random drawings from the standard normal distribution.
To simulate the derivative of Pn with respect to, say, B~ we first write
h[exp ( r~~x„}ouv),~s,,,a]} pocv~ a~ - v~
8B~ - J-~ aB~ lu 1
exp {-lvz}dv (2.79)
2~r 2
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where the derivative in the integrand can be calculated analytically. Then we simulate
ít by
1 R Ó~ ~-h1eXP~n y~fo~v,~..)~W,.~altPocv,~.r 1
~ ~ ` vs~u J~n7(eivR) - R ,.-, 8B; (2.80)
2.4.1 Monte Carlo results
To get an idea about the performance of the estimation methods we have performed
some Monte Carlo experiments. First of all, values for the parameters in (2.69), (2.70),
(2.71) and (2.72) were chosen. Next, disturbances e„ and u,,, n- 1,...,N, were generated,
under the assumptions (2.71), (2.72) with vE„ - 0. The characteristics x,,; from the
sample were used to generate wages w,,, n- 1,...,N. Included are the constant term with
parameter ~~, log(age) with parameter ~2 and the square of log(age) with parameter ~3.
These wages were used to generate the h;,, n- 1,...,N. Making use of (2.73) and (2.74)
and the non-labour income series from the sample, we generated the "observations" h,,.
This generated data set was used to estimate the mode] with different methods of
estimation. First of all the model is estimated with maximum likelihood (ML) using
numerical integration. The Gauss-Hermite quadrature formula is used with a number
of abscissae equal to 16, see e.g. Stroud and Secrest (1966). The second method of
estimation is simulated maximum likelihood (SML) with a number of drawings R equal
to 10. Here the probabilities are simulated according to (2.78) and inserted in the
likelihood function directly. Although this method is inconsistent for a fixed and small
number of drawings, it would still be useful if the asymptotic bias were small. Finally,
the model is estimated using the three MSS estimators, abbreviated as MSS1, MSS2 and
MS53 below. Two different numbers of drawings to simulate the response probabilities
are used, i.e. R- 1 and R- 10. The matrix of instruments is constructed on the basis
of formula (2.27) evaluated in the true parameter point, where the number of drawings
to simulate the instruments is RZ - 10 for both MSS1 and MSS2. For MSS1 the model
is also estimated with RZ - 500 and R- 1.
Table 2.1 presents the results of the Monte Carlo study. The Monte Carlo proce-
dure was repeated 20 times, so that the numbers in the tables refer to means over 20
replications. This modest number of replications has been chosen in view of the rather
heavy computational burden of non-linear optimization problems in general. For each
parameter the first line presents the mean of the estimates as given by:
zo
Bi - 20 ~ei, .7 - 1,...,N (2.81)
~-i
N is the number of parameters, whereas the subscript j stands for the j-th component
of the parameter vector. The second line gives the sample standard deviation of the
estimates:
20
SD; - 1 ~(9~ - B;)2, j- 1, ..., N (2.82)20 - 1 ~-~
The third line presents the relative error:
rel. err. - 10001o x ~B; - Bo;~~~Bo;I (2.83)
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From the table it can be seen that the ML estimator in general performs best in the
sense that it has the lowest standard errors and the lowest relative errors. It is clear
that SML with R- 10 performs very badly. Its performance is even worse than all
of the three MSS variants with R- 1. Therefore, the use of MSS instead of SML is
not just something that only has theoretical relevance. By comparing different numbers
of drawings of the same MSS estimator it can be seen that the standard deviations
decrease with the increase in number of drawings, which is consistent with the analysis
of the simulation residuals in section 2.3.1. For MSS1 the number of drawings RZ to
simulate the matrix of instruments has been increased from 10 to 500. Recall that for
this method the construction of the matrix of instruments not only affects the efficiency
of the estimator but also its consistency. MSS1 with R- 1 and RZ - 500 outperforms
MSS1 with R- 10 and RZ - 10. The standard deviations are comparable with those
of MSS2 with R- 1 and RZ - 10, but they are not lower than the MSS2 standard
deviations, which questions the use of MSS1. Comparing MSS2 with MSS3 it can be
said that for R- 1 method 2 has the lower standard deviations and the higher relative
errors, whereas for R- 10 the differences are rather small, although MSS3 seems to
perform slightly better, which may be due to the fact that in MSS2 theoretically an
additional inefficiency is introduced by simulating the matrix of instruments with only
RZ - 10 drawings.
One may question the practical relevance of the experiments so far with respect to
MSS1 and MSS2, since the instruments were computed at the true parameter point
which of course is unknown in practice. To see how this affects results, Table 2.2 presents
results for MSS1 and MSS2 with instruments based on estimates obtained with MSS3.
Moreover, Table 2.2 also presents the mean standard error of the estimates over the
twenty replications so that a comparison with the sample standard deviations is possible.
Comparing the table with the corresponding columns in Table 2.1, one observes that
MSS1 is a bit more sensitive to the choice of instruments than MSS2, as one would
expect. Actually, MSS2 is hardly affected at all by the new instruments. Although
M5S 1 does give somewhat different estimates now, they are not systematically worse than
before, sometimes the relative error is better, and sometimes it is worse. It remains true
that the small value for RZ induces inefficiency. Finally, we observe that the estimated
standard errors tend to be of a similar magnitude as the standard deviations, though
with some exceptions. The standard errors tend to be a little higher than the standard
deviations; hence, one could take standard errors as a somewhat conservative estimate
of the inaccuracy of the estimates.
We conclude that for SML the limited number of drawings of 10 is clearly not suf-
ficient for a reasonable performance of the estimator. All of the three M55 estimators
perform acceptably even with only one drawing, although it is clear that efficiency can
be improved by taking more than one drawing.
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TABLE 2.1 MONTE CARLO RESULTS
parameter 9o ML SML MSS1
R-10 R-1,RZ-10
a~ -8.686 -8.961 -5.996 -19.122
SD 0.586 15.689 12.004
rel. err. (oJ'o) 3.166 31.0 120.1
aZ -0.0482 -0.0483 -0.414 -0.0503
SD 0.0146 0.653 0.0126
rel. err. (oI'o) 0.265 760.4 4.443
CY3 3.137 3.098 -2.258 4.090
SD 0.0784 10.249 1.118
rel. err. (~o) 1.259 172.0 30.4
a4 -0.163 -0.156 -0.109 -0.210
SD 0.00850 0.0598 0.0587
rel. err. (oI'o) 4.518 33.2 29.0
v? 346.921 346.923 254.785 601.509
SD 0.0233 255.331 581.318
rel. err. (o!o) 0.00552 26.6 73.4
vu 1.080 1.175 0.448 1.966
SD 0.123 0.572 2.311
rel. err. (oIo) 8.809 58.6 82.0
~~ -11.801 -11.860 158.243 -8.983
SD 0.0597 202.316 5.900
rel. err. (oI'o) 0.501 1440.1 23.9
r~2 8.644 8.560 5.600 7.124
SD 0.118 6.436 3.284
rel. err. (oI'o) 0.972 35.2 17.6
r~3 -1.199 -1.189 -3.801 -0.978
SD 0.0383 7.795 0.453
rel. err. (~o) 0.844 217.0 18.4
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TABLE 2.1 MONTE CARLO RESULTS (continued)
parameter MSS1 MSS1 MSS2 MSS2
R-10,RZ-10 R-1,RZ-500 R-1,RZ-10 R-10,RZ-10
~1 -22.589 -10.765 -2.517 -6.705
SD 11.920 6.556 6.880 3.407
rel. err. (oIo) 160.1 23.9 71.0 22.8
~z -0.0436 -0.0490 -0.0493 -0.0503
S D 0.0185 0.0136 0.0110 0.0116
rel. err. (oÍo) 9.451 1.752 2.405 4.388
CYg 4.535 3.353 2.624 2.921
SD 1.220 0.685 0.528 0.303
rel. err. (PIo) 44.6 6.890 16.4 6.890
~4 -0.221 -0.173 -0.147 -0.156
SD 0.0548 0.0300 0.0194 0.0139
rel. err. (~o) 35.6 5.976 9.913 4.340
v? 366.357 349.480 347.272 347.013
SD 63.981 8.146 0.469 0.163
rel. err. (~o) 5.602 0.736 0.101 0.0266
Qu 7.586 2.809 0.995 1.004
SD 16.004 6.503 0.0869 0.0686
rel. err. (~o) 602.4 160.1 7.896 7.066
r~l -8.430 -8.694 -12.602 -12.022
SD 3.342 5.512 5.382 0.630
rel. err. (qo) 28.6 26.3 6.783 1.871
r~2 7.299 7.100 9.215 8.859
SD 1.683 2.963 2.970 0.389
rel. err. (~o) 15.6 17.9 6.609 2.482
~3 -1.003 -0.990 -1.291 -1.243
SD 0.227 0.423 0.411 0.0689
rel. err. (~o) 16.4 17.4 7.707 3.658
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rel. err. (oJ'o) 35.7 0.00420
a2 -0.0445 -0.0506
SD 0.0193 0.0141
rel. err. (oI'o) 7.609 5.125
a3 3.305 3.091
SD 0.641 0.178
rel. err. (oI'o) 5.355 1.460
a4 -0.168 -0.161
SD 0.0230 0.0100
rel. err. (~o) 3.233 0.982
Q? 342.439 346.921
SD 19.954 0.000762
rel. err. (alo) 1.292 0.0475 x 10-3
Qu 1.116 1.065
SD 0.155 0.0994
rel. err. (oI'o) 3.332 1.427
~1 -12.031 -11.775
SD 7.450 0.0955
rel. err. (oI'o) 1.946 0.225
r~z 8.651 8.696
SD 4.092 0.167
rel. err. (qo) 0.0850 0.599
~3 -1.185 -1.216
SD 0.565 0.0544
rel. err. (qo) 1.127 1.418
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Est. SE. 14.623 9.369
rel. err. (010) 121.8 29.242
a2 -0.0560 -0.0508
SD 0.0177 0.0121
Est. SE. 0.0106 0.00989
rel. err. (~o) 16.208 5.560
a3 4.068 2.902
SD 1.073 0.366
Est. SE. 1.318 0.607
rel. err. (~o) 29.678 7.490
a4 -0.211 -0.156
SD 0.0528 0.0154
Est. SE. 0.0674 0.0231
rel. err. (~o) 29.155 4.575
~É 647.011 347.050
SD 460.838 0.210
Est. SE. 493.617 103.994
rel. err. (~o) 86.501 0.371 x 10-3
vu 5.095 1.0001
SD 12.633 0.0756
Est. SE. 2.673 0.0696
rel. err. (oI'o) 371.8 7.335
r~l -11.286 -11.650
SD 12.470 10.542
Est. SE. 14.975 11.945
rel. err. (qo) 4.371 0.152
~2 8.814 8.647
SD 7.301 4.928
Est. SE. 8.539 6.734
rel. err. (070) 1.970 0.299 x 10-3
r~3 -1.224 -1.212
S D 1.020 0.843
Est. SE. 1.191 0.951
rel. err. (qo) 2.119 1.098
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2.4.2 Estimation results
We now present the estimates of the model for the real data. The model has been
estimated using the three methods described in section 2.3 and by ML. For each method,
the model was estimated under the assumption Qf„ - 0 with two different numbers of
drawings; R- 5 and R- 10. The restriction vE„ - 0 is relaxed below. The instrument
matrices are constructed using RZ - 10 drawings.
In table 2.3 the ML estimates are given. The estimates have the expected sign. The
maximum number of hours worked occurs at a wage rate of about 11 guilders per hour;
the wage rate reaches its maximum at the age of 35 years.
In table 2.4 the estimates by method 1, using R- 5 drawings from the standard
normal distribution, and their asymptotic standard errors are presented. To circumvent
problems with consistency, we used the estimates of inethod 3(see table 2.9) to construct
the matrix of instruments. Most of the parameter estimates have the expected sign. Non-
labour income has a negative impact on labour supply. The estimate of the linear wage
parameter is positive and the estimate of the squared wage parameter is negative. We
can calculate that the number of hours worked reaches its maximum at a wage rate of Dfl.
13.5 per hour. Log-family size influences the log-wage rate negatively. The education
dummies have the expected negative sign. Moreover, the higher the level of education,
the less negative is the parameter estimate of the corresponding education dummy. From
the parameter estimates of log-age and its square we can calculate that the wage rate
reaches it maximum at the age of 38.
The estimates in table 2.5 are also obtained by applying method 1, but now we have
used R- 10 drawings to construct the simulators. Again, most of the estimates have
the expected sign. The maximum of the number of hours worked with respect to the
wage rate is reached at w- 13.4. The log-wage rate reaches its maximum with respect
to age at 38 years. The estimates don't differ much from the ones in table 2.4, but the
standard errors are somewhat lower.
In table 2.6 we present the estimates obtained by method 2. The matrix of instruments
is constructed using the estimates in table 2.9. Apart from the other parameter estimates,
now also the parameter estimate of ~3 (number of children below the age of 6) has the
expected sign. The wage is maximal at the age of 37 and the number of hours supplied
is maximal at a wage rate of 54.7.
Table 2.7 shows the method 2 estimates when R- 10 drawings are used. Again, the
matrix of instruments is constructed using the estimates in table 2.9. The wage equation
is maximal at the age of 37, whereas labour supply is maximal at a wage rate of 32.9.
The main difference between the method 1 estimates and the method 2 estimates are
the parameter estimates of the labour supply function.
Finally, we look at the estimates obtained by method 3. In table 2.8 the results with
R- 5 drawings are presented. We can make the same remarks about the signs of the
estimates as in the previous ca.ses. Wage is maximal at the age of 38 and hours supplied
are maximal at the wage rate of 9.4. To obtain the results in table 2.9, we used R- 10
drawings to construct the simulators. Most of the standard errors of the estimates are
lower than in table 2.8, and whenever they aren't lower, they are only slightly higher.
In table 2.10 we present the estimation results with R- 50 drawings. Comparing
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tables 2.4 and 2.8, we see that there is not much difference between the results with R
- 10 and R- 50 drawings. Apparently R- 10 drawings are in this case sufficient to
minimize the effect of the simulation residuals.
Comparing the three methods, we can say that method 1 is the cheapest in C.P.U.-
time because it doesn't make use of simulators of the derivatives. Also, it appears to
produce the smallest standard errors. However, it only makes sense to use this method
when a consistent estimate is available to construct the matrix of instruments. Method
2 is the most expensive in C.P.U.-time.
Table 2.11 gives the results of estimating the model without the restriction of zero
correlation between the disturbances by method 3, using 10 drawings to simulate the
response probabilities. The estimates of the disturbances' variances and the covariance
imply a correlation coefficient of p- 0.082 which is not significantly different from zero.
A comparison of tables 2.11 and 2.9 reveals no big shifts in the parameter estimates.
To get some more feeling for the differences in estimates across methods, we present
elasticities of hours worked and of participation with respect to wages. These have been
calculated as "aggregate" elasticities in the sense that all wages in the sample have been
raised by 5~o and then hours and participation probabilities have been predicted for
every individual in the sample. The observed changes in the sample averages of these
quantities are used to compute the elasticities. The results are given in table 2.12.
Strikingly, ML gives elasticities that are much larger than those implied by the other
methods. Method 1 is most similar to ML in this respect. It is hard to interpret these
differences. In principle they would call for specification tests. Given the simplistic
nature of the model and the illustrative purposes of the estimation we abstain from a
specification search.'
As a final comparison of estimation methods, we present in table 2.13 the likelihood
values corresponding to the estimates obtained by the various methods. We now see that
MSS2 is closest to ML and M5S3 has the lowest likelihood value.
~ Presumably the most important problem with the present model is that it assumes that anyone
who wants to work can do so (if h' 1 0, one works a positive amount of hours). This assumption is far
too strong; see for instance Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987) or Kapteyn and Woittiez (1989).
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TABLE 2.3 MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES
parameter Bl standard error
al (const.) -86.696 10.860
az (non-labour income) -5.605 10-2 0.00936
a3 (wage) 12.1126 1.312
~4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.574 0.0625
v? 558.052 96.753
~u 0.135 0.0164
~71 (const.) -14.959 3.733
~2 (log(fs)) -0.387 0.0766
~a (~ child. C 6) -8.765 lo-Z 0.0206
r~4 log(age) 10.322 2.110
r~5 (educl) -0.767 0.119
r~s (educ2) -0.771 0.117
~7 (educ3) -0.625 0.115
r~e (educ4) -0.317 0.112
~7s (secl ) 0.266 0.410
Tllo (sec2) 5.61110-2 0.0511
rlll (square oflog(age)) -1.452 0.295
TABLE 2.4 ESTIMATES BY METHOD 1
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 5
parameter Bl standard error
al (const.) -22.595 9.43
az (non-labour income) -6.194 10-Z 0.02
a3 (wage) 3.158 1.12
cr4 (0.5x square of wage) -0.117 0.05
v2 309.942 17.53
o,~, 6.81910-Z 0.01
~1 (const.) -11.855 2.43
~z (log(fs)) -0.118 o.os
~73 (~ child. C 6) 1.353 10-2 0.03
r~4 log(age) 8.198 1.39
~5 (educl) -0.522 0.10
~s (educ2) -0.454 0.10
~7 (educ3) -0.395 0.10
~a (educ4) -0.156 0.10
r~o (secl) 0.163 0.04
~lo (sec2) 6.796 10-2 0.04
rlll (square oflog(age)) -1.128 0.02
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TABLE 2.4 ESTIMATES BY METHOD 1
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 10


















(non-labour income) -6.209 10-z 0.02
(wage) 3.162 1.08













(square of log(age)) -1.129 0.02
TABLE 2.6 ESTIMATES BY METFIOD 2
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 5


















(non-labour income) -4.815 10-z 0.01
(wage) 0.989 2.45













(square of log(age)) -1.177 0.23
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TABLE 2.7 ESTIMATES BY METHOD 2
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 10
parameter Bz standard error
al (const.) -8.686 19.59
az (non-labour income) -4.817 10-z 0.01
a3 (wage) 1.098 2.71
a4 (0.5x square of wage) -1.667 10-z 0.14
v? 346.921 23.92
Qu 7.92410-z 0.02
r~l (const.) -12.441 2.84
r~z (log(fs)) -0.202 0.01
~3 (~ child. C 6) -4.507 10-z 0.05
~4 log(age) 8.644 1.67
~5 (educl) -0.580 0.12
~s (educ2) -0.541 0.14
r17 (educ3) -0.437 0.11
~e (educ4) -0.189 0.11
p9 (secl) 0.188 0.06
rllo (sec2) 6.29910-z 0.04
rlll (square of log(age)) -1.199 0.24
TABLE 2.8 ESTIMATES BY METHOD 3
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 5




















(non-labour income) -6.680 10-z 0.01
(wage) 3.423 3.03













(square oflog(age)) -1.084 0.02

















TABLE 2.9 ESTIMATES BY METHOD 3
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 10
parameter B3 standard error
(const.) -7.717 13.55
(non-labour income) -6.593 10-z 0.01
(wage) 3.137 2.35





(~ child. C 6) 4.146 10-z 0.03
log(age) 7.895 1.57






(square of log(age)) -1.084 0.02
TABLE 2.10 ESTIMATES BY METHOD 3
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 50
parameter B3 standard error
cYl (const.) -7.716 13.69
~z (non-labour income) -6.598 10-z 0.01
cr3 (wage) 3.149 2.39
cr4 (0.5x square of wage) -0.164 0.01
Q? 308.748 130.46
~u 6.93210-z 0.01
~1 (const.) -11.369 2.76
~z (log(fs)) -o.lll 0.08
r~3 (~ child. C 6) 4.324 10-z 0.04
~q log(age) 7.894 1.59
~5 (educl) -0.517 0.11
t~s (educ2) -0.437 0.11
r~7 (educ3) -0.386 0.10
~g (educ4) -0.147 0.11
~y (secl) 0.168 0.05
~IO (sec2) 7.263 10-z 0.04
r)11 (square of log(age)) -1.084 0.02
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TABLE 2.11 ESTIMATES BY METHOD 3
NUMBER OF DRAWINGS R- 10
CORRELATED DISTURBANCES




















(non-labour income) -6.592 10-Z 0.01
(wage) 3.298 1.84














(square oflog(age)) -1.111 0.22
TABLE 2.12 WAGE ELASTICITIES ACCORDING




The main purpose of this chapter has been to investigate the usefullness of MSS esti-
mators in mixed discrete-continuous models, with a focus on the kind of model typically
encountered in the analysis of labour supply. The experience in this chapter appears
to be that the estimators perform quite well. In the example considered, the MSS esti-
mators do a little worse than ML, but in more complex situations ML would simply be
infeasible. This is not only a matter of computing time, but also due to the fact that in
certain situations it is impossible to write down analytically the probability of certain
events, whereas the events can still be simulated. Estimation by simulation techniques
then turns out to be a useful tool in the analysis of labour supply models, in the sense
that these techniques enable us to estimate models which cannot, or only with great dif-
ficulty, be estimated with conventional methods like maximum likelihood or the method
of moments.
The simulated scores methods presented in this chapter perform satisfactory, even














has to be paid in the form of a loss in efficiency, but this loss is modest. This is in stark
contrast with the method of simulated maximum likelihood with a limited number of
drawings, which performs poorly.
The method of simulated scores will be more useful, the higher the dimension of
integration in the evaluation of response probabilities in the likelihood function is. In
this context one may think of models of family labour supply with various sources of
randomness. In this chapter we have only used smooth simulators. In more complex
models the use of frequency simulators cannot always be avoided. Their main drawback
is their discontinuity in the parameters as a result of which conventional gradient based
optimization procedures cannot be used. The downhill simplex method, employed in
chapter 3 for instance, is quite time consuming. This disadvantage, however, is mitigated
by the possibility to use a limited number of drawings in the method of simulated scores.
Chapter 3
The estimation of utility consistent
labour supply models by means of
simulated scores
3.1 Introduction
By now there is an enormous literature on the estimation of static models of individual
labour supply. Typically, a model will consist of two equations, a wage equation and a
labour supply equation. Especially since the work of Hausman (1979, 1980, 1985) the
labour supply equation is usually utility consistentl and often the underlying budget set
is piecewise linear and possibly non-convex. See e.g. Blomquist (1983), Mofl'it (1986)
and the papers in the special issue of the Jouraal of Human Resources, Summer 1990.
Despite the vast quantity of papers written on the topic, there are still various unsatis-
factory elements in the models estimated so far. These pertain to both the specification
and the estimation of the models. As to specification, one usually adheres to simple
forms of the labour supply function, whereas the stochastic specification is often more
governed by considerations of convenience than of plausibility. Estimation of simple
models is not much of a problem (e.g. of a type II Tobit model), but in somewhat
more complicated models often short cuts are being taken that strictly speaking impair
consistency of estimators. In section 3.2 these issues will be discussed in more detail.
There are good reasons for all of this. As we will illustrate in section 3.2, essentially
the canonical Hausman model with a flexible specification of preferences, a non-convex
budget set and a proper stochastic specification could not be estimated with methods
available until recently. Possibly the most glaring difficulty is that except in very simple
models it is impossible to write down the probability of participation. Since this prob-
ability plays a role in any estimation method one would like to apply, ranging from ML
to MM, all estimation methods applied in practice can be seen as approximations with
varying degrees of accuracy.z
~ By "utility consistent" we mean thtoughout this chapter that observed or predicted labour supply
can be rationalized as the result of the maximization of a well- behaved utility function; we call a utility
function well- behaved if it is strictly quasi-concave and increasing in consumption
Z[n this chapter we do not pay attention to more extensive models where the hours decision and
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R.ather closely related to the previous issues is the issue of coherency. 3 It turns out
that in models with kinked budget constraints coherency requires quasiconcavity of the
direct utility function at all kink points. Since these kink points will be different for dif-
ferent individuals in a sample, coherency requires quasiconcavity at many combinations
of hours and wages. See MaCurdy, Green, Paarsch (1990) or Van Soest, Kooreman, and
Kapteyn (1993). This in turn means that parameters and error distributions have to
be restricted in order to make sure that the model is utility consistent (i.e., the direct
utility function is strictly quasi-concave) at relevant kink points for each observation. 4
Except for simple models, the imposition of utility consistency is non-trivial. Failure to
do so, however, may lead to inconsistent estimators.
In this chapter we specify a utility consistent static model of individual labour supply,
with a flexible specification of preferences. The model is of the conventional two-equation
form, a wage equation and a labour supply equation. Three random errors are specified,
one additive random error in the wage equation representing unobserved heterogeneity,
one additive error in the labour supply equation representing optimization and reporting
errors and a non-additive error in the labour supply equation representing random pref-
erences. We impose utility consistency at all data points. The estimation method is a
variant of a method of simulated scores (MSS), developed in an earlier paper (Bloemen
and Kapteyn, 1993a), chapter 2 of this thesis. Thereby we avoid the impossible task of
writing down the probability of participation; instead we draw from the errors in the
model and simply determine whether utility is maximal while working or not working.
Since the model and estimation method are rather intricate, we first look at the proper-
ties of the estimation method by means of Monte Carlo. Next the model is estimated for
Dutch data on married females. In recent years substantial advances have been made
in the development of computationally efficient simulators. See e.g. the survey by Ha-
jivassiliou (1991). All these approaches exploit to some extent specific properties of the
model at hand, like linearity, normality, or smoothness. In the present context none of
these properties applies. Hence the estimation method will be rather brute force, using
frequency simulators and numerical approximations of derivatives whenever required.
The order of presentation is as follows: In the next section we set out the basic model
and discuss various approaches in the literature using the model as an illustration. In
section 3.3 the estimator is presented. In section 3.4 we give a detailed specification of
the model and the restrictions that have to be imposed to render the model coherent.
In section 3.5 we present details of the simulation methods needed to operationalize the
estimator. In section 3.6 we compare our estimator with a number of alternatives used
in the literature. We first do this for artificial data generated by means of Monte Carlo
and next for real data. Section 3.7 concludes.
participation decision are modelled separately, as in e.g. Blundell and Meghir (1987) or Blundell, Ham,
and Meghir (1987). Although at first sight this may seem to circumvent the problem mentioned, a fully
consistent treatment will still require the computation of the probability that desited hours are zero,
and that is precisely the problem we are dealing with.
3See e.g Gourieroux, Laffont, and Montfort (1980). A model is cohetent if endogenous variables are
uniquely determined by the exogenous variables and the errors.
4If one allows for measurement error, the construction of a likelihood requires that one integrates
over all possible values of the "true" number of hours, which includes all kink points.
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3.2 The economic model
Consider the following utility function, which is a special case of the utility function





- 2(c } B)1 ~ 2]
(3.2)
The variables h and c are hours worked and consumption respectively; Q, ry, ó, B are
parameters. Maximization of this utility function subject to a linear budget constraint
of the form c C wh f~ yields the following labour supply function:
h(w, l~) - ó f{~`Q ~- wry (3.3)
with
~` - B -}- ~ -~ ów ~ Zyw2 (3.4)
The cost function dual to the utility function is:
c(u, w, ~c) - u. exp(Qw) -{B f ów f 2rywz} (3.5)
We will assume throughout that ry~ 0. It is easy to see that concavity of the cost
function requires
W~ c 7~Q2, (3.6)
An equivalent condition in (c, h) space is that the indifference curves are convex. This
requires:
m` G ry~Q2 (3.7)
Notice that under this condition utility is increasing in consumption.
Using ( 3.2), (3.7) can be written as follows:
~ 1~ R2 L(h
- ó)2 - 2(c ~ B)~ ~ a
1 0 (3.8)
ry 7
Clearly this holds true whenever the utility function is defined. The condition for the
existence of the utility function can be written as:
(h ry ó)2 - 2(c f B) ~-~2 (3.9)
or,
~ ~ -e ~ ?' ~ ( h - ó)Z :- .f(h) (3.10)2Q2 27
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0 leisure h
Figure 3.1: The domain of U(h,c)
with f(h) implicitly defined. The function f(h) is a parabola with a minimum for h- b.
The value of the minimum is -B f ry~2Q2. Figure 3.1 sketches the domain of U(h, c):
Let us now turn to the description of behaviour under a nonlinear (actually piecewise
linear) and non-convex budget set. Figure 3.2 represents the familiar example of a
utility maximum attained at the point where an indifference curve is tangent to the
budget constraint.
As the budget set is not convex, but can be seen as the union of convex sets, an
algorithm for finding the utility maximum is to first find points of tangency or corner
solutions (kink points) for each convex set and then pick the point which yields the
maximum maximorum.
To complete the model we need an equation explaining the before tax wage of an
individual and the specification of the stochastic structure. Furthermore, we introduce
a subscript n to index the observations, n- 1, ..., N. The wage equation is specified as
follows:
J
log w„ - ~ r~ix„~ ~ u„ (3.11)
~-i
where u„ is an i.i.d. error term representing unobserved heterogeneity, x„J are observable
characteristics and r~~ are parameters. As to the labour supply equation, we introduce
preference variation by allowing B to vary across agents as follows:
Bn - BO ~ xnLJ ~{- vn (3.12)
where x„ is a vector of individual observable characteristics and v„ an unobservable error
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c
0
Figure 3.2: Utility maximization over a nonconvex budget set
leisure
term; w is a parameter vector.s For later purposes it is useful to define also
1
{ln - Bn ~~n ~ wnó' f 2wny (3.13)
For given values of wn and vn indivdual n's optimal number of hours, say hn is
determined as in Figure 3.2. In general this is a complicated function of the wage,
nonlabour income, individual characteristics and the random preference term. We write
this as
hn - hn(wn~ i4ni a~ ~nw } vn)i (3.14)
where a-(~i, y, 6, Bo)'. Notice for instance that the function hn(.) need not be con-
tinuous. We allow for the possibility of optimization or measurement errors by adding
an error term en:
hn - hn f E„ (3.15)
Let hn be observed labour supply, then we assume:
hn - hn if h;, ~ 0 and hn(wn, flnr a f ~nw ~ vn ) 1 0 (3.16)
hn - 0 if h;, C 0 or hn(wn, pn; a, x;,w 1- vn) C 0 (3.17)
SThere is no a priori reason to let preference vaziation enter through 8 only, any of the other parame-
ters of the utility function may be made dependent on obeervable and unobservable chatactetistics. For
simplicity of the exposition we stick to the present somewhat arbitrazy choice
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This formulation brings out the distinction between the random preferences v„ and the
optimization or measurement errors e,,. This type of stochastic specification is in line
with the work of Hausman (1981).
With this model at hand, we can discuss various problems in estimation and charac-
terize different approaches in the literature.
~ It is difficult to derive the density of wages and hours for working indivfduals if the
budget constraint is non-convex. The joint density of hours and (before tax) wages
can be written as the product of the conditional density of hours given wages and
the marginal density of wages. The latter is not difficult to write down, but the
former may be. As indicated above, if the budget constraint is non-convex it can
be written as the union of convex sets and the obvious thing to do is to first find the
utility maximum in each convex set and next compute the maximum maximorum.
With random preferences this means that we have to find the density of hours for
each convex subset and the probability that the maximum maximorum is in any
of the convex sets. Finding the density of hours for each convex set is tedious
but feasible (see section 3.5), but the probability that the utility maximum occurs
in any given convex subset is almost impossible to write down, as one can easily
imagine, by inspecting the formula for the direct utility function. This difficulty
will arise in all but the simplest utility specifications.
~ It is very hard to write down the probability of participation. To write down the
probability of participation, one has to characterize the values of e,,, u,,, v„ for which
individual n will be observed working. For non-working individuals the wage they
could earn while working is typically not known. The random variables un and
v„ cause the budget constraints and the indifference curves to move around in a
complicated way. Even for a given budget constraint (i.e. for someone who does
participate) it is difficult to find the values of v„ for which the utility of working
will exceed that of not working for the same reason as given above. Since the
budget constraint is the result of the interplay of the gross wage with possibly
quite complicated institutions, the resulting distribution of the budget constraint
will in general be intractable. Combined with the difficulty of writing down the
probability of working for a given budget constraint, this makes it impossible to
write down the probability of participation as an analytic function of exogenous
variables and parameters.
~ Incohererzcy. The problem of finding a utility maximum is generally well-defined if
indifference curves are convex. However, if a flexible specification is adopted for the
utility function, it will generally not be globally quasi-concave and hence there will
be combinations of the parameters and values of exogenous variables and errors
for which indifference curves are not convex or are not defined, cf. Fig. 3.1. As
shown by Van Soest, Kooreman, Kapteyn (1993), this means that the model is no
longer coherent. This in turn implies that estimation methods are not well-defined.
To have well-defined estimation, coherency has to be imposed. For instance, these
authors give an example where data are generated by a coherent model, but no
coherency is imposed in estimation. It is shown that in that case the "likelihood"
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does not attain its maximum at the true parameter point, but rather at a point
which violates coherency.
~ Time consuming numerical integration. Even if we are able to write down in
principle the probability of certain events or the density of wages and hours, they
are bound to be complicated expressions involving multi-dimensional integrals.
Since the model involves various non-linear transformations it is very unlikely that
analytical solution of the integrals is possible. Numerical integration tends to be
extremely time consuming.
To solve or evade these problems, various routes can be taken.
~ Choose simple functional forms. As said above, to write down the joint density
of (before tax) wages and hours for working individuals one needs the density of
hours conditional on the wage times the marginal density of the wage. The latter
is straightforward. The former can be simplified considerably by choosing a simple
specification, like e.g. the Hausman linear labour supply function. This function
arises from model (3.1)- (3.4) by letting ry approach zero. The utility function then
reduces to
U(h, c) - b~ h exp {-1 f Q~c ~~ )} (3.18)
~ Ignore random preferences. This can take two forms. One can ignore random
preferences altogether, so that the only source of random variation of hours given
wages is optimization or reporting errors (see e.g. Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986)).
Alternatively, sometimes a random error is appended to the (non-stochastic) utility
difierence between working and not working, as in Kapteyn, Kooreman and Van
Soest(1990). This latter term may also have the interpretation of random prefer-
ences. It is of course a bit hard to see why preferences would only be random in
utility comparisons and not in the hours choice. s
~ Ignore uraobserved heterogeneity in wages for non-participants. In this approach the
wage equation is estimated for working individuals and then used to predict before
tax wages for non-participants. The implied budget constraint is assumed to be
the true budget constraint, with neglect of unobserved heterogeneity. Notice that
for the estimation of the wage equation for working individuals some correction for
selectivity bias is required, which in turn requires the probability of participation.
Strictly speaking, one should use the full model to estimate this probability. Since,
as indicated, this is either very difficult or impossible, some approximation of this
probability is used at this stage.
~ Use working individuals only, with correction for selectivity. By only using working
individuals one does not really avoid the necessity of computing the probability of
participation, but one can approximate this probability as in the previous approach.
Often, if only working individuals are used in the analysis, the budget constraint is
sAn alternative interpretation may be that the random term in the utility comparison represents
optimization errors, which may be more naturalin certain contexts.
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linearized in the observed point. Of course the marginal wage used to linearize the
budget constraint is endogenous, but this may be solved by the use of instrumental
variables. In this approach, typically no steps are taken to guarantee coherency
of the model in all data points. For this reason. it is not quite clear whether the
estimation method is consistent or not.
3.3 Estimation
In this section one of the estimation methods described in chapter 2 is used. For ease
of notation we introduce the dummy variable dn with
dn-1 ifhn-0 (3.19)
dn-0ifhn~0 (3.20)
Furthermore we write Pn(t9), where 19 contains the parameters of cr, r~ and the param-
eters of the distribution functions of un, vn, and E,,, for the probability that hn equals
zero. The joint density of wages and hours for a participating agent n is denoted by
9~(hniwn~~n,l~n,~), where
-oo G h;, L o0
OGwnCoo
From this we can derive the mixed discrete-continuous probability density function of
hn and wn, 9lhniwnl~n~i~n~~)~
9lhn~ wn~~ni ~nf ~) -~ t
Pn(79) lf hn - 0
9(hni wnl~ni~ni1i) lf Íln i 0,O C wn ~ 00
For ease of notation we will often denote the probability Pn(19) by Pn. We shall denote
the probability of working 1- Pn(~9) by Pn(~9) or simply by Pn. We assume that our
sample is ordered in such a way that the observations 1 to Nl refer to non-working
individuals and the observations Nl d- 1 to N are working individuals.
Generally, the log-likelihood function of the model is
L(~~~n, i~ni wni h ni n- 1, ...~ N) -
N~ N
~ ln Pn(v9) -t- ~ ln 9 Rlhni wnl~n~ ~ni ~) (3.21)
n-1 n-N,}I
It will be assumed that the likelihood is differentiable almost everywhere with respect to
the elements of ~9'. Thus in principle we can differentiate the log-likelihood with respect




N~ 81n Pn(~9) N 81n g '(Ílni wn~~n~ l~n~ ~)
a ~
n-1 V~ n-N~}1 Ó~
0 (3.23)
'For consistency some additional regularity conditions are required: aéaé~ eicists in a neighbourhood
of 19o and is non-singular and negative definite in a neighbourhood of 190.
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where ~9M~ is the maximum likelihood estimator of ~9.
Alternatively, we can rewrite the derivative of the log-likelihood function as
ar,(,v) - alnPn(,~) 81ng~(hnfwnl~n,l~n,~) j
á~9 ~[dn a~y
f(1 - dn) ad J (3.24)
n-1
where dn is the dummy variable introduced above. Let ~9o be the true parameter value.
It is well known that if the support of hn and wn does not depend on ~9, the score vector
has expectation zero:
E(8L(~9o)1 -0
l a~ J (3.25)
It is this fact which implies consistency of the ML estimator. In the present context
the evaluation of the score vector is impossible for the reasons set out in the previous
section. We will replace the score by an unbiased simulator, which can then still be used
for consistent estimation of the parameters in ~9.
We rewrite the first order derivative of the log-likelihood function in the following
way.
V a~o~V ) - n~ 1 Zn(dn - Pn) ~(I - dn)






The first component of this expression equals the score of the log-likelihood of the binary
response model. If we replace the vector Zn by an arbitrary vector of instruments Zn,
independent of ~9, the expectation of the resulting expression, conditional on Zn, equals
zero at the true parameter value ~90.
In Section 3.5 we will describe how we simulate Pn(i9) and its derivative unbiasedly.
As to the second term in (3.26) the simulation of the part involving the density g' will
be described in Section 3.5 as well. And finally, we use the fact that
E I(1 - dn)v a19n, - 8t9
(3.28)
so that we may replace (1 -dn)a á~~ by a~ without affecting the unbiasedness property
of the score. As a result, the original score vector is replaced by
ÓL óln9`(hn~wnl~n~N~n~~) aPn
8,9 - ~
[Zn(dn - Pn) ~- (1 - dn) a~9 - á,9,
(3.29)
Inserting unbiased simulators knR and ~rFznR based on R replications for the response
probabilities and their derivatives respectively in this expression gives the simulated
score:
KR(~) -~ I~nldn
- knlUi vR)) ~ lI -
dn)Óin
g~(hni?~ I ~nf l~ni y) - ~n(~~
VR)~
n-1 L U (3.30)
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The advantage of writing the score vector this way is that the simulators for the
response probabilities and their derivatives enter the expression linearly. As a result
simulation errors are averaged out over individuals. Moreover, if a frequency simulator is
used to simulate the response probabilities discontinuities are averaged over individuals,
thereby eliminating the reason for the poor performance of the frequency simulator in
the context of simulated maximum likelihood estimation. See, e.g., Lerman and Manski
(1981) and BSrsch-Supan and Hajivasiliou (1993).
The estimation procedure now becomes: Choose instrument vectors Zn and obtain
the estimator by solving the moment conditions:
IfR(~9) - 0 (3.31)
To ascertain the efficiency of the estimator described here, we compare it to the ML
estimator. A convenient way of doing this is to look at the "simulation residual", i.e.
the difference between the score and the simulated score. First, (3.26) with Zn replaced
by Zn is compared with (3.30). Then the following residual is obtained:
~~~ LZn(Pn-knr)-l mnr-(1-dn)aati
n~Jn-1r-1 l
The dummy variable can be rewritten as
dn - Pn ~ Un
with E(vn) - 0
and Var(vn) - Pn(1 - Pn)
Inserting this in the residual gives:
(3.32)
(3.33)
R ~ ~ L Zn(Pn - knr) - S mnr - a~9n ~J - ~ vnala~" (3.34)n-1r-1 l n-7
The variance of the first term of (3.34) can be reduced by increasing the number of
drawings R. Suppose that Var[Zn(Pn - kn,) -{inn, - a~ }] - ~n, conditional on the
instruments Zn. This variance does not depend on R because the drawings are identical
and independent. Then the variance of the first term is R~n 1,-,n. With fixed N, increas-
ing R to infinity results in reducing this variance to zero. The second term is the error
which is caused by the fact that ( 1 - dn)a á~n is simulated by a simulator for aa . The
expectation of this term equals zero, whereas the variance equals ~n1 P„Pna ~ a~
This term of the simulation residual cannot be influenced by the number of drawings.
Therefore, this term leads to ineflïciency, also for large R.
To compare the efficiency of the method of simulated scores estimator to the maximum
likelihood estimator, the term involving the difference between Zn and Zn also has to be





Compared to (3.34) we now have an additional term involving the difference Z„ - Z,,. If
we base Zn on (3.27), with some consistent estimate of ~9 and simulators of a~ and Pn
based on RZ replications, then for RZ going to infinity the difference disappears. Note
that during the optimization process the matrix of instruments Z is fixed. This implies
that this matrix only needs to be initialized once at the beginning of the estimation
procedure. Therefore it is computationally feasible to calculate the instrument matrix
using a large number of drawings RZ, which need not be equal to the number of drawings
R that is used in the calculation of the remaining part of the simulated score.
3.3.1 Asymptotic distribution of the estimator
The simulated score vector satisfies the property that its expectation, evaluated at
the true parameter vector ~90, equals zero. It is intuitively clear that if we solve the
moment equations, defined by the simulated score, with respect to the parameter vector,
the resulting parameter vector ~9R, at which the simulated score is zero, will converge
to the true parameter value ~90, or, equivalently, ~9R will be a consistent estimator of
~90. If smooth simulators were used, standard asymptotic theory could be applied to
derive the consistency and asymptotic normality of the estimator. Pakes and Pollard
(1989) derive conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality that do not rely on
smoothness assumptions. The first set of conditions concerns the moment vector (3.29).
Let G(~9) denote the unconditional expectation of the term in square brackets in (3.29).
G(~9) is a set of population moments. Note that G(~9o) - 0. The identifiability condition
requires that infll~-~oll~ó II G(~) II~ Odó ) 0. Furthermore, G(~9) is required to have a
non-singular derivative matrix at ~90.
NfíR(~9) is the empirical counterpart of G(~9). In their proof of consistency and
asymptotic normality, Pakes and Pollard use the fact that NKR(~9) can be written as
the expectation with respect to an empirical distribution function, the shape of which
depends on the particular simulator that is employed, which should converge to its
population counterpart G(~9), making use of the independence-across-observations as-
sumption. Consequently, no smoothness assumptions are required. A condition which
has to be satisfied in case of using a frequency simulator is that the probability of being
at a tie (i.e. d- 1 and d- 0) has to be zero at ~90. This condition is clearly satisfied
here. Finally, Pakes and Pollard, as opposed to McFadden, allow the region which de-
termines whether d- 1 or d- 0 to be a non-smooth function of the parameters as well.
For our application non-smoothness of this region is not required. Smoothness of this




I(R(~9o) asy N(fi, V~), (3.36)
with V~ some positive definite symmetric matrix, and
~N(t9R - t9o) asy N(fi, I'-'Vtto(I" )-') (3.37)
1 a(
aL Bo )
where I" - plimN ~~ (3.38)
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Using the expression of the asymptotic covariance matrix and the results of the analy-
sis of the simulation residuals, it is possible to analyse the efficiency of the estimators
by comparing the asymptotic covariance matrices of the simulation estimators with the
asymptotic covariance matrix of the maximum likelihood estimator. It is a well known
result that
~(~ML - ~o) ~r N(Oi ~ML) (3.39)
where S2,yL - B-I (3.40)
1 ó2L(~o)B - -plimN
a ~9a~9'
(3.41)
To make clear the relation with the asymptotic covariance matrix of the simulation
estimators we rewrite S2,yL as
~ML - rMLVML(rML)-1 (3.42)
where
a ( aL So
Ir',yL - plim N ` a~ - -B (3.43)
which is the equivalent of (3.40), and
1 N aL„(,9o) áL„(~o)VML - P1imN ~ ~9 8~9n-1 ,
(3.44)
To examine the efficiency of the estimator we first need to establish the relation
between r~yL and r'. It is readily established that
r - rML -
-plim ~~N (Z - Z)~ f~(d - P) v a e-p 1 a~.~N n-~ [ n n aB aB n n~ n aB } ~ aB aB', (3.45)
from which only the first three terms equal zero if the instruments are constructed
according to (3.27) with the number of drawings per individual tending to infinity. From
the analysis of the simulation residuals it becomes clear that if the matrix of instruments
is constructed according to (3.27) with drawings tending to infinity, and if the response
probabilities and their derivatives are simulated with R tending to infinity as well, the
asymptotic variance of the score of the likelihood function, evaluated in a consistent
estimator is exceeded by X, where
X- plim
1~ pnpn a In P„ 81n P„
(3.46)( N n-, 8,9 8,9' )
To estimate the covariance matrix we calculate
SÈR - r-1 VR(r ')-' (3.47)





r~ - N á~9
(3.48)
N
UR - 1 ~ I~nR(~R)KnR(~R) ~ (3.49)
N n-,
where the index n indicates the n-th component of the simulated score. Expression (3.49)
can be calculated by simulation.
3.4 Stochastic specification
Recall (3.12):
en - BO ~ 2nw ~ vn (3.50)
We have seen above that for the specification of the utility function adopted here, in-
difference curves will be convex whenever the utility function is defined. The utility
function is defined whenever (3.10) holds true. We want (3.10) to hold true for all data
points. To indicate this, we add subscripts and write:
h - ó)2
Cn G -Bn ~- 7 -}. (
n
2~2 27 :- .fn(hn) (3.51)
To ensure that the direct utility function is properly defined for every individual in
the sample, a practical procedure is the following one. Let w and j~ be the wage rate
and non-labour income which imply a linear budget constraint such that all observed
budget sets are contained in it. We call this an encompassing budget set. See Fig. 3.3
for an illustration.
If we restrict the range of Bn such that inequality (3.51) holds for all values of cn and
hn in this encompassing budget set, then we know that indifference curves are convex
at all data points. To achieve this we have to restrict the range of Bn such that the
function fn(.) is either tangent to the encompassing budget constraint or is outside the
encompassing budget set. A tangency point is found for hn - ó-h wry and
Bn - -~ - ów - 2yw2 ~ 2RZ (3.52)
Thus, in view of ( 3.51) the inequality constraint on Bn has to be
Bn C-~ - ów - 2ryw2 -h 2Ra (3.53)
To guarantee that this inequality on Bn holds for all observations we proceed as follows.
Let the error term vn be defined on (-oo, 0) then we impose the restriction:
1
Bo C-x;,w - j~ - ów - 2ryw2 -~ 2Qa (3.54)
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F~
0 leisure ~ ~h
Figure 3.3: An encompassing budget set
T
for all n. For the random preference term v,~ we will actually assume that it follows a
negative I' distribution, defined on (-oo, 0). A similar procedure, in a somewhat different
context, was followed by Kapteyn, Kooreman, and Van Soest (1990).
For non-participating individuals wages are not known and have to be integrated out.
To ensure coherency of the model, the support of the wage distribution has to be re-
stricted so that for all wages the implied budget set is contained within the encompassing
budget set. This is achieved by restricting the support of the wage distribution to [0, w].
A convenient choice of distribution for u,,, which restricts the range of w„ to [0, w], is to
define a random variable .~„ following a lognormal distribution with log-mean rrc„ and
log-variance r2, and to define
u„ :- log{~„~„~[1 d- an]} (3.55)
where
. ~n .- w~[eXp(w(~.., rl))] (3.56)
It seems reasonable to require that the median of exp(u„) equals one. This holds true if
we specify
ra„ - - log(~i„ - 1) (3.57)
Thus the number of free pa,rameters is equal to the case where the un were assumed
normal with mean zero.8
~Notice that under normality the inequality ( 3.53) is violated with non-zero probability and hence
the model would be incoherent.
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~ leisure ~ HZ H, Ho ~- h T
Figure 3.4: The determination of optimal hours
3.5 Outline of simulation
In this section a description is given of the construction of the simulators. The
technical details are presented in the appendix. Most of the simulation can be understood
by reconsidering Fig. 3.2. For convenience, we repeat the basic features in Fig. 3.4 and
add some notation. Figure 3.4 presents an example of a non-linear budget constraint and
a non-convexity where the non-linearities arise from a tax system with two brackets and
from the welfare and social security system. The budget constraint has three segments.
In the first segment, on the right hand side of the figure, the individual works a positive
number of hours, whereas at the same time he receives an unemployment benefit. Of
each additional guilder of labour income the individual looses, say, a~o of the social
security benefit, until, eventually, at hours Ho, nothing is left of the benefit. This results
in a net wage rate in the first segment of wo. In the second segment, between Ho and
H~, no more benefits are received and therefore the net wage rate rises to wl. At hours
Hl the next taac bracket is reached, which causes the net wage rate to fall to w2 in the
third segment. Now let hn denote the optimal labour supply of individual n at a linear
budget constraint with slope w„j and intercept ~,,j, j - 0,1, ..., rrc, and denote optimal
labour supply by h,,.
~n - h(wni ~ni ai xnw ~- v,y) (3.58)
in which wn is the before tax wage rate which implies that the function h(.) includes the
tax and the welfare system. Then the optimal labour supply hn, conditional on v„ and
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wn, can be determined according to the following scheme:
hn,tvc - ~ if hn G 0
- hn if 0 C hn G Hno
- Hno if hn ~ Hno
hn - Hn0 Zf hn C Hn0
- hn if Hn,j-1 ~ hn G Hnj 7 - 1, ..., m- 1
- IÍnj 2 f hn i Hnj i hntl ~- 1, . .., 72 - 1
- hn Z f Hn,m-1 C hn C T
- T tif h;" ~ T
hn - hn if utility in hn exceeds utility in hn,nrc
- hn,NC otherwise
(3.59)
hn - ai f az~nj ~ CYgwn7 ~ 2~9wnj }~n ~ f azvn
The parameters a and ~ are obtained by reparametrization of Q, y, b and w in section
3.2. The precise form of this reparametrization is given in the appendix. The utility
level has to be calculated using the direct utility function. Note, that if the coherency
restrictions are satisfied, the event hn - Hno will occur with probability zero.
Looking at variation in the gross wage rate wn and in the unobservable taste com-
ponent vn, we can say that wn determines the segments of the budget constraint by
determining the slopes and the kink points, whereas vn determines in which segment
labour supply will be optimal given everything else. The distribution of ineasurement
or optimization errors en can be used to determine the distribution of h;,, defined in
(3.15), conditional on the unobserved taste component vn and on the gross wage rate
wn. The distribution of vn can be used to integrate out the unobserved taste compo-
nent, taking into account the decision rule on hn. Note that this involves comparing and
integrating over utility functions. Finally, we multiply by the marginal density of the
wage rate to obtain the joint density of h;, and wn. This joint distribution ca.n be used
to determine the censored distribution of observed labour supply hn and it will be clear
that the expression for the probability that observed labour supply equals zero (hn - 0)
will be complicated. It will be difficult even to write down an analytic expression for
the probability and the likelihood function as a whole. Therefore it will be impossible
to use smooth simulators (see, e.g. McFadden,1989), because an analytic expression is
needed in order to construct a smooth simulator. We will simulate the probability with
a frequency simulator FnR. The frequency simulator works as follows: Draw R times
a wage rate w;,,, an unobserved taste variable v;,r and a measurement error e;,, from
their assumed distributions, calculate hn and hn and use the rules in (3.16) and (3.17)
to determine hn. The simulator becomes:
fnr - 1 if hn 1 0 (3.60)
fn,. - 0 otherwise (3.61)
FnR - R ~r~--1 fn, (3.62)
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Since we also need the vector of derivatives of P„(~9) we approximate this vector by a
difference approximation of frequency simulators which is an unbiased simulator for the
difference approximation of the probabilities. The evaluation of the contribution to the
score vector of the working individuals involves the integration over random preferences.
Two different methods to implement the integration are discussed in the appendix.
Finally, a suitable algorithm has to be chosen to minimize the objective function
which can handle the discontinuities caused by the use of frequencies. Methods which
make use of first derivatives turned out not to work and therefore we switched to the
downhill simplex method of Nelder and Mead (1965) of which an overview is given in
Press et al. (1986).
3.6 Results
In this section, the model is estimated using Monte Carlo data as well as real data.
In the Monte Carlo experiment, the performance of the MSS method, outlined in section
3.3, is compared with some of the more conventional methods that have been mentioned
in section 3.2. The conventional methods that we consider are the estimation of the
model without random preferences and the estimation by instrumental variable methods.
Furthermore, two variants of the MSS method are applied. The first variant estimates
the parameters of the wage distribution separately by means of a reduced form wage-
participation model. Then the labour supply parameters are estimated using predicted
wages for non-participants. The second variant consists of estimating the wage and
labour supply parameters simultaneously, thereby taking into account the stochastic
nature of the budget constraint.
Subsequently the model is estimated for a sample of 849 married females, drawn from
the Dutch population in 1985. In the Monte Carlo experiment the real data series of
exogenous variables has been used in conjunction with a priori chosen parameter values to
generate endogenous variables for each observation. The vector of taste shifters consists
of the log family size variable (parameter ~I ) and a dummy indicator taking the value one
if the woman has children with age below 6, and zero if not (parameter (2). In the Monte
Carlo experiment, the variables in the wage equation are a constant term (parameter
r~l), log-age (parameter r~z) and log-age squared (parameter r~3). To restrict the number
of parameters in the Monte Carlo experiment we have omitted dummy indicators for the
level of education. These dummies are included in the estimation on the real data. The
parameters of the negative gamma distribution are y~ and y2. Using the distributional
assumptions, random numbers have been generated which have been transformed to
hours and wages using the true parameter values in the first column of table 3.1 and the
decision rules in (3.16) and (3.17). The true parameter values are chosen such that the
coherency restrictions are satisfied. Moreover we have tried to choose parameter values
that generate distributions of observables similar to what we see in the sample. The
values of some parameters are the result of experimentation with preliminary versions
of the mode. Benefits are measured in guilders per week.
Both for the real data and the Monte Carlo data the budget constraint of each indi-
vidual has been constructed on the basis of the Dutch tax code, also taking into account
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the welfare and social security system. In 1985 the tax system and the social security
system were not well-integrated. They each have their own marginal tax rates and the
social security system has ceilings for different sorts of payroll taxes. As a result of this
the budget constraint may be quite complex with various kinks and with non-convexities.
Table 3.1 presents the a priori chosen parameter values which are used to generate
the Monte Carlo data. Twenty Monte Carlo datasets have been generated using the
completely specified model, which includes random preferences. 9
Table 3.1: True parameter vector
Labor supply equation
a!1 (Const.) 14.14
a2 (non-labour income) -0.04692
a3 (wage) 10.690
a4 (0.5x square of wage) -0.260
~~ (log(family size)) -24.002
~2 (d. children with age c 6) -13.903












3.6.1 Monte Carlo, no random preferences, predicted budget
constraints
The first estimation method is the estimation of a simplified model which neglects
random preferences and ignores random variation of budget constraints for non-parti-
cipants. In the absence of random preferences the labour supply function (3.14) becomes
hn - h(wn, l~n, EY, ~„w) (3.63)
Optimal labour supply is determined according to scheme (3.59) with vn - 0. The only
source of randomness now is measurement error E and the participation rule in this model
is:
hn - hn f En
h - 0 lf h;, c 0
- h;, if h;, 1 0
(3.64)
9This small number of replications is due to the fairly heavy computational burden associated with
estimation of the completely specified model
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The coherency constraint (3.54) remains the same.
For the non-participants one single budgetconstraint is used, i.e. variation in the
budget constraint due to variation in wages is ignored. This means that the wages
for non-participants are predicted from the systematic part of the wage equation. For
participants, the distributional assumptions (3.55), (3.56) and (3.57) are maintained. To
avoid selection bias, the wage equation will be estimated for participants jointly with a
selectivity equation of the form
~Jn - ~~zn ~ en (3.65)
which can be interpreted as an approximate reduced form of
hn - h(eXP(~~~n ~ T~n), ~n~ CY, 2~nGJ ~ TJn) ~ E (3.66)
It is clear that the vector of variables zn should contain all the variables included in the
wage equation, as well as the variables appearing in the labour supply function h(.). The
joint wage-participation model is
ln wn - ~,~n ~ un
y~ - ~~zn ~- En
y~ 1 0 if working ( wn observed)
G 0 if not ( wn unobserved)
with
and
where ~n and mn have
normalized to one.
been
` 1 e~n ~~ N" On I~~l
r. -
Que





Once the model (3.67)-(3.69) has been estimated, (3.63) is estimated with predicted
wages for non-participants. The predicted wages come from the systematic part of the
wage equation.
Table 3.2 shows the Monte Carlo results for the estimation of this reduced form wage-
participation model. The means in column 2 refer to the averages of estimates over
20 replications. Column three shows the standard deviations of the estimates over the
replications and column four presents the average of the estimated asymptotic standard
errors. Relative errors are given in the final column. They are defined by ~B - Bo~~~Bo~,
where B is the mean in column 2 and 9o is the true parameter value. The mean of
the parameter estimates ~2 and ~3i which correspond to the age variables in the wage
equation are somewhat higher in absolute value than the true parameter values. The
same holds for the variance r. The parameters ~c~ of the participation equation all are
significant.
The Monte Carlo results for the labour supply parameters are given in table 3.3. The
mean estimates of the constant term, a2i ~1 and ~2 are all larger in absolute value than
their true values, but their sign is estimated correctly. The estimate of a3, the parameter
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of the linear wage term in the labour supply function, is close to its true value. However,
the mean estimate of a4i which corresponds to the quadratic wage term in the labour
supply function is close to zero as compared with the true value. In fact the mean
estimate of ~4 is about five standard deviations below the true value. The standard
deviations and the mean SE are fairly similar. The variance aE is higher than the true
value, which is due to the neglect of random preferences.
3.6.2 Monte Carlo, IV, participants only
The next method we consider is the instrumental variables method. Now the non-
convex piecewise linear budget constraint is linearized. Only participants are taken into
consideration. We look at the observed value of labour supply, h. We check between
which kinkpoints of the budget constraints this value is. Suppose that H;-~ C h C H;:
Then we are on the j-th segment and the budget constraint is linearized by the linear
budget constraint with slope w; and intercept p; that correspond to segment j. The
equation we might want to estimate is:
h -~i f c~zF~i -F aaw~ -t~ 2a4w~ 1- x'~ ~- e (3.70)
in which w; -(1 - r;)w, with w the gross wage rate and T; the marginal tax rate of
segment j.
As is well known, there are two reasons why this equation cannot be simply estimated
by OLS. The first is the presence of correlation between (p;,w;) and the error term, and
the second is the selectivity problem.
There are two causes for correlation between (p;, w;) and the error term e. The first is
that the value of h determines which segment of the budget constraint is the appropriate
segment, and consequently it determines which pair (~;, w;) is chosen. Secondly, optimal
labour supply need not coincide with observed labour supply due to measurement error.
As the choice of the segment is determined by observed labour supply, instead of optimal
labour supply, the wrong segment may be chosen. As a consequence, (~e;, w;) will be
subject to measurement error as well, and their measurement errors are correlated with
the measurement error of labour supply. The fact that we do not observe individuals at
kink points can also be explained by measurement error. Instrumental variables for the
intercept ~;, the slope w; and its square w~ will have to be used. Obvious candidates are
non-labour income p,, the gross wage rate w and its square, and individual characteristics
that appear in the wage equation. It has to be assumed that the gross wage rate and e
are uncorrelated.
As we restrict ourselves to participants, a selectivity problem arises. We solve this
problem by applying the standard Heckman correction: In (3.67) a reduced form wage-
participation model has been presented. Suppose that the error term of the gross wage
rate, u, is uncorrelated with the error e of the labour supply equation. Next, make the
standard assumption (false in this case) that the error term of the participation equation,
e, and e are jointly normally distributed. Then the expectation of e, conditional on
participation, y' ) 0, can be derived:
rÓ(-~'z) (3.71)1 - ~(-~c'z)
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in which ~(.) is the standard normal density function and ~(.) the standard normal
distribution function.'o The estimate ~c, obtained from estimating the reduced form
participation model can be used as a value for ~c. To correct for selectivity, .~ is added
to the labour supply equation, where a is equal to ~ with ~c replaced by fc. The final
estimation equation becomes:
h- at f~zFzi } a3wi ~ 2a4wi ~ x~~ } Qfe~ ~ e (3.72)
The model has been estimated on the Monte Carlo data, using two sets of instrumental
variables. The extended set of instrumental variables contains, apart from the constant
term, the correction term and the vector of characteristics x that already appears in the
labour supply function, non-labour income ~C, the gross wage rate w and its square and
the age variables that also appear in the wage equation. These age variables are excluded
from the restricted set of instrumental variables. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the Monte
Carlo results obtained with the full set and the restricted set of instrumental variables
respectively. There is not much difference between the Monte Carlo results with the
different sets of instrumental variables. The signs of the estimates are correct, and there
is significant evidence for the backward bending labour supply curve. The parameter ~3
of the linear wage term is a bit underestimated, whereas parameter a4 of the quadratic
wage term is overestimated. The standard deviations of ~zi ~i and ~z are sizeable and
the estimates are lower than the corresponding true values.
In the estimation with the instrumental variable methods, no coherency constraints
are imposed and therefore these constraints may not be satisfied for all individuals.
For the estimates obtained with the restricted set of instrumental variables, 6.3~0 of
the individuals does not satisfy the coherency constraint. For the extended set this
percentage is 8.3.
Comparing tables 3.4 and 3.5 with table 3.3, it appears that the instrumental variables
method performs somewhat worse on average than the estimation of labour supply with
neglect of random preferences, as carried out in the previous subsection, except for the
fact that the instrumental variables method does manage to reproduce the backward
bending labour supply curve.
3.6.3 Monte Carlo, M5S
We now consider the estimation by means of the method of simulated scores. Random
preferences, as well as the tax and social security system are properly accounted for. Two
variants can be distinguished. In the first variant we use predicted wages for non-working
individuals. The predictors are obtained from the reduced form wage-participation model
(3.67). Stochastic variation in the budget constraint due to stochastic variation in the
wages is ignored here. The second method consists of estimating parameters of the
labour supply model and the wage equation jointly.
In table 3.6 the Monte Carlo results of the variant with predicted wages are given. For
the optimization of the objective function the downhill simplex method has been used.
The results of the Monte Carlo study of the model without random preferences have
loStrictly speaking we only assume (3.71), which is weaker than normality of e and e
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been used in the construction of an initial starting simplex. The number of drawings to
construct the simulator is equal to 10. The matrix of instruments has been constructed
on basis of the true parameter values, using RZ - 800 drawings. (Recall that the
matrix of instruments has to be calculated only once at the beginning of the optimization
procedure.) The consequences of constructing the matrix of instruments with estimated
values in the context of a two step estimation procedure have been studied in Bloemen
and Kapteyn (1993a). It was found that the means of the estimated values do not change
much by employing the two step procedure, but the standard deviations of the estimates
are higher than in the case in which the matrix of instruments is calculated based on the
true parameter vector.
The present method of estimation clearly outperforms the previous two estimation
methods. Although the parameter of the quadratic wage term in the labour supply
function is still underestimated, it is closer to its true value as well, and it is significantly
different from zero at the 10~0 level.
Table 3.7 presents the Monte Carlo results of jointly estimating the labour supply
model and the wage equation. Again, RZ - 800 drawings were used to contruct the
matrix of instruments and R- 10 drawings were used to construct the simulators. The
estimates of the labour supply parameters are not very different from those obtained with
the nonstochastic budget constraint in table 3.6. There is, however, a slight improvement
in the estimation of the parameter of the quadratic wage term, which is closer to its true
value than for any of the previous methods of estimation. Comparing the parameters
of the wage distribution with the parameters obtained with the reduced form wage
participation model in table 3.2, we see that there is an improvement in all but one of
the parameters estimates.
In conclusion we may say that the Monte Carlo results show that the method of
simulated scores with a nonstochastic budget constraint already yields fairly reasonable
results, as compared to approximate methods like the instrumental variables method or
leaving out random preferences. All of the methods of estimation seem to have problems
in properly estimating the parameter of the quadratic wage term in the labour supply
function. Leaving out random preferences severely underestimates the parameter of
the quadratic wage term, whereas the instrumental variables method overestimates this
parameter. In the Monte Carlo study the joint estimation of the labour supply function
and the wage equation gives the best results with respect to the quadratic wage effect.
3.6.4 Estimation, no random preferences, predicted budget
constraints
The model without random preferences is estimated using the 1985 OSA data, which
includes 849 married female individuals of which 331 have a paid job. First the wage-
participation model is estimated and the estimates are presented in table 3.8. Apart
from the age variables, four education dummies have been included in the wage equation
and consequently also in the participation equation. Educl is a dummy variable for
the lowest level of education. The highest level of education is taken as the reference
category. The four education dummies in the wage equation are negative and significant
and they are increasing with the level of education, as they should. The age-earnings
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profile reaches its maximum at the age of 36. The dummy for the number of children
with age below 6 and log family size have a significant negative effect on participation.
A higher level of education tends to reduce the probability of non-participation. The
probability of participation rises with age until the age of 29 after which it decreases.
The covariance vue between wages and participation is insignificant.
The wage estimates are used to predict wages for the non-participants, after which
the labour supply model without random preferences is estimated.
The parameter estimates are given in table 3.9. Non-labour income has a small but
significant (at the lOPIo level) negative effect on labour supply. The parameter estimate of
a3, which corresponds to the linear wage term in the labour supply equation is positive
and significant at the 10~0 level. The quadratic wage term does not seem to play a
significant role in the labour supply function, so the present estimates do not provide
evidence for a backward bending labour supply curve. Both the presence of children
with age below 6 and an increase in log family size have a significant negative effect on
labour supply. The age variables turn out to be insignificant.
3.6.5 Estimation, IV, participants only
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 present the empirical results, obtained with the instrumental
variables method. Again two sets of instrumental variables are used. The restricted set
contains the constant term, the dummy for the presence of children with age below 6, log
family size, the correction term and the age variables. The full set contains, in addition
to the variables that have been included in the restricted set, the education dummies
which also appear in the wage equation.
There is not much difference between the IV estimates obtained with the restricted set
and the IV estimates obtained with the full set of instrumental variables. The difference
with the estimates in table 3.9, obtained by the model without random preferences, are
considerable. Non-labour income has a larger impact on labour supply according to the
IV estimates. Remarkably the IV estimates provide evidence in favour of a backward
bending labour supply curve, as opposed to the estimates in table 3.9 in which the
parameter estimate of a4 was insignificant. This is in line with the Monte Carlo results
presented above. Also there IV generated by far the largest estimate (in absolute value)
of the quadratic wage effect. According to the IV estimates, the dummy for presence of
children with age below 6 has a positive, though insignificant, effect. Log family size still
has a significantly negative effect, but its estimated impact on labour supply is much
smaller than according to table 3.9. The age variables are insignificant for both types of
estimators.
The percentage of individuals that does not satisfy the coherency constraint is 45 for
the restricted set and 43 for the extended set of instrumental variables.
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3.6.6 Estimation, MSS
Table 3.12 shows the estimation results with MSS and a non-stochastic budget
constraint.'~ The standard errors of the individual characteristics in the labour sup-
ply function are high relative to the estimates.
Table 3.13 presents the estimates obtained with the method of simulated scores and
a stochastic budget constraint. The estimate of a3i the parameter of the linear wage
term in the labour supply function, is larger than the estimates for this parameter that
we obtained with the IV and no random preferences methods. Non-labour income has
a larger impact as well. The standard errors of the parameters of the wage distribution
are rather high. The same holds, to a lesser extent, for the the standard errors of the
parameters ~;. Comparing the estimates of the wage parameters obtained with MSS
with the estimates obtained with the reduced form wage-participation model in table
3.8, it is clear that there are differences. In view of the large standard errors in table
3.13, this does not necessarily mean much. Again, the quadratic wage term in the labour
supply function is not significant. The parameter estimate of -y2 is of large magnitude
and estimated imprecisely.
3.6.7 Wage and participation elasticities for different methods
Table 3.14 shows the wage and participation elasticities that are implied by the
various methods of estimation. These have been calculated as "aggregate" elasticities
in the sense that all wages in the sample have been raised by 5~o and then hours and
participation have been predicted for every individual in the sample. For the method of
simulated scores with a stochastic budget constraint the wages for non-working individ-
uals have been simulated using the estimates of the wage distribution in table 3.13. For
the remaining estimation methods the predicted wages based on the estimates in table
3.8 have been used. For the simulation of hours and participation the scheme (3.59) with
v„ - 0 has been used for the IV method and the method without random preferences,
whereas simulated values for v„ have been inserted for the MSS methods. The wage elas-
ticities range from 0.11 for MSS with a non-stochastic budget constraint up to 1.29 for
the model without random preferences. The participation elasticities range from 0.064
to 0.99. The elasticities with the IV method have been calculated both including and
excluding the individuals that do not satisfy their coherency constraint. The standard
errors of the estimated elasticities are sizeable. Consequently, the differences between
the elasticities are not significant.
Table 3.15 presents the wage and participation elasticities of the Monte Carlo data.
Also, for the Monte Carlo data, the different estimation results produce different elas-
ticities, although the variation is a bit less than for the real data. Note that the ranking
of the elasticities by method of estimation coincides with the ranking of the empirical
elasticities in table 3.14, except for MSS with a non-stochastic budget constraint, which
exhibits much larger elasticities for the Monte Carlo data than for the real data. The
I1To be sure, throughout we assume that the budget constraint is non-stochastic from the viewpoint
of the agent; however from the viewpoint of the econometrician the budget conatraint is stochastic since
we do not observe all sources of heterogeneity across individuals
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standard errors of the elasticities of the Monte Carlo data are smaller than for the real
data. For the Monte Carlo data, most of the differences in the elasticities are significant.
Altogether, it is clear that there are considerable differences in the empirical estimates
obtained by the various methods of estimation. These differences in the estimates have
implications for the wage and participation elasticities, which vary widely across differ-
ent methods of estimation. The standard errors of the elasticities are sizeable. Apart
from the IV method, none of the methods provide evidence in favour of a backward
bending labour supply curve. In the Monte Carlo experiment we saw that IV tends to
overestimate the quadratic wage term in the labour supply function, whereas the other
methods had a tendency to underestimate.
Table 3.2 Monte Carlo: Wage-participation model
B true value mean SD mean SE rel. err.
Participation equation (3.65)
~cl (const) - 0.825 0.203 0.251 -
~cZ (log(fam. size)) - - 0.536 0.0552 0.0864 -
~c3 (d. child. G 6) - -0.264 0.0604 0.0639 -
~c4 (non-labour income) - - 0.000819 0.0000940 0.0000742 -
~cs (log(age~17)) - 3.083 0.699 0.798 -
ks (square of log(age~17)) - - 2.425 0.516 0.544 -
Wage equation (3.67)
r~~ (const) 1.4 1.097 0.169 0.235 0.22
r~z (log(age~17)) 2.75 3.408 0.564 0.698 0.24
~3 (square of log(age~17)) - 2.2 -2.646 0.440 0.483 0.20
T 0.981 1.145 0.0591 0.0388 0.17
a„e - 1.136 0.0632 0.0406 -
Table 3.3 Monte Carlo: Labour supply model
No random preferences
B true value mean SD mean SE rel. err.
al (const) 14.1 15.768 5.734 9.456 0.12
a2 (non-labour income) -0.047 -0.0631 0.00980 0.00648 0.34
a3 (wage) 10.69 10.704 1.286 2.270 0.0014
a4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.26 -0.0126 0.0477 0.115 0.95
Sl (log(family size)) -24 -34.044 5.218 3.788 0.42
~z (d. children with age G 6) -13.9 -17.594 5.607 3.328 0.27
~f 19.3 24.234 0.729 0.856 0.26
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Table 3.4 Monte Carlo: Labour supply model
The Instrumental Variables method
Extended set of Instrumental Variables
B true value mean SD mean 5E rel. err.
a!~ (const) 14.1 28.657 6.808 7.618 1.03
a2 (non-labour income) -0.047 -0.0284 0.0207 0.0209 0.40
a3 (wage) 10.69 7.391 1.991 2.210 0.31
a4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.26 -0.355 0.160 0.158 0.36
~1 (log(family size)) -24 -11.236 7.151 5.354 0.53
~2 (d. children with age G 6) -13.9 -5.868 3.481 3.905 0.59
a~ 19.3 27.352 2.907 - 0.42
Table 3.5 Monte Carlo: Labour supply model
The Instrumental Variables method





a4 (0.5 x square of wage)
(I (log(family size))
~2 (d. children with age G 6)
~E
true value mean SD mean SE rel. err.
14.1 26.591 6.934 8.234 0.88
-0.047 -0.0351 0.0244 0.0232 0.25
10.69 8.071 1.965 2.401 0.24
-0.26 -0.377 0.165 0.170 0.45
-24 -12.069 7.826 5.677 0.50
-13.9 -6.567 3.940 4.176 0.53
19.3 28.623 3.707 0.48
Table 3.6 Monte Carlo: Labour supply model






~4 (0.5 x square of wage)
~~ (log(family size))




true value mean SD SE rel. err.
14.1 13.639 9.573 7.683 0.035
-0.047 -0.0504 0.0116 0.00335 0.075
10.69 11.041 1.182 1.004 0.033
-0.26 -0.169 0.101 0.360 0.35
-24 -25.693 9.071 7.351 0.070
-13.9 -14.604 6.032 7.409 0.050
19.31 20.851 2.625 6.019 0.080
3.0 3.025 1.319 2.239 0.0082
4.0 4.111 0.883 2.561 0.11
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Table 3.7 Monte Carlo:
Labour supply model and wage distribution
Method of Simulated Scores, R- 10
Stochastic budget constraint
B true value mean SD SE rel. err.
~I (const) 14.1 14.467 8.829 4.585 0.023
a2 (non-labourincome) -0.047 -0.0517 0.0129 0.0138 0.10
a3 (wage) 10.69 11.075 1.452 0.903 0.036
a4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.26 -0.176 0.0967 0.210 0.32
(t (log(family size)) -24 -25.409 8.048 5.831 0.059
~2 (d. children with age C 6) -13.9 -14.750 4.112 4.107 0.061
Qf 19.31 23.966 5.475 2.481 0.24
ry, 3.0 3.222 1.076 0.403 0.074
ry2 4.0 4.711 2.176 1.061 0.18
The wage distribution
r~l (const) 1.4 1.444 0.365 0.197 0.044
r~2 (log(age~17)) 2.75 3.395 0.547 0.439 0.23
r~3 (square of log(age~17)) -2.2 -3.149 0.812 0.334 0.43
T 0.981 1.082 0.103 0.0195 0.10
Table 3.8 Estimates of the wage-participation model
B 8
kl (const) 2.922
~c2 (log(fam. size)) -1.335
~c3 (d. child. C 6) -1.085
rc9 (non-labour income) -0.000340
ks (log(age~17)) 3.136
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Table 3.9 Estimates of the labour supply model
No random preferences
B B SE
al (const) 15.049 11.819
a2 (non-labour income) -0.00720 0.00369
a3 (wage) 3.200 1.745
a4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.0315 0.127
~1 (log(family size)) -30.995 4.563
~2 (d. children with age C 6) -22.787 3.645
~3 (log(age~17)) 2.726 26.15
~4 (square oflog(age~17)) -24.578 17.503
af 24.240 1.540
Table 3.10 Estimates of the labour supply model
Instrumental Variables: restricted set
6 B SE
a~ (const) 35.842 4.218
a2 (non-labour income) -0.0389 0.0237
a!3 (wage) 1.719 0.422
a4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.0950 0.0252
~1 (log(family size)) -6.422 2.948
(2 (d. children with age G 6) 0.748 2.487
~3 (log(age~17)) -18.154 11.957
~4 (square oflog(age~17)) 4.684 8.963
af 9.722 -
Correction term -3.380 2.543
Table 3.11 Estimates of the labour supply model
Instrumental Variables: F~II set
B 9 SE
a~ (const) 35.780 4.175
a2 (non-labour income) -0.0372 0.0235
Q'3 (wage) 1.719 0.417
CYq (0.5 x square of wage) -0.0965 0.0247
~~ (log(family size)) -6.307 2.938
~2 (d. children with age c 6) 0.870 2.478
(3 (log(age~17)) -18.280 11.928
~4 (square oflog(age~17)) 4.770 8.941
a~ 9.699 -
Correction term -3.498 2.535
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Table 3.12 Estimates of the labour supply model




a2 (non-labour income) -0.0194
a3 (wage) 11.522
a4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.00462
~~ (log(family size)) 5.902
~2 (d. children with age c 6) 14.900
~3 (log(age~17)) 85.328







Table 3.13 Estimates of the
labour supply model and wage distribution




cr2 (non-labour income) -0.0480
a3 (wage) 10.285
a4 (0.5 x square of wage) -0.00243
(I (log(family size)) -26.251
r;z (d. children with age C 6) -17.912
ti3 (log(age~17)) 56.486



















(square oflog(age~17)) -1.325 1.477
(educl) -0.935 0.998
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Table 3.14 Wage and participation elasticities
Method of wage
estimation elasticity
No random preferences 1.29
IV, restricted set 0.23
IV, restricted set (excluding non-coherents) 0.21
IV, full set 0.19
IV, full set (excluding non-coherents) 0.19
MSS, non-stochastic budget constraint 0.11
MSS, stochastic budget constraint 0.39
Table 3.15 Monte Carlo: wage and participation
Method of wage
estimation elasticity
No random preferences 1.05
IV, restricted set 0.33
IV, restricted set (excluding non-coherents) 0.36
IV, full set 0.26
IV, full set (excluding non-coherents) 0.30
MSS, non-stochastic budget constraint 0.95





















Both the Monte Carlo results and the estimation results for real data show large
variation of outcomes across estimation methods. For the Monte Carlo we know the true
model and the results suggest that an incorrect treatment of the stochastic nature of the
data may lead to large biases. Estimated wage and participation elasticities may easily
be double or half the true elasticity if the wrong estimation method is applied.
For the real data, we do not know the true model, of course, but the huge variation
in parameters and implied elasticities is disconcerting. The fact that the ordering of
elasticities is by and large the same as for the Monte Carlo data is suggestive of the
fact that also here an oversimplification of stochastic structure may be a cause of biased
outcomes.
In itself the model considered in this chapter cannot claim to be realistic. After all, it
does not have any dynamic elements, no fixed costs of working, etc. The purpose of this
chapter has not been to build a fully realistic model of labour market behavior. Rather
we have limited ourselves to a somewhat simplified environment in which agents are
supposed to behave and then concentrated on a utility consistent specification behavior
in that environment. Where our results seem to show the extreme importance of a
correct (utility consistent) treatment of the stochastic structure of the model in such a
case, we would anticipate even more relevance of such treatment in more complicated
environments.
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3.A Simulation of the score
In this appendix the technical details of the simulation of the score will be worked
out. The simulation of the score can be split up in two parts, i.e. the simulation of the
participation probabilities and the simulation of the score of the continuous part of the
likelihood function.
First, some notation is introduced. Let ~n~ denote the intercept of the j-th segment
of the budget constraint, as indicated in figure 3.4, where j - 1, ..., m. The index j- 0
indicates the segment which introduces the non-convexity in the budget constraint. The
slope of the j-th segment is denoted by wn;, wn0 G wnl, wnj 1 wn,j}l,~ - 1, ..., m- 1,
and Hnj is the kink point between the j-th and (j ~- 1)-th segment, j- 0, ..., m- 1. If
Hno - 0 we just have the model without social security system. If we allow for variation
in the gross wage wn, the slopes wnj and the kink points Hnj will depend on wn, so
formally:
7Unj - 7Ui(Zl)n) (3.A.1)
Ifn; - H;(wn) (3.A.2)
w'~(wn) 1 0 (3.A.3)
H~(wn) G 0 (3.A.4)
As in section 3.5, we let hn denote the optimal amount of labour supply if the budget
constraint is linear with slope wnj and intercept pnj, j - 1, ..., m. In our model:
hn - h. ( a i wn9 i~n9 ~ ~ i~n ) ~ a2vn ( 3.A.5)
where
h~(a~ w, l~, ~, ~) - al f azF~ } asw d- 2cr4wz f~~ (3.A.6)
Expressing ~ and ( in terms of the original parameters gives:
al - S d- QBo (3.A.7)
az - p (3.A.8)
aa - ry -F Qb (3.A.9)
a4 - Qry (3.A.10)
( - wQ (3.A.11)
Because Q G 0 and y 1 0 we find that az G 0 and ~4 G 0. Notation will be abbreviated
by defining
rcn; - h.(a~wn,yi~n;iSi~n) (3.A.12)
The unobserved taste parameter vn is assumed to be distributed according to a negative
gamma-distribution with parameters ryl and ryzi i.i.d. over individuals, by which we mean
that -vn has a gamma distribution. The probability density function of vn is
1 v
9(vni~iliÍ~2) - Tt ( -vn)1'~-1 eXp n ,~Ïl i 0,72 i 0,-00 G iJn G O (3.A.13)
r ('1'1)'1'z ryz
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As pointed out in section 3.5, the distribution of the measurement errors is assumed to
be normal with mean zero and variance oÉ :
~(E,,, vÉ)- 1 e exp {- lf En y,-oo c e„ c oo (3.A.14)
2~rv l 202 )
The wage distribution can be derived from assumptions (3.55), (3.56) and (3.57).
1 z
~(wn,rl,TZ) -
1 w 1 eXp
-2rz Llog `w w w I-
mnJ (3.A.15)- `L7rT 1ll - 2Un wn n
ran -- log I w~ - 1~ , 0 G wn C w (3.A.16)
`eXp(rl ~n)
It is a straightforward extension to incorporate correlation between wages and mea-
surement errors. However, to restrict the introduction of notation, we abstain from it
here.
The likelihood contribution of an individual will be formulated now. We make use
of the scheme (3.59) for determining optimal labour supply and the participation rules
described in (3.16) and (3.17). First note that the h;, in (3.59) all depend on the random
preference parameter vn, so given everything else, vn determines in which segment of the
budget constraint labour supply is optimal. Therefore, we have to determine which set
of values of vn coincides with which segment of the budget constraint. The following sets
are defined:
Aj - {vn I Hna-1 G itn C~In~} 7- ~, ..., rn,
BO - {êJnllLn G O}
B~ - {vnlhn ) Hn~ ) hn}1} 7- 1,...,m- 1
B,,, - { vn ~ h;; ) T}
Hn,-i - 6, Hn~n - T
Q(hn,tvc,hn~) - {vn~U(hn,NC,yo(hn,tvc)) C U(hni,TJ~(hni))}
~w~(hn,NCihni) - {vn~U(hn~NCi~JO(hn~NC)) 7 U(hnjiTJi(hni))}
with hn,NC defined in (3.59) and y~(h) - w~h ~~~
Rj(hn~NC~ hn) - A; ~ Q~(hn,NCi hn) 7- 1,...,Tn
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S;(hn,NC) - B; nQ'(hn,tvc,Hni) j- 1,...,m
Zo~ - Bo fl {~U~ rR;(O,hn)~ U ~UmiS;(0)~}
Zoz - Ao n l lUm~Ri(ho, hn)~ U~U~-isi(hn)~I
Z;1 - B; n Q(hn,IVC,Hn;) j- 1,...,m
Z;2 - A; n nw(hn,NCihn) j- 1,...,m
Z` - ~Um,Z;,~ U (U~oZjz~
(3.A.17)
Zol is the set of vn for which optimal labour supply is zero, Z0z is the set for which it is
optimal to be in the first segment of the budget constraint, before the non-convexity kink
Hno, Zj1 is the set for which optimal labour supply is equal to the j-th kink, j- 1, ..., m,
Zjz is the set for which it is optimal to be on the j-th segment after the non-convexity
kink, j- 1, ..., m and Z' is the set for which optimal labour supply is positive.
We now determine the probability that observed labour supply is zero, conditional on
the value of vn. According to (3.17) there are two possibilities for observed labour supply
to be zero. The first happens when optimal labour supply is zero. Then observed labour
supply is equal to zero, irrespective of the value of ineasurement error. So if vn is from
the set for which optimal labour supply is zero, the probability that observed labour
supply is zero, conditional on vn, is equal to one. The second possibility for observed
labour supply to be zero occurs when optimal labour supply is positive but optimal
labour supply plus measurement error is negative. Summarizing, the probability that
observed labour supply is zero, conditional on vn becomes:
P(hn - O~vn, wn) - 1 if vn E Zol
- ~(-á) if 1In E Z;1, j- 1, ..., m
~
- ~ -á ]f vn E Z;2i7 - 0,...,m
in which ~(.) is the standard normal distribution function.
(3.A.18)
The contribution of positive values of labour supply, conditional on vn, is restricted
to vn E Z` for which optimal labour supply is positive.
X(hnlvniwn) - ~(hn - Hn;,af) if vn E Z;l,i - 1,...,m
(3.A.19)
X(hnlvn~wn) - ~lhn -hni~F) if vnEZ;z,j-O,...,m
Having determined the density of observed labour supply, conditional on vn, the uncon-
ditional contribution can be obtained by integrating over vn.
P(hn - O~wn) - fz~uzo~ P(hn - O~v~wn)9(v,7i,yz)dv if hn - 0
(3.A.20)
l(hnlwn) - .1z~X(hnlviwn)9(vi~Yli7z)dv if h.n 10
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or, making use of (3.A.18) and ( 3.A.19)
P(h„ - O~w„) -
r i 1
Jze, 9(v,7i,72)dv f~ fZr~ ~(- a~') 9(v,7i,7z)dv
f~JZ' ~ -áf I 9(v,7i,7z)dv




J ~(hn - Hni, OE )91v,
~Í1, ~Ïz)dv ~ ~ ~ ~(hn - hn, QE )9(v,71, iz)dv
i-~ Z~' i-o Z~'
(3.A.22)
ifh„)0
For an individua] whose labour supply is zero, wages are not observed and they are
integrated out. The final response probability becomes
fw P(h„ - O~w)w(w,t~,TZ)dw (3.A.23)
0
The problem with the above defined sets is that the bounds of these sets are not known
explicitly. The advantage of the frequency simulator in the context of an integral with
bounds that are known implicitly only, is that it is possible to draw random numbers
and then check in which region the simulated value of labour supply is.lz
We now describe the construction of the frequency simulator. The first thing we need
is drawings from the distributions of ineasurement errors, wages and random preferences.
As measurement errors are normally distributed, a series of R random numbers can be
drawn from the standard normal distribution which will be kept constant during the
minimization process. These basic drawings can be transformed to drawings from the
distribution of e„ through multiplying by vE. Any change in the drawings of e„ is caused
by a change in Q~.
To draw a series of gross wages we also start by drawing a series of R standard normal
random variables 1;,,, r- 1, ..., R, which are the constant basic drawings. These basic
drawings can be transformed to drawings of the wage rate:
w exp(rn,,, ~ Tln,.)
w` - ) r - 1 ... R (3.A.24)nr - 1 ~- eXp(rrtn ~ Tinr ' ' '
The transformation is continuous in the parameters and therefore, keeping the basic
drawings constant, a change in the drawings w;,, can only be caused by a change in the
parameters.
'ZNote that it is possible to simulate (3.A.23) by drawing wages and tandom preferences from their
respective distributions, without drawing measurement etror, then checking the region (Zii or Ziz) and
setting the contribution to the simulator equal to the conditional probability corresponding to this region,
evaluated in the drawings. This results in a piecewise continuous simulator, whicó is a combination of
a frequency simulator and a smooth simulator. The possibility to construct this type of simulator
however, depends strongly on the model structure imposed in (3.15)-(3.17), which would change if
dynamic elements, fixed cost of working, separation of the labour supply decision and participation
decision, etc. were introduced. Therefore, the general applicable frequency simulator is employed here.
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The generation of random numbers from the negative gamma distribution is not as
straightforward as the generation of random numbers from a normal distribution. The
method commonly used for the generation of gamma random numbers is the acceptance-
rejection method. Although this method is very useful for generating gamma random
numbers if the parameters remaín constant, the use of this method in the context of a
minimization problem with changing parameters is not appropriate. A change in the
parameters can cause discrete jumps in the drawings. The alternative would be to gen-
erate random numbers by means of the inversion method, see e.g. Devroye (1986). A
major drawback of this method is that for every draw the negative gamma distribution
function has to be inverted using numerical methods. Experiments with the inversion
method have shown that the application of this method in the context of an estimation
problem leads to an infeasibly high computational burden, even in rather simple prob-
lems. Therefore, the inversion method applied in estimation by simulation procedures
is only useful either if the functional form of the inverse of the distribution function is
known, or if a good approximation for the inverse of the distribution function is avail-
able. A third possibility is to use importance sampling. In that procedure the random
numbers are drawn from a different distribution with favourable characteristics and it is
corrected for drawing from a different distribution by the use of a weight function. This
is the procedure which we use here. We draw random numbers from the exponential
distribution with parameter p:
A(p,vn) - pexp{pv„},-oo G v„ G 0,p 1 0 (3.A.25)
Because this is not the "true" (assumed) distribution, the frequency simulator has to be
weighted, like in importance sampling. The weight function !c(vn, ry~, ry2i p) is the ratio
of the negative gamma density function and the negative exponential density function.
k v~,?'i,ry2,P) -
9(vn~ryi,7a) - 1 7~ (-vn)7~-lexp 1 p vn 3.A.26
( A(P,vn) r(ryi)rya P ?'z - )
( )
The fact that we draw from the exponential distribution instead of the gamma distri-
bution increases the variance of the estimator. In the first place we have to choose the
parameter p in such a way that the variance wil] be finite and second, the choice of
p has to make the addition to the variance as small as possible. In the implementa-
tion a random number v from the negative exponential density in (3.A.25) is inserted
in (3.A.26), so in calculating the mean and the variance of the weight function we do
this with respect to the negative exponential density. By construction, the mean of the
weight function is always equal to one. Note that if it is drawn from the true density
the weight function is identically equal to one and as a consequence the variance of the
weight function is equal to zero. Therefore, the larger the deviation of the shape of the
approximate density function from the true density function is, the larger the variance
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will be, see e.g. Kloek and Van Dijk (1978). The expression for the variance is given by:
E~k(v, 7~, 7z, P))z - 1-
o(g v,ryt,ryz 1 z A v dv - 1-f~ l n(a,v) 1 (P, )











This is the difference of the mean of the weight function with respect to the true density
function g(v, ryl, ryz) and the mean of the weight function with respect to A(v, p) which
is equal to one. (3.A.29) is the necessary condition for the variance to be finite. The
smallest variance can be obtained by choosing p in such a way that the variance of the
weight function is minimized. Solving the first order conditions and checking the second




Note, that condition (3.A.29) is satisfied if condition (3.A.28) is satisfied.
Summarizing, the drawing procedure for vn is as follows. Draw a series of R random
numbers "v;,r from the exponential distribution with parameter p. These are our basic
drawings. Transform the basic drawings to drawings vn,. from an exponential distribution
with parameter y-~ by multiplying the basic drawings by rylryz:
vnr - ili'zvnr (3.A.31)
Note that this is a continuous transformation in ryl and yz. These are the final drawings
which will be used in the simulation of the labour supply.
Having described the way of generating the required random numbers, we now turn to
the simulation of the probability. Using the drawings ( Enr, 1fln,., vnr) the optimal labour
supply hn,. and the observed labour supply hn, can be simulated according to scheme
(3.59) and the participation rules (3.16) and (3.17). Then the participation probability
can be simulated by a frequency simulator like in (3.60)-(3.62) where (3.60) has to be
weighted. The frequency simulator becomes:
fnr - k(vnT,?'i,7z,P) if hnr 1 0 (3.A.32)
fn,. - 0 otherwise (3.A.33)
FnR - R ~r~--1 fnr (3.A.34)
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By construction, this is an unbiased simulator for the participation probability.
The estimation method also requires a simulator of the derivatives of the probability
with respect to the parameters. Let FnR(B) denote the frequency simulator in parameter
vector B. Then the derivative with respect to the k-th component of B is simulated by a
difference interval of frequency simulators:
irt k(B E` v' w` )- FnR(B } Sek) - FnR(B)n ~ R~ Ri R ~ (3.A.35)
where ek is the k-th unit vector. Because FnR(B -~ óek) is an unbiased simulator of
the participation probability in B~- óek and FnR(B) is an unbiased simulator of the
participation probability in B, (3.A.35) is an unbiased simulator of the difference interval
of the participation probability. Because FnR(B) is discontinuous in the parameter vector
B we have to choose ó large enough to ensure that the sum of the difference interval over
all individuals and all drawings in (3.30) is not equal to zero. The larger the number
of drawings R is, the smaller the value of ó can be. To construct the optimal matrix of
instruments, which only has to be calculated once at the beginning of the optimization
procedure, a large number of drawings can be used. In our empirical applications we
used 800 drawings.
We now turn to the simulation of the continuous part of the score vector. First,
we abstract from the problems that arise because the bounds are unknown, and from
the problem that we cannot draw directly from the gamma distribution. Note, that it
is possible to simulate the integral appearing in the log-likelihood function unbiasedly.
Draw random numbers vnr from the density g(v,ryl,y2) restricted to the region Z' for
which optima] labour supply is positive, defined in (3.A.17).
v. 9(v, 7~, 72) v. E Z` (3.A.36)nr ~ P(v E Z ')' nr
An unbiased simulator for l(hn~wn) is
or, writing this out:
1(hn~wn) - P(v E Z`)~ ~X(hn~ vnriTUn ) (3.A.37)
r-1
llhnl wn) -
R m m 1
k ni c }[~ I ( vnr E ZJl )`Y(hn - Iiln7,
Q2) 11P(v E Z`)1~ ~ I(vnr E Zi2)~(hn - hJ a) [~ ,(,R r-~ ;-o ;-~
(3.A.38)
in which h'~ is computed on the basis of v;,r and I(.) the indicator function. A sim-




separately. This introduces a bias in the simulation of the score in the sense that the
expectation evaluated in the true parameter vector will not be equal to zero. However,
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this simulator for the continuous part of the score contribution is piecewise continuous
and therefore it does not have the unfavourable characteristics of a probability frequency
simulator in the context of simulated maximum likelihood, see e.g. Lerman and Manski
(1981).
An additional complication arises from the fact that the bounds of the region Z` are
unknown. Hence we have to draw from a different region Z' which contains the original
region, i.e. Z' C Z`, and which approximates the original region as close as possible.
Consider the region
Z` - {77I - 00 G 1I G lJ(LY, ~, wn, i~n) }
9(a,~,wn,Wn) - -hnilaz if - hnilaz G 0 (3.A.40)
- 0 if - hnl~az ~ 0
-h~~ ~az is the value of v for which hn is equal to zero. The region Z' of positive optimal
labour supply is contained in this region. The simulation procedure now becomes as
follows: Draw a random number vnf from the negative exponential distribution with
parameter p:
vn,. ~ pexp{pvn,.},-oo G vnr G O (3.A.41)
Define vn,, as
vnr - v;,,. } 4(~, ~, wn, N'n) (3.A.42)
As a consquence, v;,,. is a truncated negative exponential variable:
v~r N pexp{py~,.} vn,. E Z` (3.A.43)
P(v E Z')
Now we construct a simulator that is a combination between a smooth simulator and a
frequency simulator. The simulator 1(h„~wn) becomes
P(vR Z~) ~I(vnr E Zf)X(hn~vnT,wn)k(vnr,ry~,7z,P) (3.A.44)
.-i
Until now, we have considered the integration of the integrals appearing in the nu-
merator and denominator of the score contribution separately. However, it is possible
to construct a simulator on the basis of the vector of scores which has expectation zero
in the true parameter vector. The drawback of this simulator is that we have to draw
the random preference variables from their conditional density, i.e. conditional on the
observed value of labour supply. The density function conditional on labour supply con-
tains the same integral which we want to avoid to evaluate. Hence, we will consider an
approximation. First consider the score of the log-likelihood contribution with respect
to parameters that appear in the integrand only. Note that the derivatives of g(v,-yl,ryz)
with respect to its parameters can always be written as a multiple of g(v, ryi, ryz) and
therefore they can be treated in the same way as the following case.
The derivative of l(hn~w„) with respect to v? is
al(h„~w„) - aX(h„w,w„)g(v,7t,7z)dv (3.A.45)a~f .ÍZ. a~2
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and
alnl(hn~wn) - al(hn~wn)~l(hn~wn) (3.A.46)a~É - a~f
For expository purposes, we ignore again for the moment the problem of the unknown
bounds of Z'. Now suppose that vn, can be drawn from
9(v~71~yz)X(hn~v,wn) v E Z` (3.A.47)
l(hn~TUn)
Then the score contribution can be simulated by








Taking expectations with respect to the draws vn,., this yields the original score compo-
nent.
For parameters which appear in the bounds of the integral we also have to difFerentiate
the bounds. Suppose that the bound of the region Z' is given by b. Optimal labour
supply, evaluated in the bound is zero. Taking the derivatives of the bound yields
f á~~(hn,~É)9(b,7~,~r~)~l(hn~wn) (3.A.49)
where the sign is positive or negative, depending on whether it is an upperbound or
a lowerbound. Taking expectations with respect to positive values of observed labour
supply, i.e. with respect to the density l(hn~wn)~P(hn ) 0) yields:
~ 1
ab9(b,7i,71)~P(hn ~ 0) - 1
afa~ 9(v,7i,7s)dv~P(hn ~ 0) (3.A.50)2 a~9 2 a,9
which is one half times the derivative of the probability that optimal labour supply
exceeds zero, divided by the probability that observed labour supply exceeds zero. Now
the same trick can be applied as in Bloemen and Kapteyn (1993a), which means that the
original derivative of the bound is replaced by one half times the probability that optimal
labour supply is greater than zero for every individual in the sample, both working and
non-working. The derivative of the probability that optimal labour supply is zero can be
simulated in the same way as in (3.A.35). Summarizing, for parameters which appear in
the bound as well as in the integrand we can use the same kind of simulator as in (3.A.48)
and in addition to that, we have to adjust the score contribution with a simulator of the
derivative of the probability that optimal labour supply is positive for both working and
non-working individuals. The resulting score simulator has expectation zero in the true
parameter vector. For the problem of the unobserved bounds of Z`, the same method
can be used as in (3.A.44).
The practical appliability of this score method is restricted by the fact that random
draws from the conditional density are required. The method, however, still has the
advantage that the discontinuities are averaged out as the simulated score consists of
linear contributions. Therefore, it is useful to draw random number from an approximate
density. The most straightforward way to draw random numbers in this context is to
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draw them from their marginal distribution. In that case the score contribution will not
be unbiased anymore, i.e. the appropriate moment conditions are used in combination
with the wrong draws. This point can be made more clear if, for the moment, we ignore
the tax system. Suppose that optimal labour supply is given by the function h„(v„) for
individual n. The participation scheme (3.16) and (3.17) for observed labour supply is




~ ~ ~(~, ~~ ) (3.A.52)
as before. Then for positive h„ we have
hn ~ f,~(hn - hn(v), QÉ )9(v)dv~P(hn 1 0) ( 3.A.53)
z
in which Z' is, as before, the region for which optimal labour supply is positive. Now
draw vn, from its marginal density g(.), whereas h„ can be considered as a draw from
(3.A.53). Then the implied density for En,. :- h„ - h„(vn,.) is
f, f,~(Enr f h ,.(v) - hn(v)~~É)9(v)9("v)dvdv~[P(v E Z')P(hn ) 0)~ (3.A.54)
which is not equal to ~(E;,r, Q?)~P(h„ 1 0). R,ather, it is a weighted average of
~(En, v2)~P(h„ ~ 0). Note, that the implicit draws En, are always in the right region,
i.e. hn(vn,.) ~ Enr ) 0. It can be shown that the parameter estimate for the variance of
measurement error is biased upwards.
The Monte Carlo results in section 3.6 are obtained with method (3.A.48) using draws
form the marginal density of v. From the results it can be seen that the estimate of the
variance of ineasurement error is indeed biased upwards. However, the estimates of the
utility parameters do rather well.
Chapter 4
A model of labour supply with job
offer restrictions
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter a model of labour supply is set up in which individuals are restricted
in their choice by the job offers that are offered to them by the employers. In the mid-
eighties it was recognized that the standard neo-classical labour supply model (see e.g.
Heckman (1974), Hausman (1980)), in which wages are fixed and the optimal number
of working hours can always be chosen, was not in accordance with reality. Dickens and
Lundberg (1985) introduced hours restrictions into the labour supply model assuming
that hours arrive from a discrete offer distribution. Tummers and Woittiez (1991) ex-
tended the model by making the wage rate dependent on hours. Van Soest, Woittiez
and Kapteyn (1990) compared the standard model with the model with hours restric-
tions using a Dutch data set on labour supply, taking into account the tax system, and
their estimation results are relevant empirical evidence in favour of the hours restric-
tions model. In Blundell, Ham and Meghir (1987) a different approach to restrictions
on the labour market is followed. Here the emphasis is on the modelling of involuntary
unemployment.
Although wages can vary with the number of hours offered in these models, for ex-
ample because individuals base their decisions on net wages, the possibility that wages
also vary from job offer to job offer because of an independent wage offer effect is not
taken into consideration. We will assume that, like in job search theory (see Mortensen
(1986) for an overview), wages arrive from a wage offer distribution.
We thus make the assumption that a job offer consists of two characteristics. It has
a wage component and an hours component. An individual will choose the job yielding
the highest utility level. If all jobs offered generate utility levels less than the utility of
not working, the individual is observed to be non-working. The possibility is left open
that an individual will receive no job offer at all, so involuntary unemployment may
arise. Only wage-hours offers that are accepted will be observed. The distribution of the
observed wages will depend on the structure of the model and therefore it is not possible
to use a twostep procedure to estimate the labour supply parameters, estimating the
parameters of the wage ditribution separately. All parameters of the model have to be
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estimated simultaneously.
As opposed to previous studies, like Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest,
Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990), the distribution of the number of job offers is made de-
pendent on individual characteristics. It is tested for the significance of the dependence
of the average number of job offers on individual characteristics. Particular attention is
paid to the effects on the parameter estimates of the utility function, as the introduction
of an individual specific number of job offers turns out to have serious consequences for
these estimates.
The model is estimated both with and without hours dependence of the wage equation,
which enables us to test for the significance of hours in the wage equation. The estimates
of the specification with hours in the wage equation provide a different explanation
for observing low frequencies of weekly working hours above the full time level than
specifications without hours dependent wages.
Simulation experiments are performed to compare the empirical frequency distribu-
tion of working hours with the frequency distribution that is generated by the model.
Moreover, it is tested formally whether the simulated hours distribution and the empir-
ical hours distribution are equal.
In section 2 we present the model and formulate the likelihood function. In section
3 the maximum likelihood estimates of various model specifications are presented. Sim-
ulation experiments and formal testing procedures are performed. Finally, in section 4,
some concluding remarks are made.
4.2 The model
The model assumes that the individual cannot supply the optimal number of working
hours which results from maximizing utility subject to a budget constraint, like in the
standard labour supply model, in which typically no involuntary unemployment can
occur, see e.g. Heckman (1974) and Hausman (1980). Instead, it is assumed that the
individual, at a given point in time, receives a random amount of job offers from the
employers. A job offer is characterized by a wage rate and a weekly number of working
hours. The job offers are compated with each other by their utility level. The individual
selects the job with the highest utility level, which is compared with the utility level of
not working, after which it is decided whether or not the job is accepted. Note that
the model is fully static in the sense that all job offers arrive at a given point in time
and the job acceptance decision is made immediately, without taking into account the
possibility of future job offers. Therefore, the model can be estimated with cross section
data. In chapter 5 of this thesis a sequential job search model is presented in which a
job not only has a wage component, as is usua] in the standard job search model, see
e.g. Mortensen (1986), but has an hours component as well, as in the (static) Dickens
and Lundberg (1985) model. In this sequential search model, apart from data on labour
supply and the wage rate, use is made of duration data in the estimation of the model,
so the availability of a panel survey is a requirement. In making the job acceptance
decision the expectations with respect to possible future job oft"ers are taken into acount
as well.
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The present model provides a link between the static Dickens and Lundberg (1985)
model, in which only the number of working hours varies from job offer to job offer, and
the standard job search model in which the wage rate is the only job component.
The number of job offers is assumed to be Poisson distributed with parameter .~. An
advantage of this specification, as opposed to the binomial specification of Tummers and
Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest et al. (1990), is that it can easily be made dependent on
individual characteristics. In these previous studies, the effect of individual characteris-
tics, like age and the level of education, on the number of job offers, have typically been
ignored. Moreover, in the binomial distribution a fixed maximum number of job offers
has to be chosen in advance.
A job offer is modelled as a simultaneous draw of a wage rate w and a weekly number
of working hours h from a joint wage hours offer distribution f(w, h).
As in the Dickens and Lundberg (1985) approach we assume that there is a discrete
hours offer distribution defined over m fixed numbers of positive hours h~,1 - 1, ..., m.
That is, hours are grouped into m categories, where the probability of drawing from
category d is given by p~. The advantage of this approach is that no heavy restrictions,
like single peakedness or symmetry, are placed on the shape of the distribution. The
price which has to be paid for this flexibility of the sha.pe of the hours distribution is
that labour supply can only take a discrete number of values.
P(h - hi) - pr, d- 1, ..., m (4.1)
In the estimation the probabilities can be parametrized as
~~
pi - C~„~ , F~i - 1 (4.2)
L.k-1 ~k
in which pl has been normalized to 1 and the remaining p~ are non-negative.
The wage rate, conditional on h- h~, is assumed to be lognormally distributed. Tum-
mers and Woittiez (1991) also estimated the wage distribution jointly with the labour
supply probabilities, but they use a normal wage distribution, thereby not restricting
the range of possible wages to positive values. The wage specification becomes
In w - ~~~ d- v (4.3)
v ~ N(O,vv) (4.4)
or equivalently
w- exp(xjrl)u with u - exp(v) (4.5)
in which the subindex 1 indicates possible dependence on h~. The joint job offer density
fimctio~ be~comes
1 1 ~ 1 1
f(w, hr) - - exp --[In w - r~'x~]21 p~, 0 G w G o0, 1 - 1, ..., m (4.6)
- 2~r w 2vv
For ease of exposition it is assumed for the moment that the budget constraint is
linear, ignoring the tax system.
y - wh ~- ~e (4.7)
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where y, is non-labour income.
The utility function is defined over labour supply h and income y and is indicated
by u(h,y). The specification of the utility function is the Hausman ( 1980) specification.
Maximizing this utility function subject to a linear budget constraint yields a labour
supply function which is linear in both non-labour income and the wage rate.
u(h, y) -- ln(ry - Qh) - Q(h
- Xë - e- Qy) (4.8)
ry-Qh
where
~ Q, ry, ó are parameters, Q G 0, ry 1 0
~ y is disposable income
~ h is the number of working hours
~ e is an unobserved random taste variable, e~ N(O,vé)
~ X is a vector of individual characteristics
At a given point in time, an individual receives n job offers each of them consisting of
a wage w, 0 G w G oo and a number of working hours h E {hl, ..., hm}. Furthermore, an
individual can always choose not to work. The alternative which yields the highest level
of utility will be chosen. An individual will be observed to be non-working if the utility
level of not working exceeds the utility level of al] of the n job offers. The number of job
offers is assumed to be a Poisson distributed random variable.
exp(-~)~"
p(n) - , n - 0,1, ..., oo (4.9)
n!
Note, that it is possible that no jobs are offered at all so that individuals can be invol-
untarily unemployed.
In order to write down the likelihood function the likelihood contribution of non-
working and working individuals will be determined separately. Suppose that for a
working individual we observe the wage-hours pair (w., hl,), where 1, E{ 1, ..., m}. The
fact that (w„ h~, ) is observed means that all other job offers, if there are any, are from
the set of wage-hours packages which yield at most the same utility level as the observed
pair. This set has to be determined. For every level of hours h~, l- 1, ..., m, the set A~(e)
of wages can be determined which includes all wage levels w for which u(ht, wh~ f~) G
u(h~,, w,h~, f p) for a given value of e.
Ar(e) :- {w~u(h~, wh~ ~- p) G u(h~,, w,h~, -h p)~e} (4.10)
The probability P(w„ h~, ~e) of drawing an arbitrary job offer which yields at most the
same utility level as the observed job (w„ h~, ) equals the probability of drawing a job
offer from any of the sets A~(e), i.e.
m
P(w„hi, ~e) :- P(u(h, wh f p) C u(h~,, w,hl, f p)~e) -~ piP(w E Ai(e)~e) (4.11)
t-~
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Using the distributional assumptions in (4.3) and (4.4) yields
P(w E Ai(e)~e) - ~(~s~()-n'x,) if gt(e) 1 0 (4.12)
- 0 if gt(e) C 0 (4.13)
with ~(.) the standard normal distribution function and
7-Ph~
9t(e) -(ry -~ht)
ln 7-a,l,, -(ht, - ht)(7 - QXb - Qe - Qz~C) t y- Qht ht, w. (4.14)
QZht Qht(7 - Qht.) 7-(~ht. ht
Note that if 1- 1' the first two terms of (4.14) are equal to zero, whereas the last term
becomes w`.
Now assume that there are n job offers (w(;), h(;)), j- 1, ..., n. Only the job with the
highest utility level, (w„ht,) is observed if its utility level is higher than uo - u(0,p),
the utility level of not working which we will call the reservation utility level. So
(w., ht.) -(w(~), h(i)) if u(h(i), w(i)h(i) f h) ~
and u(h(1), w(1)á(I) f Ft) ~




) u(h(i)~ w(i)h(i) ~ h)
j - 1, ..., n,7 ~ 2
and u(h(z), w(z)h(z) f ll) )
(w., ht.) -(w(„), h(~)) ]f u(h(„), w(~)h(n) -b fi) 7






The observed job is the result of any of these n possibilities and therefore, the likelihood
contribution of the observed job equals n times the probability that there are n- 1
job offers with a utility level that does not exceed the utility level of the observed job,
times the wage offer density function evaluated in the observed wage rate w„ times
the probability pt, of drawing the observed number of working hours ht,. The likelihood
contribution of an observed wage-hours pair, conditional on e and the number of drawings
n, becomes:
1(w.,ht,~e~n) - n~P(w.,ht.~e)~n-'k(T".,rl~~,a„)pt. 1. E {1,...,rre}
u(ht., w~ht. f !~) ~ uo
(4.16)
where k(.) is the log-normal density function of wage offers. Note that if n equals zero the
likelihood contribution of the observed value is zero, as observing a job is in contradiction
with the occurrence of zero job offers. If n- 1, there is no choice among different jobs
and the likelihood contribution of observing (w„ ht, ) becomes just the job offer density
evaluated in the observed job.
(4.16) is multiplied by the probability that n occurs, after which we sum over all n
to obtain the likelihood contribution of the observed wage-hours package, conditional on
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the unobserved preference parameter e:
l(w.,h~,~e) - aexp{-a[1 - P(w.,ht.~e)]}k(w.,n~x,o„)P~. l. E{1,...,rn}
u(hi.,w.hi. f l~) ~ uo
(4.17)
For an individual who is not working, none of the n job offers generate a utility level
which exceeds the utility level of not working, where we have to take into account that
n actually may be zero. Then the probability that none of the n job offers is acceptable
is given by
P(h - O~e~ n) - (P(O~e)]n (4.18)
where
m
P(O~e) - ~PiP(w E A~o(e)~e) (4.19)
t-i
where A~o(e) is defined as in (4.10), with h~, replaced by zero and g~(e) in (4.12) and
(4.13) is replaced by gio(e), which is gi(e) with ht, replaced by zero.
Multiplying by the probability that n job offers arrive and summing over all possible n,
including n- 0, gives the likelihood contribution of a non-working individual, conditional
on e:
1(h - O~e) - exp{-.~[1 - P(O~e)]} (4.20)
To remove the conditioning on the random preference parameter, the likelihood con-
tribution has to be integrated over all e, -oo G e G oo. For the working individuals
the likelihood contribution is zero if u(ht,,w,h~, d- P) G uo and therefore the effective
integration region becomes
B :- {e~ua G u(h~„w,hi, -}-P)} (4.21)
The final likelihood contribution for an individual with a job becomes
l(w„h~,)- fBd(w.,hl,~e)~e~~ae~de,l, E{1,...,m},0 G w G oo (4.22)
where ~(.) is the standard normal dens`ity function. Note, that the range of w is (0, oo)
after having integrated out e as the region B is non-empty for every positive wage rate,
i.e. there always exists a range of random preferences such that working is preferred over
non-working for every positive wage rate.
For the non-working individuals the likelihood contribution becomes
l(h - 0) - f exp{-.~[1 - P(O~e)]} 1~~e~ de (4.23)
~e `Qe
If the tax system is introduced the procedure remains basica,lly the same. The prob-
abilities in (4.12) have to be adapted and split up in accordance with the brackets in the
tax system.
4.3. ESTIMATION RESULTS 83
4.3 Estimation results
The model is estimated using a sample of 849 married women in the year 1985,
obtained from the Organization for Strategic Labourmarket Research (OSA). In order
to estimate the model the m hours categories of the hours offer distribution have to
be chosen. To specify the discrete hours offer distribution, the hours are grouped into
categories each of which contain four hours levels. As a consequence, the discrete hours
distribution becomes
P(h - hi) - p~ with hi - 4 x 1,1 - 1, ..., m (4.24)
In order to be able to identify all the probabilities, some equality restrictions are placed
on probabilities of hours categories which have a low sample frequency. These restrictions
are
Pi-Pz-Ps-Pa
Ps - P~ (4.25)
Piz - Pls - Pia - Pis
The value of m is chosen to be 15 in which case the maximum number of hours with
a positive probability is 60, which coincides with the largest number of hours observed
in the sample. The vector of individual characteristics X which appears in the utility
function (4.8) consists of a constant (Xl with parameter ól), the logarithm of the family
size (Xz with parameter óz) and a dummy indicator for the number of children with
age below 6(X3 with parameter ó3). The latter two are characteristics of which it is
reasonable to assume that they affect the participation decision through the preferences,
i.e. they affect the reservation utility level. The vector of characteristics x in the wage
offer distribution consists of age variables to approximate the age-earnings profile and
of education dummies as an approximation for human capital. To be more precise, xl
is the constant term with parameter r~~, xz and x3 are the logarithm of age~17 and its
square, respectively, with paremeters riz and ~3, where the division by 17 is just a matter
of normalization, and x9i xs, xs, x~ with parameters ~4 -~~ are education dummies, with
x4 the lowest level of education, xs is the next to the lowest level etc.
As a point of departure the model is estimated with a linear budget constraint,
whereas the parameter a, representing the average number of job offers according to
the Poisson distribution, does not depend on individual characteristics, which is also
the case in the studies by Tummers and Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest, Woittiez and
Kapteyn (1990). Table 4.1 shows the estimation results as well as estimates of the stan-
dard errors. The parameter estimates of log-family size and the number of children
with age below six, óz and ó3 respectively, have a strong positive effect on the reserva-
tion utility level. The estimate ~- 36.7 of the Poisson distribution seems to be rather
high, indicating that the individuals in the sample are not that restricted. To compare,
in Tummers and Woittiez (1991), the fixed maximum number of job offers in their bi-
nomial distribution was set equal to 10. The estimate has a sizeable standard error,
however. From the estimates of the hours offer probabilities it can be seen that there
are peaks at the numbers of hours of 20, 32 and 40, which can also be found back in the
empirical distribution of labour supply. The age-earnings profile takes on its maximum
value at the age of 33.
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Having obtained parameter estimates it is possible to simulate the distribution of
hours. The simulated hours frequencies can be compared with the observed hours fre-
quencies. For each individual, a random preference parameter e and a number of job
offers n is drawn from their assumed distributions. Then n wage-hours pairs are drawn,
the utility levels are calculated and the highest utility level is compared with the utility
of non-working to make the participation decision. This procedure is repeated 10 times
and the resulting frequencies ca.n be found in table 4.2. The second column in table 4.2
shows the observed frequencies and the third column shows the simulated frequencies.
The participation decision is predicted well and the peaks at 20, 32 and 40 hours a week
are predicted by the model.
Given the values of the parameter estimates it is possible to simulate the desired
number of working hours, i.e. the number of working hours the individual would have
chosen if she were not restricted in hours, which is the tangency point of the indifference
curve and the budget constraint. Then we can simulate the frequency distribution of
desired hours. In the case of a]inear budget constraint the utility maximizing number
of hours of utility function (4.8) is h with
h- 0 if h' C 0 (4.26)
-h' ifh'~0 (4.27)
h' - Q~ -f- ryw f X8 ~ e (4.28)
The simulation procedure is as follows. Draw a random preference parameter e and a
number of job offers n. As the individual is not restricted in her working hours the only
characteristic of a job that counts is the wage rate. Draw n wage rates and choose the
highest. Calculate h' in (4.28) and make the participation decision according to (4.26)
and (4.27). Count the frequencies at which the hours occur. The results are in the
fourth column of table 4.2. We can see that desired participation is somewhat higher
than the actual participation: the frequency of observed participation is 0.390, whereas
the frequency of desired participation is 0.473. This suggests that there is involuntary
unemployment. Also, we see that the desired participation at 40 hours a week is about
three times smaller than the actual participation at 40 hours a week. For positive hours,
the hours distributions are plotted in the figures 4.1 and 4.2. In figure 4.1 we see the
sample distribution and the distribution of simulated hours. In figure 4.2 the sample
distribution can be compared with the distribution of desired hours. The distribution of
desired hours clearly does not match the sample distribution. The peaks at the values
of 20, 32 and 40 are not present in the distribution of desired hours.
So far, the parameter ~ of the Poisson distribution which influences the number of
job offers received by individuals has been the same for everybody. However, there are
good reasons to assume that the number of job offers received by the individuals may
differ across individuals. Young persons may get more job offers than older persons.
The number of job offers may be different for workers who work in different sections of
the economy. Different levels of education imply different kinds of jobs and the hiring
procedures for the higher educated are usually not the same as those for individuals with
a low level of education. Therefore, the Poisson parameter has been made dependent on
individual characteristics:
~; - exp(B'z;),i - 1,...,N (4.29)
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TABLE 4.1 PARAMETER ESTIMATES

































































piz - pis - p,a - p,s 0.00556 0.00242
Log-likelihood value: -2002.4699
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TABLE 4.2 SIMULATED HOURS FREQUENCIES





















































Figure 4.1: Distribution of working hours per week
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of working hours per week
The vector z; contains the individual characteristics. The characteristics which are in-
cluded are the constant term with parameter Bl, an age variable with parameter B2i
dummy variables which indicate the type of education (B3 and B9) and the level of edu-
cation (parameters BS - Bg). Three types of education are distinguished: non-technical
and non-commercial type of education, indicated by secl in table 4.3 (parameter B3),
semi-technical and semi-commercial type of education (sec2, B4), and technical and com-
mercial type of education for which no dummy variable is included. The estimation
results are in table 4.3. Before considering the parameter estimates, the values of the
log-likelihood functions of the specifications with and without a characteristic dependent
Poisson parameter are compared. The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic to test
the nullhypothesis that ~ is independent of characteristics ( BZ - B3 -... - Bs - 0) is
83.58, which is well above the critical value at the 5Plo level of 14.07.
Looking at the estimates of the utility parameters it can be seen that there are large
increases in the (absolute) values of the estimates, including that of the standard de-
viation of the random taste parameter, as compared to the estimates of the invariant
Poisson parameter model in table 4.1. Comparing the estimates of the parameters in B
with their standard errors we see that the age variable has a negative and significant ef-
fect, the dummy indicators for the semi-technical and semi-commercial type of education
are positive and significant. The signs of the education dummy parameters are negative
which indicates that the highest level of education has a higher Poisson parameter than
the lower four levels of education. However, only the dummy for the second level is
significant.
The distribution of hours is simulated in order to see how well the model tracks
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of working hours per week, variation in ~
the empirical distribution. The simulated frequencies are in table 4.4. The results
are comparable to those in table 4.2. In the last column of table 4.4 are the desired
frequencies, i.e. the frequencies of the number of hours which would have been chosen
according to the estimates of the utility parameters if the individual were not restricted
in the choice of hours. There is a large proportion of agents which is willing to work more
than 60 hours a week. This is largely the result of the large variance of the unobserved
taste parameter. Again, the hours distributions are plotted. Figure 4.3 shows the sample
distribution and the distribution of simulated hours and figure 4.4 shows the sample
distribution along with the distribution of desired hours. The distribution of simulated
hours matches the sample distribution very well. The distribution of desired hours is so
flat that it almost appears as a straight line in the figure.
So far, the following conclusions can be drawn. From the significance of the likelihood
ratio test statistic it becomes clear that dependence of the distribution of the number
of job offers on individual characteristics cannot be ignored, as was done in Tummers
and Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990). At the same time,
however, we see that if the parameter ~ is made dependent on relevant individual char-
acteristics, preferences seem to play no further role. The distribution of desired hours
becomes very flat. This may of course be the result of the fact that demand side re-
strictions play such an important role on the labour market that they fully determine
the behaviour of individuals. A different explanation for the phenomenon is that once
the Poisson distribution has been made dependent on individual characteristics, there is
simply not enough information in the data set to trace down the underlying preference
structure. Furthermore, although it is possible to interprete the parameter estimates
4.3. ESTIMATION RESULTS
TABLE 4.3 PARAMETER ESTIMATES WITH VARIATION IN a
Parameters Estimates Standard errors
,Q -0.163 0.319
ry 22.613 47.508
b, (const) 409.473 739.121
b2 (log fs) -421.260 820.003
b3 (~ childG6) -264.451 523.084
Qe 248.687 484.629
B, (const) 3.759 0.545
B2 (log(age~17)) -3.378 0.317
B3 (secl) 1.417 1.427
BQ (sec2) 0.397 0.165
BS (educl) -0.568 0.525
Bs (educ2) -0.970 0.515
B~ (educ3) -0.445 0.483
B8 (educ4) -0.119 0.506
o„ 0.265 0.00113
~7i (const) 1.857 0.119
~z (log(age~17)) 1.912 0.259
~3 (log(age~17))2 -1.060 0.197
r~4 (educl) -0.397 0.0889
~s (educ2) -0.288 0.0839
~76 (educ3) -0.279 0.0764
~ry~ (educ4) -0.0962 0.0824
P1 - P2 - P3 - p4 0.117 0.0120
ps 0.162 0.0244





p,2 - p,3 - p,4 - p,s 0.00194 0.000802
Log-likelihood value: -1960.6767
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TABLE 4.4 SIMULATED HOURS FREQUENCIES
hours Empirical Simulated Desired
frequencies frequencies frequencies
0(i.e. non-working) 0.610 0.603 0.484
4 0.0153 0.0177 0.00441
8 0.0318 0.0216 0.00443
12 0.0236 0.0260 0.00434
16 0.0259 0.0315 0.00432
20 0.0518 0.0529 0.00427
24 0.0318 0.0188 0.00437
28 0.00942 0.0228 0.00412
32 0.0495 0.0509 0.00439
36 0.0259 0.0272 0.00451
40 0.101 0.104 0.00426
44 0.0141 0.0144 0.00432
48 0.00353 0.00206 0.00432
52 0.00471 0.00221 0.00438
56 0.000 0.00241 0.00441
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of working hours per week, variation in ~
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of the characteristics in .~ qualitatively, it is difficult to give an interpretation of their
value. In the first model for example, the estimates of which are in table 4.1, we found an
estimate of .~ of about 37 which, in the context of this model and ignoring the standard
error for the moment, would mean that each individual on average would have obtained
37 job offers. But as the model is static, the interpretation of this number is unclear as it
has no time dimension. This problem would be solved if a dynamic model of sequential
search would be formulated, in which data on unemployment duration would provide
additional information, both to estimate and to interpret the parameters of the number
of job offer distribution and the parameters of the utility function. This approach is
followed in chapter 5 of this thesis.
We now drop the assumption that the budget constraint is linear. A progressive tax
system causes the net wage rate and the number of hours to be negatively related in the
budget constraint. Although a fully structural treatment of a system of labour income
taxes is in principle implementable in the model, we abstain from it here because of its
rather heavy computational burden. Mofi'it (1984) proposed to formulate the wage rate
as a second order polynomial in the number of working hours. The advantage of this
approach, over the introduction of a fully specified tax system, is that we can actually
test for the dependence of net wages on the number of working hours.
The wage equation is extended by introducing hours.
]nw-r~'x~7,h-1-TZh2~v (4.30)
where w is the net wage rate, x is a vector of individual characteristics and v is again
a normally distributed random variable. The wage equation in (4.3) has been extended
with a term which is linear in the number of working hours and a term which is quadratic
in the number of working hours.
There is another reason why wages may depend on hours which is interesting to
mention in this context. At institutionally determined numbers of hours like 20, 32 and
40, the offered wages may be higher for given individual characteristics and therefore
hours restrictions need not be the only explanation for observing peak levels. To capture
this possible relation between wages and hours in the model, dummy variables could be
taken up in the wage equation. However, inspection of the data led us to abstain from
it because no such relation appears to be present. Therefore, we shall assume from now
on that the hours terms in the wage equation represent the tax system. The gross wage
rate, w~, is given by
wc - exp(~'x -1- v) (4.31)
and the relation between the gross and the net wage rate is
w - (1 - T(h))w~ (4.32)
where T(h) is the marginal tax rate which should be between zero and one and which is
non-increasing in h for a given wage rate if the tax system is progressive. From (4.30),
(4.31) and (4.32) we derive:
0 c T(h) c 1 if r,h -1-T2h2 c 0 (4.33)
T'(h) C 0 if T, d- 2r2h c 0 (4.34)
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From the parameter estimates it can be checked whether these conditions are satisfied,
i.e. it can be checked whether our assumption, that the hours terms in the wage equation
mainly represent the tax system, is fulfilled.
The parameter estimates are given in table 4.5. If the estimates of the utility param-
eters are compared with the estimates of the basic model in table 4.1, it can be noticed
that in the present model preferences play a more pronounced role. The estimate of the
standard deviation of the random preference parameter has decreased substantially. The
parameter estimate of the number of job offers is also reduced. There is a striking dif-
ference in the estimates of the hours offer probabilities, especially of those for the hours
categories above 40 hours a week. In the basic model, there was a close relation between
the observed frequencies of hours and these probabilities. The explanation for the low
frequency of hours above 40 was that these values of hours are hardly offered. In table
4.5 it can be seen that according to the present model the probability of receiving hours
levels of 44 or higher is not that low at all. However, the marginal increase in income as
a result of working an additional hour is apparently so low, as compared to the efFect on
the marginal utility of leisure, that the individuals are in general not willing to supply
these high hours levels.
Looking at the estimates of rl and T2 it can be observed that Tl is positive but
insignificant and that r2 is significantly negative. Checking relations (4.33) and (4.34)
it follows that (4.33) is satisfied if h ~ 5.7 and relation (4.34) is satisfied for h) 2.9.
This, together with the insignificance of Tl, is in accordance with our interpretation of
the hours terms.
The likelihood ratio test statistic to test the hypothesis Tl - r2 - 0 has the value
16.596. The critical value at the 5~0 level is 5.991, which means that the hypothesis is
rejected.
The simulation results in table 4.2, 4.4 and 4.6 and the graphs in the figures 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3 provide an informal way of testing the model. To formalize the testing of the
model the chi-square test statistic of Andrews (1988) can be calculated. As the aim of
the testing procedure is to test the predictive power of the model, only the values of the
endogenous hours variable are categorized into cells. Andrews' test statistic is calculated
using three different partitions of the hours variable. Partition 1 is the most refined and
coincides with the catogorisation of the hours in the simulation studies in tables 4.2,
4.4 and 4.6. In partition 2 the values of the hours have been classified according to the
restrictions which have been imposed on the probabilities of the hours offer distribution.
Partition 3 classifies hours in only two dif['erent groups i.e. positive and non-positive
hours. The test statistic calculated wíth partition 3 can be used to test the predictive
power of the model with respect to the participation decision. The values of the test
statistic are in table 4.7. It is clear that all of the three model specifications are rejected
by the three test statistics.
Estimation experiment with both an hours dependent wage equation and an individual
specific Poisson parameter gave similar results as the results in table 4.3, i.e. a flat utility
function.
4.3. ESTIMATION RESULTS
TABLE 4.5 PARAMETER ESTIMATES,
MODEL WITH HOURS DEPENDENT WAGES
Parameters Estimates Standard errors
Q -0.0172 0.00476
ry 4.185 1.201
bi (const) 14.670 5.664
b2 (log fs) -31.568 7.887




~1 (const) 2.218 0.187
~2 (log(age~17)) 1.388 0.242
~3 (log(age~17))~ -1.388 0.173
r~4 (educl) -0.495 0.0750
~5 (educ2) -0.460 0.0719
~6 (educ3) -0.359 0.0674
~~ (educ4) -0.125 0.0721
Tl 0.00208 0.00652
TZ -0.000362 0.000122
p~ - pz - P3 - p9 0.00760 0.00472
p5 0.0210 0.0120





p12 - p13 - p19 - p15 0.107 0.0451
Log-likelihood value: -1985.8735
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TABLE 4.7 ANDREWS' CHI-SQUARE TEST STATISTIC
chi-square statistic partition 1 partition 2 partition 3
fixed .~ model 395.460 47.466 33.534
variable ~ model 269.233 39.481 19.062
hours dependent wages 216.504 49.494 34.337
critical value
at 5~0 level 24.996 15.507 3.841
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Figure 4.6: Distribution of working hours per week, hours dependent wages
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4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter a static model of labour supply with job offer restrictions has been
formulated. A job, as it is offered by an employer to an individual, consists of both an
hours component and a wage component, thereby linking the standard job search model
with the static model of labour supply with hours restrictions. Because of the structure
of the model, the parameters of the wage distribution and the hours distríbution have
been estimated simultaneously. The number of job offers has been assumed to be Poisson
distributed and the parameter of the Poisson distribution has been made dependent on
relevant individual characteristics to examine their effect on the average number of job
offers. The results of the likelihood ratio test indicate the significance of the set of
individual characteristics in the Poisson distribution. The result of the introduction of
the individual characteristics in the Poisson distribution is that the parameters of the
underlying utility specification cannot be traced down anymore. That is, the utility
function becomes a flat and approximately uniform random function. This suggests
that the available data provide too little information to obtain sensible estimates of the
utility parameters. Although the simulated hours distribution in this type of model fits
the labour supply data better than in the neoclassical model, as argued in Van Soest,
Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990), this is mainly the result of the discrete specification of the
hours offer distribution.
We have pleaded for the introduction of a time dimension into the model by formulat-
ing a sequential job search model in which duration data provide additional information
in the estimation and interpretation of the model parameters. This idea is worked out
in chapter 5 of this thesis.
Estimation results of a model specification in which the wage equation contains the
number of weekly working hours indicate the significance of the presence of working hours
in the equation. Moreover, the estimation results are consistent with the interpretation
that working hours arise in the wage equation as a result of the tax system. The estimates
of this specification suggest that the fact that empirical frequencies of weekly working
hours above 40 are low, is not mainly the result of low offer probabilities, as was the case
in previous specifications, but is the consequence of a low marginal increase in income of
working an additional hour as compared to the marginal utility of leisure at high hours
levels.
Simulation experiments in which the simulated hours distribution, as generated by the
model, was compared to the empirica,l hours distribution show that the model predicts
participation and various peaks in the hours distribution well. However, a formal testing
procedure rejects the hypothesis that the simulated data and the observed data have the
same distribution.
Chapter 5
Job search theory, labour supply
and unemployment duration
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents models in which elements of job search theory and the labour
supply literature are combined. A functional form for the models will be specified and
the functional form will be estimated structurally. Flinn and Heckman (1982a) present
an overview of the estimation of structural job search models. Applications can be found
in Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van den Berg (1990a). In order to find closed
form solutions for the model, restrictive assumptions have to be made and this is the
reason why the estimation of structural job search models has not become as popular as
the reduced form duration models, see Flinn and Heckman (1982b) and Kiefer (1988)
for an overview.
Nevertheless, there is still room for extension in the specification of structural job
search models as compared with the models which have been estimated up till now.
Notably, the assumption that the wage rate is the only component in the objective
function of the individual decision maker can be relaxed. The standard job search
framework is only concerned with the choice of a job on the basis of the wage rate. On
the other hand, there exists an extensive literature on labour supply models. In these
models the availability of a job is given and the emphasis is on the participation decision
and the choice of the number of hours. Until now few attempts have been made to
integrate these two types of models. The aim of this chapter is to extend the standard
job search framework with elements of labour supply theory.
Basically, two routes can be followed. The first one is to make the neo-classical as-
sumption that individuals can choose their labour supply optimally, given the level of
their wage rate. In this case, the assumption from standard job search theory, that the
wage rate is the only job component on which the job acceptance decision is based, re-
mains valid. The neo-classica] assumption is usually not supported by empirical evidence
on the distribution of hours worked, where we typically see peaks at various levels of
hours, e.g. at 40 hours a week. Therefore, the second possibility is to assume that hours
are, just like the wage rate, a component of the job offer. The first attempt to introduce
hours in a job search context was made by Kiefer (1984,1987). Blau (1991) estimated a
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search model in which both wages and hours appear in the utility function. In the labour
supply literature restrictions on hours were introduced in a static model by Dickens and
Lundberg (1985). Their model was further developed by Tummers and Woittiez (1991)
and Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990). A different route, to handle hours restric-
tions, was followed by Rettore (1990). In the previous chapter a static model with hours
restrictions was formulated which can be interpreted as a static version of a dynamic job
search model in which the rate of time preference is infinite.
In this chapter, specific attention is paid to the stochastic specification. A random
preference term is included in the utilíty function. As a result, the reservation wage
rate will be random as well, as opposed to earlier work, e.g. Van den Berg (1990a) and
Narendranathan and Nickell (1985), in which the reservation wage rate could only be
changed by a change in the model parameters. Both the model with neo-classical labour
supply and the model with hours restrictions will be considered in this chapter. Data on
unemployment duration and post unemployment job characteristics are used to estimate
the parameters of the utility function, the parameters of the job offer distribution and
the job offer arrival rate. The likelihood function can be formulated, conditional on the
random preferences, after which the random preferences can be integrated out. This inte-
gration procedure can be costly if it has to be performed numerically, which is definitely
the case here, because the integrand contains the reservation wage rate which is the so-
lution of a fixed point problem. To save computing time we can make use of simulation
estimators. McFadden (1989) introduced a simulation estimator which is consistent for a
fixed number of simulation replications in the context of a multinomial choice model. In
chapter 3 this method was adapted to the limited dependent variables model and applied
to the neo-classical labour supply model. In the application in chapter 3 use is made of
simulation methods to integrate out an unobserved random preference variable. Various
simulation estimators in the context of models with unobserved random variables and
the specific problems which actually arise in this context will be discussed.
In section 5.2 the model without hours restrictions will be set up. First, attention
will be paid to the assumptions that have to be made in order to be able to estimate
the model. After that the reservation wage equation will be derived which specifies the
strategy followed by the individual. The likelihood function is specified after which it
is indicated how the likelihood estimator can be replaced by a simulation estimator.
Thirdly, specific functional forms for the model will be chosen. Fourth, the available
dataset is discussed. Finally, the model will be estimated and estimation results will
be presented. In section 5.3 the neo-classical assumption of no hours restrictions is
dropped and a job offer is supposed to consist of two characteristics, i.e. the number
of hours and the wage rate. Instead of a single reservation wage rate there now exists
a unique reservation utility level. All job offers which yield a higher utility value than
this reservation utility value are acceptable. Again, the model will be estimated and
estimation results will be presented. Section 5.4 presents residual analysis and the final
section concludes.
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5.2 Job search without hours restrictions
5.2.1 The model
In this section a job search model is presented in which an unemployed individual
maximizes the discounted sum of expected future utility flows, under the assumption
that he knows the probability distribution according to which job offers arrive. The
utility flow is a function of income and labour supply and it is assumed that once the
wage rate is known, hours can be chosen optimally by maximizing the utility function
subject to the budget constraint. Implicitly, the assumption of no hours restrictions is
also made in the standard job search model in which the individual just maximizes the
discounted sum of expected future utility flows. Therefore, the value of work function in
the standard job search framework can be interpreted as the discounted sum of indirect
utility flows. In the next section the neo-classical assumptions that individuals can choose
hours optimally will be dropped. Because the neo-classical assumption elucidates the
relation between the present model and the standard job search framework and uncovers
some of its implicit assumptions it is a good point of departure.
In order to be able to find closed form solutions for the model, some possibly restric-
tive assumptions have to be made. Most of these assumptions are standard assump-
tions which are usually made in structural models of job search. They can be found
in Mortensen (1986). We deviate from the standard framework in Mortensen (1986)
by including labour supply in the utility function. A different approach of incorporat-
ing labour supply in the context of a job search model can be found in Burdett and
Mortensen (1978).
The assumptions are the following:
1. The individual maximizes a discounted sum of future expected utility flows, subject
to the budget constraint and the job offer process:
~
max E u(ys, h,; e)e-P~'-`l ds (5.1)
~e,he t
where yt is income in period t, ht is labour supply in period t, p is the discount
rate, e is an individual specific, time independent unobserved random taste pa-
rameter, known to the individual. The appearance of the expectation sign refers
to the uncertainty about the future state, i.e. the uncertain job possibilities and
the associated wage rates. The job offer arrival and wage processes are specified
below. By the inclusion of labour supply in the utility function we deviate from
the standard job search framework, in which the utility function contains income
only.
2. The income consists of a state dependent component and a state independent
component (non-labour income). If employed, income equals the sum of labour
income and non-labour income:
y~ - wht f ~ (5.2)
100 CHAPTER 5. SEARCH, LABOUR SUPPLY, UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION
where w is the wage rate and ~ is non-labour income. If unemployed, income
equals the sum of the unemployment benefit payments b and the state independent
income:
ye-6fl~ (5.3)
As a consequence, the level of the benefit payments will influence the job acceptance
decision.
3. A job offer consists of a wage rate w. Job offers arrive randomly according to
a Poisson process with parameter .~ from a distribution function F(.; zli, T) with
accompanying density function f(.; ~i, r), with ~i the location parameter and T the
scale parameter. The distribution function is known to the individual. The domain
of F(.; ~i, r) is ( 0, oo).
4. The model is stationary, i.e. the job offer arrival rate ~, the unemployment benefit
level b, the wage distribution F(w; z,i, T) and the non-labour income p are indepen-
dent of both calendar time and elapsed duration.
5. Once the unemployed has accepted a job it will be kept forever.
6. The utility function has the properties:
áuá 1 0 (5.4)
y
k(h) :- u(wh -F ~, h; e) (5.5)
k"(h) c 0 for all h) 0 (5.6)
Under these assumptions it can be derived that there exists a unique reservation wage
~(e). All wage offers above the reservation wage rate are acceptable, whereas those below
will be rejected.
Assumption 3 is a standard assumption in the job search framework. Assumption 4 is
an assumption which we need to arrive at a closed form solution. Without this assump-
tion the reservation wage rate can only be defined implicitly in terms of a differential
equation, which can only be solved if not too complicated assumptions for the process
of exogenous variables are specified. Van den Berg (1990b) relaxes the stationarity as-
sumptions by introducing general forms of non-stationarity. His empirical application,
however, remains restricted to non-stationarity in the benefit level b, in which, after the
unemployment spell has reached a specified length, a discrete jump takes place where-
after it remains constant. In the duration model literature, in which reduced form models
are estimated, it turns out to be difficult to distinguish empirically between negative du-
ration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, i.e. once unobserved heterogeneity is
introduced, the presence or absence of duration dependence is hard to establish. As we
have included a random preference parameter in the utility function we hope to be able
to ca.tch the heterogeneity in the model.
Assumption 5 is made to be able to find a closed form expression for the value of
a job, which then can be compared with the value of search. This assumption is of
course restrictive if a job is taken on for a short period only, but if a fixed job is taken
5.2. JOB SEARCH WITHO UT HO URS RESTRICTIONS 101
on it is not unreasonable to assume that the individual acts as if he will hold the job
forever. Moreover, the general form of the reservation wage equation remains valid if it
is assumed that there is a constant layoff rate (see e.g. Flinn and Heckman (1982a)). In
that case we have to be careful in the interpretation of the rate of time preference p.
The final assumption on the form of the utility function is made to ensure that a
higher wage level is always preferred to a lower, and to ensure that, once a wage level
is chosen, within period utility will reach a maximum if it is maximized with respect
to labour supply, subject to the linear budget constraint. Note, that no restrictions
are placed on the sign of the derivative of the utility function with respect to labour
supply. This is done because results of Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van
den Berg (1990c) indicate that individuals might value unemployment, i.e. total leisure,
lower than having a job. However, their specification of the objective function was very
straightforward in the sense that there is a discrete jump between the utility values of
unemployment and having a job. The size of this jump was estimated by them with
the result mentioned before. The restrictiveness of their specification and the fact that
their estimated utility parameters were not based on the after spell income data directly,
because the parameters of the wage equation were estimated separately, using some ad
hoc truncation rule, imply that care must be taken in the interpretation of the results.
Any acceptance of a job which cannot be fully explained by the individual characteristics
in their model, can only be explained by the jump in the utility value, so the negative
valuation of total leisure may have been only the result of their restrictive specification.
Nevertheless, their results induce us not to restrict our utility function by the requirement
that it is decreasing in labour supply everywhere. This implies that the reservation wage
rate may become negative, in which case any job offer is acceptable to the individual.
The reservation wage ~(e) is implicitly defined by the following equation, the deriva-
tion of which can be found in appendix A:
~
~(~(E), ~; E) - ~(b ~ ~, 0; E) -1- n f~ 1 [v(w, ~; E) - v(~(E), ~; E)l dF(w; ~G,T) (5.7)
in which v(w, p.; e) is the indirect utility function which is the result of substituting the
labour supply function into the direct utility function. The indirect utility function is
well-defined whenever the labour supply function is positive, i.e. wl}enever the wage rate
w exceeds wo(e) which is defined by
v(wo(E), ta; E) - u(!~~ 0; E) (5.8)
wo(e) is the reservation wage rate of the static model without unemployment benefits
(p -~ oo, b- 0). It can easily be shown that the dynamic reservation wage rate ~(e)
defined by (5.7) always exceeds the static model reservation wage rate wo(e). This ensures
that labour supply is positive whenever w~~(e).
In words, the reservation wage rate is the wage rate which equates the value of the
indirect utility function to the sum of the direct utility value of being unemployed and
the expected gain of receiving wage offers in the future.
Under the above assumptions it is a general result that the distribution of completed
spells of unemployment, conditional on e, is exponential with escape rate B(e), which
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loosely speaking equals the probability of getting an acceptable job offer.
B(E) - ~FIS(E))
The density function of a completed spell of unemployment, conditional on e, is
k(t~e) - B(e)exp{-B(e)t},O C t G o0 (5.10)
In the formulation of the likelihood function the sampling scheme has to be taken
into account. In practice, usually two sampling methods are distinguished, i.e. sampling
the flow and sampling the stock. In the flow sample the observation period starts at
a certain point in time, whereafter, all individuals who become unemployed after the
beginning of the observation period are drawn into the sample and their completed
spells are observed. There may be right hand censoring because the unemployment spell
has not ended before the end of the observation period. This type of sampling is the
most straightforward because we can directly use the distribution of completed spells.
In the stock sampling scheme we take a given point in time and sample individuals who
are unemployed at that point in time from the stock of unemployed. We assume that
we can observe both how long they have already been unemployed (i.e. the backward
recurrence times) and how long they will be unemployed from the point of sampling on
(the forward recurrence times), again with possible right hand censoring. Suppose, that
the backward recurrence time is indicated by p and the forward recurrence time by r
which implies that the total spell of unemployment t is the sum of p and r. Now, different
routes in the formulation of the likelihood function ca,n be followed. We can formulate
the joint distribution of forward and backward recurrence times, in which case we either
have to model the process of inflow in the state of unemployment, or have to make the
assumption that the inflow rate is constant. The second possibility is to condition on the
backward recurrence time in which case we do not have to make assumptions about the
inflow rate. The latter procedure will be followed in this chapter. In the case without
unobserved heterogeneity the backward recurrence times simply drop out because of the
stationarity assumption.
For ease of exposition, the likelihood contribution for the flow sample will be derived
first and it is supposed that the observation period, which starts with the beginning of
the unemployment spell for individuals in the flow sample, is of length M.
During the observation period the individual can be observed to accept a job or not.
If no job is accepted during the observation period, the only information we have is that
the duration of the unemployment spell lasts longer than the observation period. Then
the likelihood contribution of such an individual is given by
lu(g~E) - exp{-B(e)M} (5.11)
where g is the vector of parameters. If e has a density function g(.; a?) then the condi-
tioning on e can be removed by simply integrating out E. The unconditional likelihood
contribution becomes
1„(rl) - f~ exp{-B(E)M}g(e,o~)de (5.12)
~
For individuals who accept a job during the observation period we can distinguish
between individuals whose after unemployment spell wage rate and hours are observed
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and individuals whose job characteristics are unobserved. The optimal labour supply
h` for an individual with wage rate w and non-labour income te is given by the labour
supply function
h' - h(w, tc; e) (5.13)
Recall, that optimal labour supply is always positive for wage rates exceeding the reser-
vation wage rate. If we assume that observed labour supply h is measured with a
multiplicative measurement error exp(v), -oo C v C oo, the density of observed labour
supply, conditional on the wage rate and the random taste parameter can be derived
from the density of ineasurement error v, by making the transformation
h - h(w, ~; e) exp(v) (5.14)
Let the resulting density function be denoted by r(h~w, E). If an individual is observed
to be working at a wage w and hours h, this means that the observed wage rate must
exceed the reservation wage rate ~(e), which means that the density of observed wages,
conditional on E, is truncated. The likelihood contribution of individuals who accepted
a job and whose after spell wages and hours are observed and are equal to w and h
respectively, and whose unemployment duration equals t, conditional on E, is given by
l~o(g~e) - B(e) exp{-B(e)t}r(h~w, e) T(~~~ , 0 C t C M, h~ 0, w~ T(E) (5.15)
- 0 otherwise (5.16)
where T(e) is the truncation probability which is defined by:
T(e) - F(~(e)) if ~(e) ) 0 (5.17)
- 1 if ~(e) c 0 (5.18)
To remove the conditioning on E we have to integrate over all values of e for which
w 1~(e). The unconditional likelihood contribution becomes:
l~o(rt) - f w B(E) exp{-B(e)t}r(h~w, e) T(~É~ g(E, vÉ )de, t) 0, h 1 0, w~ 0 (5.19)
where
Iw - {EI~(E) G w} (5.20)
For some of the individuals who are observed to accept a job during the observation
period the after spell job characteristics may be unobserved. In that case the unobserved
taste parameter will be integrated out and the likelihood contribution becomes
1~„(rl) - f ~ B(e) exp{-B(e)t}g(e, ~É )dE, 0 G t c M (5.21)
Now we return to the formulation of the likelihood contributions of the individuals in
the stock sample. The point of right hand censoring M now is the length of the period
which starts at the point of sampling and ends at the end of the observation period.
As said before, we condition on the backward recurrence time p, which implies that
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we condition on duration t being longer than p. As a result, we simply have to divide
the likelihood contribution derived above by the probability that t exceeds p, see e.g
Ridder (1984). The implicit assumption on the inflow rate which is made in following
this procedure is that the inflow rate into the state of unemployment does not depend
on the unobserved random variable e.
P(t 7 p) - J ~ exp{-B(e)p}g(e, v2)de (5.22)
where in ( 5.11) and ( 5.12) M has to be replaced by p~- M and the region for t in (5.15)
and (5.21) becomes p G t G p f M.
5.2.2 5imulation estimators for models with unobserved het-
erogeneity
In this section two simulation estimators for models with unobserved random vari-
ables which need to be integrated out are discussed. The first method simulates the
vector of scores of the log-likelihood function in such a way that the resulting simu-
lated score vector has expectation zero at the true parameter vector. A drawback of
the method is that random variables need to be drawn from the distribution of the
unoberved random variable, conditional on the observed random variable. The denom-
inator of the expression for the conditional density function of the unobserved random
variable, conditional on the observed random variable, is the marginal density function
of the observed variable and this density contains the integral whose evaluation we want
to avoid by making use of simulation techniques. Drawing from e.g. the marginal distri-
bution introduces a bias in the simulation of the vector of scores and as a consequence
the resulting estimator will be inconsistent. The second method, to be considered be-
low, is called smooth simulated maximum likelihood estimation (SSML) as described by
BSrsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993).
The likelihood function presented in the previous section is of the type in which an
unobserved random variable is integrated out. Let the unknown random variable be
denoted by x with marginal density f(x~rt) and let the observed random variable, or
vector of random variables be denoted by y, with density function conditional on x given
by f(y~x; r~), in which r~ is the vector of parameters. The log-likelihood contribution of a
single individual is given by
L(rlI y) - ]n [J-~ f (y~~; rI)f (~; 0)dxJ
(5.23)
Suppose that by transformation the integral can be written as
L(OIy) - ln [f~ f(y~u~ rl )~(u)duJ (5.24)~
where m(.) is a density function which does not depend on the parameters of interest. In
the context of the previous section d ln 1„(r~) has the form of L(rl~y), where d is a dummy
variable taking on the value 1 for uncompleted spells and the value 0 for completed
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spells. Adding over all individuals the log-likelihood function becomes
L(rl;yr,...,ytv) - N ~ln (J ~.f(y;~u;0)~(u)du)
(5.25)
~-i
assuming that the y; are i.i.d. It is a well known property of the log-likelihood function
that the expectation of the vector of scores equals zero at the true parameter vector r~o.
It is this property that is exploited in the derivation of moment conditions. The vector
of scores is: 1 aL(~Iy~,...,yN) - 1" L~aï(yi~u;n)~av~(u)d~ 526
N aTl - N~ f~f(yi~u;rl)~(u)du ( ~ )
The problem is that the integral appears in both the numerator and the denominator
and if we want to exploit the possibility of keeping the number of drawings R, used in
the simulation, small, the simulator has to enter the moment conditions linearly, see,
e.g. Gouriéroux and Montfort (1989). A simulator can be constructed in the following
way. Draw R i.i.d. random numbers u;,. from f(.~y;), the density of u conditional on
the observed value y;, for every individual i, i- 1, ..., N, and use the moment functions
,
s(~~iyivuilr...iuiRiL - 1,...,i~ :
N R
1 1 af(yil~ir;~l),a~1
S(i; yii uil i...~ uiRi 2- 1, ..., N)- N R i-~ r-~ f( yi ~ui,; ~7)
(5.27)
To show that S(.) has the same expectation properties as the true vector of scores,
we take the expectation with respect to the drawings u;,., thereby conditioning on the
y;, i-, ..., N. The conditional distribution of u;,. given y; is
Ï(uir~yi) -
f(yi~uir;rl)~(uir) (5.28)
f ~ !(yi~u; rl)~(u)du
Taking expectations yields
E(S(-)~yi, i - 1, ...~ N) -
1 1 ~~ ~ af(yi~uiT;rl)~arl~(ui.)du;r- 1 ~f~af(yi~u;0)~a~1~(u)du (5.29)
NR;-i.-i~~ f~f(yi~u;rl)~(~)du - Ni-i f~Ï(yi~u;rl)~(u)du
which equals the true vector of scores. As a consequence, at the true parameter vector
r~o the simulated moments conditions have expectations zero. In (5.12) we simulate of
course only one term of the score vector, i.e. the derivative of
1 N w
~ d; ln ~f exp(-B(e)M)g(e, a?)de~ (5.30)
N i-i ` ~
In the simulator of this expression, when taking the expectation w.r.t. the drawings e;f,
we have to condition on d;, i- 1, ..., N.
The problem is that in general there is no rule of drawing random numbers from the
conditional density ( 5.28) without having to evaluate the integral in the denominator of
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(5.28), which we do want to avoid by using simulation methods. In practice the only
thing one can do is to approximate the procedure of drawing random numbers from (5.28)
by using an approximate distribution. The most straightforward choice ofapproximation
is to draw the random numbers from the marginal distribution ~(.) of u. At the same
time this is also the most naive way of approximating the drawing of random numbers
from the conditional distribution because any information about the observed values y; is
ignored. We now investigate the bias which is introduced if the moments (5.27) are used
with draws u;,. from the marginal density ~(.). First of all note that the bias, i.e. the
difference between of the expectation of (5.27) at the true parameter vector and zero,
could be avoided by introducing a weight factor w(u;,.), like in importance sampling,
which is the ratio of the true density function (5.28) and the density one actually draws
from, in this case the marginal density function ~(.).
,w(u~r) - f(u:r~y;) - f(y~~uir; rl) (5.31)
~(wir) f~oÏ(yilu;~)~(1L)du
which again contains the integral to be simulated. So in order to investigate the bias,
we have to look at the consequences of ignoring the weight function. Note, that the
expectation of the weight function equals one by construction. As a consequence, the
size of the bias is closely related to the variance of the weight function. The smaller the
variance of the weight function is, the smaller the bias in the simulated score equations
will be, see e.g. Kloek and Van Dijk (1978). (Note that the weight function is identically
equal to one if the u;,. are drawn from the conditional density function f(.~y;)). The
expectation of the square of the weight function is given by:
Eu{(w(u))2} - J-~[w(u)]2~(u)du - J~ w(u)f (u~y;)du (5.32)
The addition to the score vector of individuals who accepted a job but whose after
spell job characteristics are unobserved can be simulated in exactly the same way. If
however, the bounds of the integral are a function of the parameters, like in (5.19), an
additional complication arises, i.e. we have to take the derivatives with respect to the
bounds. Suppose we have a likelihood addition given by
6 (n) j
L; - ln r f(y;~u; y)~(u)duJ (5.33)
Ja~(n)
Then the derivatives are:
[a~f(y;~b;(n);o)~(6,(~)) - aá~n f(y;~a;(n);v)~(Q:(~))~ .f0.(~) af(ys~u;~)~an~(u)duf
fa~(~) f(y~~u;rl)~(u)du fa;~n) f(y;~u;r!)~(u)du
(5.34)
The second part can be simulated in exactly the same way as described before, presum-
ing that it is possible to draw random numbers u;,. from (a;(~7), b;(r~)), without having
to use an acceptance~rejection scheme. The first part represents the derivatives of the
probability of being inside the region ( a;(r~), b;(r~)), leaving the density unaffected, which
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can straightforwardly be calculated provided that the bounds are known explicitly. How-
ever, this is not the case in the previous section. Therefore, it is proposed to integrate
out t, w and h and replace the derivative with respect to the bounds by
r~ a~(E) [1 - exp{-B(e)M}] f(~(E)) g(e, vÉ )de (5.35)
- J-~ óg T(~(E))
The motivation behind this expression can be found in appendix C. In executing this
procedure we have to incur an efficiency ]oss. However, the expression can still be seen
as a good representative for the derivative of the probability of being in the required
region. Simulation of the expression is straightforward.
A second simulation estimator can be obtained by simulating the likelihood function
rather than looking at the vector of scores. The integrals which appear in (5.25) are
replaced by a simulator. Unbiased simulators for the integrals can be obtained by drawing





Because of the logarithmic transformation in (5.25) the resulting estimator will be incon-
sistent for a fixed and small value of R, which actually is the reason why we considered
simulation estimators based on the vector of scores before. However, if the simulator is
a smooth function of the parameters, which is the case here, the method functions satis-
factorily, even for smaller values of R. This is shown in BSrsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou
(1993) in which they call this method smooth simulated maximum likelihood estimation,
where they have added the word "smooth" in order to stress the fact that one needs a
simulator which is a smooth function of the parameters rather than a frequency type of
simulator in order to get a satisfactory performance.
5.2.3 Specification
In this subsection a specific functional form for the direct utility function is chosen,
from which the labour supply function and the indirect utility function can be derived.
We use the direct utility function of Hausman (1980).
u(y, h; e) -- ln(ry -,Qh) -~(h
- X b- e- JJy) a G 0, y 1 0 (5.37)
7-Qh
where e is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance QÉ and X is a
vector of individual characteristics. Note, that utility is increasing in income as required
by assumption 6. It can easily be verified that the second condition of assumption 6 is
also satisfied.
Maximizing utility subject to the income equation for the employed yields a linear
labour supply function in which the disturbance term equals the unobserved random
taste parameter:
h(w, p, e) -~3~ -1- ryw ~ X8 ~- e (5.38)
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The virtual wage rate wo(e), for which optimal labour supply is exactly equal to zero,
defined in (5.8), is given by
wo(E) - -Q~ d- X6 -1- e
7
(5.39)
Note, that there are no positivity constraints on this value. The dynamic reservation
wage ~(e) will always be higher than this value. Inserting the labour supply function
(5.38) into the direct utility function (5.37) yields the expression for the indirect utility
function:
v(w, p; e) - - ln(y - (iX b - Qe - ~3ryw - ,Q2~) - ,Ow (5.40)
which is well defined for all w 1 wo(e) and therefore for all w 1 f(e).
The wage offer distribution is taken to be log-normal with log-mean ('x and log-
variance r respectively, where x is a vector of individual characteristics. Measurement
error v is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance av. The error
v allows for difference between optimal labour supply, generated by the labour supply
function ( 5.38), and observed labour supply. The job offer arrival rate can also be made
dependent on a vector of characteristics z by specifying
~ - exp(k z) (5.41)
Characteristics which may influence the arrival rate of job offers are individual charac-
teristics like age and sector of education, as well as characteristics of the environment of
the individual, like the geographical situation.
5.2.4 The data
The data are obtained from the Socio-Economic Panel (SEP), which ie a survey,
carried out in the Netherlands every half a year in April and October by the Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS). In the survey, the participating individuals are asked to
report their occupational status for every month of the past six months. The data which
are used are those of the wave of the survey in October 1985 up to the wave in October
1987, which implies that the observation period is two and a half years. Selected, are
male individuals who reported to be unemployed in any month during the observation
period, which means that the sample partly has a stock character and partly a flow
character. It has been determined how many months they remained unemployed, and for
the individuals in the stock sample the backward recurrence times are also gathered. For
most of the individuals whose unemployment spell ended during the observation period,
data on their after spell hourly wage rate and the weekly number of hours are available.
The sample consists of 516 individuals. The number of complete unemployment spells
is 272. The remaining 244 spells are truncated. For 211 of the 272 individuals whose
unemployment spells are completed the after spell job characteristics, i.e. the hourly
wage rate and the weekly number of working hours, are observed.
Looking at the data on the completed unemployment spells, we see that peaks in the
frequencies of unemployment durations can be found every six months in the months
where the survey on the preceding six months year is conducted. In figure 5.1 the
frequencies of the completed unemployment spells of the flow sample and the forward
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recurrence times of the stock sample are plotted and the peaks are at duration levels of 6,
12, 18 and 24 months. The peak observations are apparently the result of misreporting
and as a result the data on unemployment durations in units of one month are unreliable.
Therefore, the durations in units of one month are divided into groups of six months.
The likelihood contribution then becomes the probability that the unemployment spell
ends somewhere in the observed interval of six months.
In table 5.1 some sample statistics are given. In the survey there are five levels of
education where level 1 is the lowest and level 5 the highest. The mode of the level of
education is 2. We have divided the Netherlands into four regions. Region 1 is the most
strongly industrialized part of the Netherlands which includes the larger cities. Region 4
is the least industrialized part of the Netherlands with a relatively low population density
and a sizeable agricultural sector. Region 3 is the south of the Netherlands which contains
some large companies and agricultural industry. In region 2(the east) there is a mix of
industry and agriculture. Apart from having information about the level of education
we have information available about the type or sector of education. Sector 1 is the
technical sector which includes chemistry, physics, mathematics and biology, sector 2
includes the economic and administrative directions, sector 3 is general education and
sector 4 includes services.
In table 5.2, estimates obtained with simulated maximum likelihood, using R- 10
drawings are presented. According to the estimates of the utility parameters, optimal
labour supply is not very sensitive with respect to non-labour income and the wage rate.
The wage elasticity of labour supply is 0.0996. Family size has a positive effect on the
optimal amount of labour supply. Age has a negative effect on the job offer arrival rate,
i.e. the older one is, the fewer job offers can be expected. The nationality dummy,
which is one for those who do not have the Dutch nationality, is negative, indicating
that having the Dutch nationality influences the job offer arrival rate positively. The
regional dummies have a positive sign, which means a higher job offer arrival rate for
people living outside the agricultural region 4. Only the dummies for region 1 and region
3 are significant. Living in the industrial west is associated with a higher job offer arrival
rate than living in the rest of the country. Only the sectoral dummy for sector 3 which
includes those individuals who only had a general type of education, i.e. no specialisation
in a certain profession, is significant. The highest wages are offered to the individuals
with the highest level of education.
The parameter estimate of p is 0.00492. As unemployment duration is measured in
months, this means that the monthly discount rate is 0.49oI'o, or equivalently, the discount
rate is 5.9~Io per year.
As noted before, estimates obtained by Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van
den Berg (1990c) showed that unemployment, i.e. total leisure, was assigned a lower
utility value than employment. Their reservation wage equation is of the form
~
u(~ -F ~) - wu(6 -F ~) - P I (u(a) - u(~)) dF(x) (5.42)
in which w is the utility parameter whose estimates have been found to be less than one.
Now note that the right hand side of (5.42) is always positive from which we ca.n derive
that
u(~ ~ ~) ~ wu(b ~- ~) (5.43)
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Now w~ 1 implies that the reservation wage rate ï; is always higher than the benefit rate
b. However, if w C 1, the reservation wage rate is allowed to be lower than the benefit
rate. Of course, a value of the reservation wage rate which is actually below the benefit
rate indicates that unemployment must have a lower utility value than employment. Our
specification has enough flexibility for the labour income at the reservation wage rate to
be below the income from benefits, but at the same time whether unemployment is valued
lower than employment cannot be checked directly by looking at a single parameter.
Therefore, it makes sense to run a simulation by drawing random preferences e for each
individual, calculating the reservation wage rate ~(e), computing the optimal labour
income at the reservation wage rate if ~(e) ~ 0, i.e. ~(e)h(r;(e),~C;e) and comparing it
with the benefit income b. This procedure was repeated 100 times and the result is that
for 87oI'o of the sample the reservation income is lower than the benefit income. The reason
for this high percentage is the fact that 70Q1o of the individuals in the sample is working
about 40 hours a week. In the context of this model, in which individuals are assumed
to choose their amount of labour supply optimally, this means that these individuals are
working 40 hours a week because they like to work 40 hours a week. As a consequence,
the virtual wage rate wo(e), given in (5.39), is relatively low. Although the reservation
wage rate ~(e) always exceeds the virtual wage rate, the reservation wage rate is close to
the virtual wage rate as the estimate of Q is close to zero. This result is consistent with
the findings of Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van den Berg (1990c) who have
estimated a value of w in (5.42) that is smaller than 1, i.e. unemployment lowers utility.
Table 5.1 Sample statistics
variable mean standard deviation
working hours (hours~week) 39.0 9.1
after tax hourly wage rate (guilders~hour) 10.1 4.5
benefits (guilders~week) 289.6 108.2
non-labour income (guilders~week) 80.4 188.8
age 31.2 11.8
family size (persons) 3.2 1.7
education level mode 2
Dutch nationality 93.6oI'o
region 1 (industrialized west) 31.6oI'o
region 2 (east) 29.3PIo
region 3 (south) 26.6oIo
region 4 (agricultural) 12.6QIo
sector of education 1(technical) 30.4~0
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 8.7aIo
sector of education 3(no specialization) 48.8~0
sector of education 4(services) 12.Oqo
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Figure 5.2: Unemployment duration in 0.5 years, completed spells and forward recurrence
times
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TABLE 5.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH
SIMULATED MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD, R- 10
THE UTILITY PARAMETERS
~ -2.479 x 10-5 1.301 x 10-5
7 0.378 0.251
ó1, Constant 32.076 2.454
ó2, Log family size 2.064 1.790
a~ 1.488 0.0286
THE JOB OFFER ARRIVAL RATE PARAMETERS
~cl, Constant 0.462 0.320
~c2i Log age -0.215 0.478
~c3i Nationality -0.958 0.351
k4i Region 1 0.676 0.202
~5, Region 2 0.312 0.195
~cs, Region 3 0.470 0.204
~c~, Sector 1 -0.0748 0.218
~c8, Sector 2 -0.293 0.304
~c9, Sector 3 -0.546 0.214
k~o, Square of log age -0.235 0.604
RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE
p 0.00492 1.008
THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
Sl, Constant -12.084 3.135
~2i Log age 8.088 1.874
~3, Square of log age -1.104 0.279
~4i educl -0.329 0.0856
~S, educ2 -0.289 0.0789
~6i educ3 -0.165 0.0797
T 0.293 0.0104
DISTR. OF MEASUREMENT ERROR
v„ 0.312 0.0909
5.3. .IOB SEARCH WITH HOURS RESTRICTIONS 113
5.3 Job search with hours restrictions
5.3.1 The model
In general when looking at pictures of frequency distributions of labour supply data
one can hardly maintain the assumption that these data can be described by a standard
neo-classical microeconometric labour supply model. 5pikes can be observed in the
empirical probability mass functions at weekly numbers of hours, like 40. In the literature
there are different explanations for the presence of this concentration of labour supply at
certain amounts of hours, but what all these explanations have in common is that they,
in one way or another, refer to the demand side of the labour market. The theory of
compensating wage differentials, see for example Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981), assumes
that employers offer hours quantities, like 40, and that employers are compensated by
means of a higher wage rate for the loss in utility they experience by being over- or
underemployed. Because of this compensation the individual is not constrained in the
sense that the same utility level is acquired as in the case in which the individual could
determine hours by utility maximization without wage compensation. The emphasis is
on the wage function, which describes wages as a function of hours, rather than on a
labour supply function. Although it is plausible that individuals within their job are
compensated for working overtime hours, over and above the amount of hours agreed to
in the labour contract, it is doubtful whether wage rates at spike levels are systematically
higher. Especially in an economy with unemployment, the employers do not have to raise
wages in order to satisfy their demand for labour.
The second point of view, then, is that individuals are not compensated for being
under- or overemployed. Moffitt (1982) recognizes that relatively few jobs exist with
hours in the part time range. He models this by adapting the standard Tobit model.
Dickens and Lundberg (1985) assume that individuals are constrained by the hours that
are offered to them by the employers. Their framework is static and assumes that at
a point in time the individuals receive a random amount of job offers (possibly zero)
from which they choose the offer which yields the highest level of utility. This utility
level is compared with the utility of not working, after which it is decided whether or
not to accept the job. All job offers have the same gross wage rate but may differ in
the number of hours. The hours offer distribution is modelled by means of a discrete
probability distribution. The idea was applied by Tummers and Woittiez (1991), Van
5oest, Woitiez and Kapteyn (1990). In the previous chapter the assumption of having
the same wage rate for every job offer has been dropped. In fact, the model in chapter 4
can be interpreted as a static version of the model presented here. Blau (1991) presents a
dynamic search model in which a job offer has both a wage and an hours component. In
his paper a comparison is made between the expected utility maximizing model, in which
both wages and hours play a role, and the expected wealth maximizing model, in which
the individual decision maker is concerned about wage income only. The choice of a
separable utility function enabled Blau (1991) to nest the latter model into the first, and
evidence in favour of the more general utility maximizing model was found. However,
in the previous section it has been shown that one of the underlying assumptions of the
wealth maximizing model is the unrestricted choice of labour, whereas in this section
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it is shown that the utility maximizing model arises due to hours restrictions. As a
consquence, the two models can never be nested once the assumption on labour supply
is allowed for explicitly.
Instead of jobs arriving at a given point in time, as in the static models of labour
supply with hours restrictions, we now assume that job offers arrive sequentially, like in
the previous section. But in contrast, a job offer now consists of both a wage rate and
an amount of weekly working hours. Individuals will evaluate the utility level of jobs,
comparing them with the value of not accepting the job taking into account possible
future job offers. Individuals are constrained in hours offered to them and therefore,
unlike the standard job search framework, the wage rate is not the only job characteristic
which is needed to decide whether or not to accept a job. Instead of having a reservation
wage it can be derived that there exists a unique reservation utility level. Jobs, i.e. wage-
hours combinations, which generate a utility level which is higher than the reservation
utility level are accepted, those with a utility level below are rejected.
More formally, assumption 1 in section 5.2.1, which states that individuals are utility
maximizers in the neo-classical sense, is replaced by the assumption that hours arrive
from an hours offer distribution, just like the wage rate. The equation for the reservation
utility level is derived in appendix B. It is given by
u(E) - u(b f p, 0; E) f~ J ~ J[ ~ [u(wh -~ p, h; E) - u(E)] f( w, h)dwdh (5.44)P ~ t~hrll~EliE1
where u(E) is the reservation utility level at random taste parameter E, f(w, h) is the
joint wage-hours offer distribution and ~(h,u(E);E) is the wage rate which generates
utility level u(E) at hours h. The wage rate ~(h, u(E); E) can be interpreted as an hours
dependent reservation wage rate. The sign of the derivative of ~(h, u(E); E) with respect
to hours h depends on whether the individual is over- or underemployed at wage level
~(h, u(E); E) and the given value of hours. If an individual is overemployed, an increase
in hours moves utility further away from its unconstrained value and consequently the
hours dependent reservation wage rate rises, thereby increasing the reluctancy to accept
a job. And vice versa for underemployment. As a result the reservation wage rate does
not depend on hours if the individual is not constrained in the choice of hours, which
leads back to the model in section 5.2.
In case of a discrete hours offer distribution the outer integral is replaced by summa-
tion.
The resulting expression for the escape rate becomes
B(E)-J~ f~ f~
0 {(h,u(cl;El
f (w, h)dwdh (5.45)
Taking into account the different functional form of the escape rate, the likelihood con-
tributions of individuals who did not accept a job during the observation period and
those who did, but whose after spell wage rate and hours are not observed, are the same
as in the previous section in (5.12) and (5.21) respectively. For the individuals whose
after spell wage-hours pair is observed to be (w, h), and, again, the observed wage rate
is truncated, conditional on hours and on E, which leads to the likelihood contribution,
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conditional on e
Ico(~I~E) - 9(E) exp{-B(E)t} f lw, h)~Q(E),
0 C t G M, h~ 0, w~ max{0, ~(h, u(e); e)} (5.46)
- 0 otherwise (5.47)
where Q(e) is the truncation probability, given by
Q(e) - f~ f~ f(w, h)dwdh (5.48)
0 ~(h,u(el;tl
The unconditional likelihood function is obtained by integrating over those values of E
for which the utility level evaluated in (w, h) exceeds the reservation utility level.
l~o(~) - fW B(e) exp{-B(e)t} f(w' h)g(e, Qé )de, t 1 0, h ) 0, w 1 0 (5.49)
~ n Q(E)
where the set Iwh is given by
Iwh - {e~u(wh ~ ~, h~e) ~ u(e)} (5.50)
The set I(w, h) has to be non-empty for every (w, h) with w ~ 0, h 1 0.
For the individuals in the stock sample the expression (5.22) for the probability of t
exceeding p can be used, taking into account that 9(e) is now determined by (5.45).
5.3.2 5pecification
For the utility function we take the specification of section 5.2.3 given in (5.34).
The spikes in the empirical hours distribution suggest the use of a discrete hours offer
distribution of the Dickens and Lundberg (1985) type. However, we are hampered by the
fact that 68~0 of the observed labour supply is at values of 38 or 40 hours a week, making
it impossible to identify probabilities of low or high levels of labour supply. Therefore,
only a rough dlstinction is made between part time jobs (32 hours or less), full time jobs
of normal levels (33 to 44 hours a week) and full time jobs of high levels (more than 44).
The hours are categorized in classes of four, which yields 20 classes of hours from 1 to
80. The probability of getting a job offer from class l is given by
P(h-hi)-p~,1-1,...,m,m-20 (5.51)
The probabilities ca,n parametrized by




lcm - 1 (5.53)
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is made. The distinction made between part time and full time jobs ca,n be expressed in
the following restrictions:
I~1 - ... - ~s : part time jobs (5.54)
hs - hio - I~ii : normal full time jobs (5.55)
Iziz -... - I~zo : high level jobs (5.56)
Again, it is assumed that wages arive from a log-normal wage offer distribution with
log-variance 7 and log-mean S 'x. The wage offer density function is
f(w) - 1 1 exp j-1 [In w-~'x]z }, 0 G w G oo (5.57)
2~rT w l 2rz J
Using the discrete hours offer distribution and the wage offer distribution the reser-
vation utility equation becomes
m ~
u(E) - u(b f Ir, 0; E) f -~ Pt f [u(wh~ -f ~C, h~; E) - u(E)]!(w)dw (5.58)
P 1-1 f~h~~u~E)~E)
A similar expression can be found for the escape rate B(e):
B(E) -~~~t f~ f(w)dw - a~n,F(~(h~, u(E); E)) (5.59)
l-1 f~h~,u~f);E) l-1
In the previous section, the assumption has been made that only preferences depend
on unobserved individual characteristics e. Now we will assume that the job offer arrival
rate also depends on an unobserved random variable q, known to the individual, which
is independent of e and which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance vá.
Inclusion of q in the job offer arrival rate at the same time ensures that the set Iwh
defined in (5.50) is non-empty, i.e. for every observed job offer (w, h) there exists an e
such that u(wh f p, h; e) 1 u(e) which is consistent with the fact that we do observe
(w, h). The job offer arrival rate becomes
~(q) - exp(~c'z f q) (5.60)
In table 5.3, estimates obtained with simulated maximum likelihood (SSML) using
R- 10 drawings are presented. This model generates estimates of ~ and ry which are
clearly different from the estimates of the model in the previous section. The reason for
this is that in the neo-classical model in section 5.2 the parameter estimates of the utility
function are mainly determined by the labour supply data, because of the assumption
that hours are chosen by the individuals according to their preferences. In the neo-
classical model the presence of a spike at 40 hours a week in the labour supply data can
only be explained by inelastic labour supply, whereas in the present model with hours
restrictions the alternative explanation for the spike is given by the presence of demand
side restrictions.
Again we see a positive effect of family size. The variance Qa of the unobserved
heterogeneity in the job offer arrival rate is not very large. From the regional dummies,
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only the dummy variable for region 1, the industrialized western part of the Netherlands,
is significant. The only significant sectoral dummy is that for sector 3, which is the sector
of individuals who are not specialized in a certain profession. The sign of the estimate
is negative.
The estimate of p is 0.688 which is equivalent to a monthly discount rate of almost
70oJ"o, which is rather high. In section 5.2.1, however, it was recognized that one should
be careful in interpreting the estimate of p. For example, if assumption 5 in section 5.2.1
is replaced by the assumption that there is an exogenous layoff rate, the estimate of p
should be interpreted as the sum of this layoff rate and the discount rate. Equivalently,
the ignorance of other possibly relevant labour market states changes the interpretation
of the estimate of p in a similar way, see e.g. Van den Berg (1990c).
To compare the labour income evaluated at the reservation wage rate, we run the
same kind of simulation procedure as in the previous section. We compare the expected
reservation income with the benefit level b. The expected reservation income has been
defined by:
m
~ Pt~(h~, u(E); E)hil(~(hi, v,(E); e) ~ 0) (5.61)
i-i
in which 1(.) is the indicator function. The number of replications is 100. For 98.7Q1o
of the number of individuals in the sample, the expected reservation income in the
sample is higher than the benefit level. This result is not consistent with a disutility of
unemployment (w G 1 in ( 5.42)). An explanation for the low reservation income in the
neo-classical model has already been given in section 5.2.4. Apart from that explanation,
there is an additional explanation for why the reservation income defined in (5.61) may
be higher than the reservation income in section 5.2.4. In section 5.3.1 it has been
explained that the larger the deviation of offered hours from optimal labour supply is,
the higher the hours dependent reservation wage rate ~(h, u(e); e) will be. The hours
dependent reservation wages are higher because the individual gets hours offers that do
not coincide with optimal labour supply. 50, even if the reservation wages were evaluated
in the same parameter values for both models, the reservation wage of the model with
hours restrictions will be higher than the reservation wage of the neo-classica,l model. As
the hours offer probabilities are large in the full time range, the reservation income in
(5.61) is likely to be higher than the neo-classical reservation income as well.
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TABLE 5.3 ESTIMATION RESULTS WITH




bl, Constant 27.478 10.523
b2, Log family size 8.576 4.386
af 21.334 14.945
THE JOB OFFER ARRIVAL RATE PARAMETERS
oa 0.000963 0.228
~c~, Constant 1.239 0.818
~c2i Log age -0.327 0.585
~c3i Nationality -0.872 0.378
~c4i Region 1 0.720 0.257
~cs, Region 2 0.182 0.247
~cs, Region 3 0.232 0.256
~c~, Sector 1 -0.00988 0.250
~c8i Sector 2 -0.574 0.342
~c9i Sector 3 -0.572 0.248
~lo, Square of log age -0.230 0.114
RATE OF TIME PREFERENCE
p 0.688 3.576
THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION
~1i Constant -12.502 3.181
~2i Log age 8.287 1.903
~3i Square of log age -1.129 0.284
~4i educl -0.320 0.0823
(5i educ2 -0.276 0.0776
~6i educ3 -0.144 0.0111
T 0.288 0.0111
PROBABILITIES OF HOURS DISTRIBUTION
p~ -... - pg part time 0.0204 0.00373
p9 -... - pl~ full time 0.251 0.0114
pi2 -... - p2o high level jobs 0.00944 0.00217
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5.4 Residual analysis and simulated frequencies
In order to be able to say something about the performance of the two models we
will do some residual analysis. An overview of residual analysis of duration models can
be found in Lancaster (1990) and Cox and Oakes (1984). There are two points according
to which the standard residual analysis in duration models cannot be applied directly
to our models. The first point is that this analysis is usually performed in the context
of a flow sample, whereas we have a sample which consists of a flow subsample as well
as a stock subsample. Therefore, in the analysis of the residuals we restrict ourselves
to the individuals who are in the flow subsample. The second point is that residual
analysis is usually performed on models which do not contain a random unobserved
heterogeneity component. This problem is solved in the following way. The marginal
density of observed duration t is given by f(t).
f(t) - J ~ 8(E) BXp{-e(E)t}g(E, QÉ )(IE, O G t G oo (5.62)~
The density of the unobserved heterogeneity variable E, conditional on observed duration
t is given by
glElt) - ooe(E)eXP{-BlE)t}g(E,O?)
-00 G E G 00 (5.63)
f~ 9(E) exp{-B( E)t}g(E, UE )C~E
Now draw a random number E,. from g(.~t). This can be done by using the inversion
method, see e.g. Devroye ( 1986). Then the pair ( t,E,.) can be seen as a joint draw from
f(t)g(E~t) - B(E) exp{-8(E)t}g(E, vÉ ), 0 G t G oo, -oo G E G oo (5.64)
Consider the following transformation:
~9 - B(E)t 5 65
E - E
( - )
The jacobian of the transformation is 1~9(E). The joint density of ~7 and E becomes
f(9(E)) g (EIB(E)) -
exp{-~9}g(e,QE),0 G~9 G oo,-oo G E G oo (5.66)
which implies that ~9 is exponentially distributed with parameter 1, which enables us to
apply the standard residual analysís. Summarizing, the procedure is:
~ Draw E, from g(.~t), where g(.~t) is evaluated in the parameter estimates and t is
observed duration
~ Calculate ~9,. - B(Er)t - B(Er,~)t in which B(E,) is the hazard rate evaluated in the
parameter estimate ~. ~9,. is the simulated residual. For every individual, several
residuals can be calculated by drawing several random numbers.
~ Calculate the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survivor function in the residuals
~9;,, i- 1, ..., N, r- 1, ..., R, in which the subindex i is over individuals and the
subindex r is over different draws from the conditional density.
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The residuals ca.n be plotted against minus the logarithm of the Kaplan-Meier estimate.
If the parametric model is correctly specified, the plot would be approximately a 45
degree line. Various forms of misspecification of the hazard rate can cause the residual
plot to deviate from the 45 degree line. Lancaster (1990) shows that omitting an un-
observed heterogeneity factor in the hazard rate leads to underdispersion, i.e. the plot
will be below the 45 degree line. Particularly interesting for our application are the
deviations which are caused by wrongly assuming that the hazard rate is constant, i.e.
the stationarity assumption. Ridder (1987) shows that when the data inhibit positive
duration dependence, whereas a constant hazard model is estimated, the residual plot
will be above the 45 degree line. In case of negative duration dependence of the hazard
rate, the reverse holds.
For every individual, five residuals have been simulated. Figure 5.3 shows the plot
of minus the logarithm of the Kaplan-Meier estimate versus the residuals for model 1,
whose estimates were presented in table 5.2. Figure 5.4 shows the same plot for model
2, based on the estimates in table 5.3. For both models the plot is above the 45 degree
line, indicating that there could be positive duration dependence. However, for model
2 the deviations are much less severe than for model 1. In the figures 5.5 and 5.6 the
Kaplan-Meier survivor functions and the exponential survivor functions are plotted. The
plots reveal that even though the parameter estimates of the job offer arrival rate show
similar effects for both models, the misspecification of model 2, in which individuals are
faced by hours resttictions on the labour market, is much less severe than in model 1.
Figure 5.7 shows the frequency distribution of simulated hours, conditional on ob-
served wages, for model 1, the model without hours restrictions, and the sample fre-
quencies of observed hours. In this figure, hours are divided in three categories, i.e. part
time jobs, full time jobs and high level jobs, and the frequencies shown in the figure
are the frequencies of these categories. The distinction between the categories has been
described in section 5.3.2. The density of hours, conditional on wages can be derived
from (5.19). It is given by
fl.~ r(hlw ~ E)T(c)g(E~ Qc )dE
r(h~w) - f ' E,~é dE ,0 G h G oo (5.67)
JIw T(c)9( )
To simulate labour supply, conditional on the observed wage rate, E is drawn from g(E, v?)
restricted to the region I,,,. Optimal labour supply can then be calculated from (5.13)
or, more specific, from (5.38), after which a measurement error v is drawn to simulate
observed labour supply by (5.14).
Figure 5.8 shows the frequency distribution of simulated hours for model 2, the model
with hours restrictions, and the sample distribution of observed hours. The distribution
of hours for the second model ca,n be derived from ( 5.49). It is given by
P~ f~ F(~(hQ(E~E)~ E))9(E, ~E)dE, l- 1, ..., m (5.68)
These are the probabilities of observing hl, l- 1, ..., m. A value for E is drawn from
g(E, ~É ), which makes it possible to calculate u(E). Then
F(f (hr, u(E); E))p~ (5.69)
i~(E)
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is calculated for 1- 1,...,m. Uniform random variates on the interval (0,1), together
with the probabilities in (5.69), are used to determine a simulated value for hi. Com-
paring figure 5.7 with figure 5.8, we see that for the model with hours restrictions the
sample distribution of observed hours is fitted much better than for the model without
hours restrictions.
Figure 5.9 shows the frequencies of simulated wages and the sample frequencies of
wages for model 1. Again, the density of observed wages for model 1 can be determined
from (5.19). It is given by
f f(w)g(e, vf)de, 0 C w G oo (5.70)
iw T(e)
A wage rate is simulated by first drawing a value for e from g(e, v~ ) and calculating
~(e), after which a wage rate is drawn from f(w), restricted to the region (~(e), oo). For
model 2 the frequencies of simulated wages can be found in figure 5.10. The marginal
distribution of wages, derived from ( 5.49) is
~pl r f(-~)g(e,a~)dE,O G 7u G oo (5.71)
1-1 JIwM Q(E)
A value for h~ is drawn from the hours offer distribution, e is drawn from g(e, vÉ ) after
which a wage rate is drawn from f(w) restricted to the region (~(hi, u(e); e), oo). Com-
paring the figures 5.9 and 5.10, we see that there is not much difference between the two
models.
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Figure 5.3: Model 1: -log(Kaplan-Meier) vs. residuals
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Figure 5.4: Model 2: -log(Kaplan-Meier) vs. residuals
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Figure 5.5: Model 1: Kaplan-Meier survivor function
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Figure 5.6: Model 2: Kaplan-Meier survivor function
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Figure 5.7: Model 1: Frequencies of working hours per week
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Figure 5.8: Model 2: Frequencíes of working hours per week
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Sam~le frequencties
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Figure 5.9: Model 1: Frequencies of after tax wage rates
Sam~le frequencties
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Figure 5.10: Model 2: Frequencies of after tax wage rates
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5.5 Conclusions
Two models of job search have been presented. In the first model individuals can de-
termine their labour supply optimally, given the wage rate. The second model assumes
that the individual is faced by hours restrictions on the labour market. It has been
shown that these two different model assumptions have different implications for the job
acceptance decision of individuals. Parameter estimates of the job offer arrival rate show
similar effects for both models. Age has a negative effect on the job offer arrival rate.
People who live in the industrialized western part of the Netherlands have a larger prob-
ability of getting a job offer. Individuals who are not specialized in a certain profession
have a lower chance of getting a job offer than other individuals. For individuals who
have the Dutch nationality the job offer arrival rate is larger than for those who do not
have the Dutch nationality.
For both models the reservation income for every individual has been simulated and
compared with the benefit income. For the model without hours restrictions a large
percentage of the simulated reservation incomes were below the benefit incomes. This is
consistent with results of Van den Berg (1990c) who finds evidence in favour of "disutility
of unemployment". For the model with hours restrictions however, most of the reserva-
tion incomes are above the benefit incomes. Two explanations for the different results
of the two models have been given. The first is that a constrained individual always has
a higher (hours dependent) reservation wage than an unconstrained individual, because
he has to choose from hours offers that do not coincide with optimal labour supply. The
second explanation is that the spike in the sample distribution of weekly working hours
at a level of 40 hours a week, together with the assumption of free choice in model 1,
lead to low estimates of the virtual wage rate and consequently lowers the lowerbound
of the reservation wage rate.
Residual analysis shows that the hazard rate is possibly positive duration dependent,
i.e. the longer someone is unemployed, the larger the escape rate is. Positive duration
dependence of the hazard rate can be caused by negative duration dependence of the
reservation wage rate, possibly due to negative duration dependence of benefit payments
or positive business cycle movements. Furthermore, the residual analysis reveals substan-
tial differences between the two model specifications. The model in which the individual
can freely choose his working hours seems to be seriously misspecified, whereas the model
with hours restrictions is reasonable, in spite of the heavy stationarity assumption.
The simulated frequencies of part time jobs, full time jobs and high level jobs reveal
that the poor performance of the model without hours restrictions is mainly caused by
the assumption made about labour supply.
5.A Derivation of reservation wage equation 5.7
Let V(e) denote the value of search of an individual with unobserved taste shifter e.
Due to the stationarity assumption (assumption 4 in section 5.2.1~, V(e) is independent
of time. At time t, the individual is not working, is looking for a job and receives
weekly non-labour income p and weekly benefits b, which are time independent due to
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assumption 4 in section 5.2.1. In a short time interval of length Ot the utility flow
derived from p and b equals
fitneJ u(b ~ P, p; E)e-v(8-~)ds - u b f F~, ~; E(1 - e-PO:) (5.A.1)
~ p
In the time interval of length Ot there is a probability of e-aot.~~t -~ o(Ot) of receiving
a job offer, consisting of a wage rate w. The value of the job, denoted by W(w; e) will
be compared with the value of continuing searching, which is V(e). The job offer w will
be accepted if W(w; e) exceeds V(e). Due to the assumption 5 in section 5.2.1, the value
will remain W(w; e) once a job w is accepted. With probability 1- e-ao`.~~t ~- o(~t)
the individual does not get a job offer in the time interval of length Ot, in which case
the value remains at V(e). Summarizing, the value V(e) is
V(E) - u(b f p,0; E)(1 - e-POt)~Pf (5.A.2)
éPotlll - e-aot.~Ot)V(e) -F e-aoo~OtEw max[V(E), W(w; E)]} ~ O(Ot)
Rearranging tlelrms yields
1- e-pot u(b f l~, ~; E) (1 - e-vot) ata)o~ o(Ot)Qt V(E) - Ot fe-( aEw max[O, W(w; e)-V(e)]-F- Ot
P
(5.A.3)
Letting Ot -~ 0 we obtain
pV(e) - u(b f p, 0; e) ~~Ew max[0, W(w; e) - V(e)] (5.A.4)
Using the assumptions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 the value of the job with wage rate w can be
obtained by solving the maximization problem
ma~c
u(y, h; E )
subject to y- wh f tC (5.A.5)
c,h p
The solution for h is h` - h(w, p; e) which is the neo-classical labour supply function.
Inserting the solution for y and h in the direct utility function yields the indirect utility
function which is v(w, ~; e) and therefore
W(w; E) -
v(w, p; E)
Inserting (5.A.6) into (5.A.4) gives
P
(5.A.6)
pV (e) - u(b f te, 0; e) ~ p Ew max[0, v(w, p; e) - pV(e)] (5.A.7)
A job offer w will be accepted if v(w, ~; e) 1 pV(e). If the reverse holds, it will be
rejected. As the indirect utility function is increasing in the wage rate, there exists a
unique reservation wage rate ~(E) such that all wages above it are acceptable and those
below will be rejected. The value of search is equal to the value of accepting a job if
Pv(E) - v(~(E), l~, E) (5.A.8)
Inserting (5.A.8) in (5.A.7) and using the distributional assumptions on w results in the
reservation wage equation:
v(~(E), p, e) - u(b d- P, 0; e) f ~ f ~[v(w, tt; E) - v(~(E), p; E)]dF(w; ~i,7) (5.A.9)
P f(E)
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5.B Derivation of the reservation utility equation
5.44
Let V(E) denote the value of search for an individual with unobserved characteristics
E. While unemployed the individual receives weekly benefits b. The amount of non-
labour income is p. The flow of utility, derived from benefit level b and non-labour
income u in a short interval of length Ot is, like in (5.A.1), given by:
u(b-f-p~fliE)(1 - e-ons) (5.B.1)
P
The probability of receiving a job offer in a short interval with length Ot is e-ao`~Ot f
o(Ot). A job offer consists of two characteristics i.e. wages and hours which arrive
randomly from a joint wage-hours offer distribution. The value of a job with hourly
wage rate w and weekly working hours h is denoted by W(w, h; E) for an individual with
unobserved characteristics E. The value of a job will be compared with the value of
search V(E) in order to make the job acceptance decision. The equivalent of equation
(5.A.2) becomes
V(E) - u(b-}- p,O;E)(1 - é 'o`)~pf (5.B.2)
e-oo`{(1 - e-~o`~Ot)V(E) -}- e-ao`~OtE(,~, h) max[V(E), W(w, h; E)]} f o(Ot)
After rearranging terms and taking the limit ~t -i 0 we get
pV(E) - u(b f p, 0; E) ~- aE(,;, h) max[0, W(w, h; E) - V(E)] (5.B.3)
The assumptions 2 and 5 are used to determine the value of the job with wage rate w
~.nd hours h:
u(wh f p,, h; E)W(w, h; E) -
P
(5.B.4)
Inserting this expression in (5.B.3) yields
pV(E) - u(b f tc, 0; E) ~ pE(w h~ max[0, u(wh -b p, h; E) - pV (E)] (5.B.5)
A job offer (w, h) is accepted if the utility value u(wh ~- p, h; E) exceeds pV(E). In other
words, there exists an unique reservation utility level u(E) with
u(E) - PV(E) (S.B.Ó)
All job offers which generate a utility level above u(E) are acceptable, those below wíll
be rejected. According to assumption 6, u(wh f p, h; E) is increasing in w, and therefore,
for a given level of h, a wage rate ~(h, u(E); E) can be found such that
ul~(h, u(E); E)h f~, Íl; E) - Tl(E) (S.B.Í)
This ~(h,u(E); E) can be interpreted as an hours dependent reservation wage rate. Using
the assumption that wage and hours arrive simultaneously from a joint wage-hours offer
distribution f(w, h), equation (5.B.5) can be rewritten such that the reservation utility
equation (5.44) is obtained:
u(E) - u(b f~, 0; E) ~ ~ f~ f~ [u(wh -F ~, h; E) - u(E)] f(w, h)dwdh ( 5.B.8)
p o f(h,u(f)~e)
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5.C Derivation of (5.35)
In this appendix we show that if the derivatives of the vector of scores with respect
to the implicitly defined integration bounds are replaced by (5.35) the expectation of the
resulting simulator still equals zero in the true parameter vector. In order to write down
the complete density function some dummy variables are introduced.
d- 1 for incomplete spells (t 1 M) (5.C.1)
- 0 for completed spells (t G M) (5.C.2)
e- 1 if d- 0 and ( w, h) is observed (5.C.3)
- 0 if d- 0 and ( w, h) is unobserved (5.C.4)
The density function consists of the following parts:
lu(g) if d - 1 (5.C.5)
(1 -~r)1~,~(r~) if d- 0, e- 0 (5.C.6)
al~o(rt) if d- 0, e- 1 ( 5.C.7)
where a- E(e), the probability that the post unemployment job characteristics are
observed which has been assumed to be independent of the parameters of interest and
therefore has been neglected before. lu(rt), lc,(rt) and l~o(g) have been defined in (5.12),
(5.21) and ( 5.19) respectively. To show that the density integrates to 1 we look at each
contribution separately.









lEl B(e) exp{-9(e)t}r(h~w, e) T((E~ g(e, o?)dwdedhdt - (5.C.11)
J J
1 - lu(rt) (5.C.12)
From these results it can be derived that
1„(r~) f(1 - ~r) fM lc„(g)dt -~ ~r f M f~ f~l~o(rt)dwdhdt - 1 (5.C.13)
As a consequence
ad„(r1) }(1 -~) jM al~(rl)dt ~- a f M f~ f~ al~o(~1)dwdhdt - 0 (5.C.14)
art fo art o 0 o art
or, equivalently,
al„(n) }(1 -~r) rM al~„(n)dt f,ra
~fó fó fó l~o(n)dwdhdt~ -
0 (5.C.15)a~ Jo a~ an
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~o(~) 8~ ó ~ f~ 1 ( dwdhdt~jM j~ j~ aia dwdhdt - f fo o a~o rl) (5.C.16)J J J ~ ~
Now, note that the left hand side of (5.C.16) is equal to the expectation of eó ln l~a(r~)~8~,
the score contribution which we want to simulate. The derivatives of (5.C.16) consist
of two major terms, i.e. the derivatives with respect to the bounds and the derivatives
with respect to the integrand. As the derivatives with respect to the integrand of the
right hand side are equal to the derivatives with respect to the bounds on the left hand
side, it follows that the derivatives with respect to the bounds are equal on both sides
as well. Using the right hand side of (5.C.16) and the fact that ( 5.C.9) equals (5.C.11)
the derivatives with respect to the bounds can be written as
f~ af (E)
[1 - exp{-B(e)M}] f(~(c)) g(e, aé )de (5.C.17)~ 8~l T(~(E))
which is expression (5.35). To handle the problem with the implicitly defined bounds,
the original derivatives are replaced by their expectation.
Chapter 6
Job search, search intensity and
labour market transitions: an
empirical exercise
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter an empirical model of job search is presented in which the intensity of
search is determined endogenously by the individual decision maker. Individuals decide
on both the amount of effort that they spend on search activities and on whether or not
to accept a job offer, as opposed to the standard job search model, see e.g. McKenna
(1985), in which the emphasis is on the job acceptance decision only.
In the literature, various models of job search with endogenously determined intensity
of search have appeared. Burdett and Mortensen (1978) present a model in which the
total time endowment is divided in time spent on labour, leisure time and time spent
on search. By increasing the time spent on search individuals can increase the average
number of job offers arriving in a given time interval. At the same time, however,
they have to incur a utility loss because an increase in time spent on search implies a
decrease in leisure time. lndividuals determine the optimal amount of time spent on
search by determining the optimal trade-off between the returns in the form of expected
job offers and the cost due to the loss of leisure time. This trade-off between cost of
search and returns of search is common to all models on search intensity that have
appeared in literature. In Mortsenen (1986) a simpler version of the same model is
presented. Instead of expressing search intensity in terms of time spent on search, he
defines search intensity much more loosely in terms of "search effort". An explicit cost
of search function is formulated and again an increase in search effort raises the job
offer arrival rate. Yoon (1981) also specifies a cost of search function. He estimates a
model of unemployment duration in which a measure of search intensity ("The number of
places looked for a job in the past few weeks" ) appears as an explanatory variable in the
hazard rate and he finds a significant negative effect, i.e. an increase in the intensity of
search tends to reduce the duration of unemployment. Lindeboom and Theeuwes (1992)
specify a reduced form model in which data on the number of search contacts appears
in the hazard rate. The emphasis in their study is on detecting the relation between the
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intensity of search and elapsed duration.
Point of departure of the model of this chapter is the search model by Mortensen
(1986). In this model, both on the job searchers and searchers without a job are con-
sidered. To make the model suitable for empirical application some of Mortensen's
simplifying assumptions have to be relaxed. We allow for differences in cost of search for
workers and non-workers and for non-zero cost of turnover. Moreover, differences in the
job offer arrival rate between different labour force states may occur and individuals may
prefer a certain labour force state, other things being equal. Optimal search intensity is
chosen such that the marginal cost of search is equal to the marginal returns, conditional
on search intensity being non-negative. An optimal search intensity of zero may arise as
a corner solution. The expected marginal returns of search depend on the labour market
conditions, as well as on the present earnings and expected future earnings. It can be
shown that there is a negative relationship between present earnings and the optimal in-
tensity of search. For an employed individual this means that if the present wage income
is above a certain threshold value, he will decide not to search. This implies that there is
jointness in the decision whether or not to search and the distribution of observed wage
income. This relation can be examined using cross section data in a limited dependent
variables model. Data on search duration can be used to estimate the relation between
search intensity and duration. The data we use are from the Dutch Socio Economic
Panel. From October 1987 on questions concerning the search behaviour of individuals
appeared in the survey. Instead of having one measure for search intensity, the data
set contains several indicators for search intensity that are related to different search
instruments. Therefore, "search intensity" in the structural model is allowed to be a
vector of search instruments on which the individual decides.
In section 6.2, the economic model is presented. In section 6.3, various empirical
specifications are presented. First of all, a reduced form model is specified in which the
employment decision, the search decision and the wage distribution are modelled jointly.
After that, a structural duration model is specified which allows for transitions from
unemployment into employment, turnover transitions and transitions from employment
into unemployment. Cost of search functions are specified and differences in cost of
search for different labour market states are examined. The duration model is estimated
jointly with the structural equation for search intensity and parameter estimates for the
job offer arrival rates and the cost of search functions are obtained. The estimation
results are presented. The final section concludes.
6.2 The economic model
The economic model is based on the model of Mortensen (1986). We extend the
model in order to make it more realistic. For example, we allow the cost of search
functions and the job offer arrival rates to be different for employed and unemployed
individuals. The within period utility level may be different for different labour force
states and we allow for the presence of non-zero cost of turnover.
It is assumed that individuals maximize their lifetime utility, taking into account
uncertainty about their future labour force state and taking into account that they can
6.2. THE ECONOMIC MODEL 133
inftuence the expected number of job offers by searching more or less intensely. The
within period utility function depends on the level of income in the given period. Given
the level of income, there may be differences in the utility level depending on the labour
force state of the individual. The same specifica,tion for within period utility was used
by Narendranathan and Nickell (1985) and Van den Berg (1990). In their application
they found evidence in favour of "disutility of unemployment", i.e. w G 1.
utility(income-x,state-employed) - u(x)
utility(income-x,state-unemployed) - wu(x)
with u'(x) 1 0.
For the unemployed, job offers arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter
(1 fa„s)~,,, which is a function of search intensity s, s~ 0, that can be determined by the
individual himself, .~„ is determined by the demand side of the labour market, and ~„ 7 0
is a parameter that determines the effectiveness of search. Note, that at an intensity
of search of zero, the job offer arrival rate reduces to ~u, leaving open the possibility of
getting a job offered without search. As our dataset contains various indícators for the
intensity of search which provide information on the use of different search instruments,
search intensity s, and consequently a,,, is allowed to be a vector of different search
instruments. For ease of exposition, search intensity is treated as a one dimensional
variable in this section, but the extension to more dimensions is straightforward.
For employed individuals the job offer arrival rate is indicated by (1 ~ aes).~e.
The cost of search is a function of search intensity, indicated by c„(s) for unemployed
individuals and ce(s) for employed individuals. The cost of search function is assumed




x - e, u
The first condition simply states, no search, no cost, the second condition implies more
search, higher cost and the third is a regularity condition on the cost function in order
to ensure that an optimal value of search intensity exists.
An employed individual who changes his job is faced by a cost of turnover of k.' A
job offer is modelled as a random draw from a wage distribution F(.), which is assumed
to be known to the individual. For employed individuals there is an exogenous layoff
rate v. The subjective rate of discount is denoted by p.
The value function for an unemployed individual, which is the maximum of the ex-
pected lifetime utility, is indicated by V. For an employed individual who earns a wage
income of w, the value function is indicated by W(w). Below the Bellman equations are
~Van den Berg (1992) formulated a model of job to job transitions in which he made the cost of
turnover a function of the present wage.
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presented. Their derivation is given in the appendix.
pV - max,~o {wu(b-}- p) - c„(s) -h (1 ~ o'us)a,,.Íó {max[V,W(x)] - V}dF(x)}
(p f a)W (w) -
maxa~0 {~(w } ~) - ~e(9)
f(1 f~es).~e fó{max[V,W(x) - k,W(w)] - W(w)}dF(x) -f vV}
(6.3)
in which b is benefit income and p is non-labour income, both assumed to be fixed over
time (stationarity assumption). The first equation is for unemployed individuals. It is
equal to the within period utility evaluated at the present income 6f fc, minus the cost of
search, evaluated at the optimal intensity of search, plus the expected returns of search.
If an unemployed individual gets a job offer with wage x, he compares the value of being
employed at wage x, W(x), with the value of being unemployed V and he chooses the
alternative for which the value function has the highest level. This implies that the
reservation wage ~ for an unemployed individual is implicitly defined by V- W(~)2.
The reservation wage income is the wage income for which the individual is indifferent
between working and not working. For an employed individual the same type of Bellman
equation holds.
The value function for an employed individual, who is currently employed at wage
w, is equal to the discounted value of the within period utility, evaluated at the present
income, minus cost of search plus expected returns of search. Note that the consequence
of a nonzero layoff rate o is that there are different discount rates for employed and
unemployed individuals, i.e. for the employed the discount rate is increased by Q. An
employed individual who gets a job offer with wage x has three choices: he can stop
working, he can accept the job, in which case he is faced by a cost of turnover of k, or
he can keep his present job. Actually, the first alternative is irrelevant, for if V exceeded
W(w), he would not be observed to be working. For an employed individual we can
define a reservation wage a(w), which is the wage at which he is indifferent between his
present job and the job offer, i.e. W(a(w)) - W(w)-}-k. Note that if the cost of turnover
is zero, the individual will accept any job that has a higher wage than the present job.
As W'(.) 1 0, ~(w) will exceed w as long as the cost of turnover k is positive.
From the Bellman equations the first order conditions for optimal search intensity can
be derived:
c;.(3,.) - ~u~,. f~ [W(x) - V]dF(x)
su - max{~,S„}
~e(Se(w)) - ae~e f(w)[W ly) - W( a(w))]dF(~)
(6.4)
sé(w) - max{O,se(w)}
where use has been made of W(a(w)) - W(w) -1- k and V- W(~). s;, and s~(w) are
the optimal intensities of search for unemployed individuals and employed individuals at
wage w respectively. For positive values of search intensity the marginal cost of search are
equal to the marginal returns of search. If the solution of the marginal cost - marginal
returns equation is nonpositive, optimal search intensity will be zero.
2 W(.) is an increasing function of the wage. This can be proved by contradiction: Suppose that W(.)
is non-increasing in the wage: then the right hand side of (6.3) is increasing in the wage. The property
that W(w) is increasing in w is sufficient to guazantee the existence of a unique reservation wage, both
for unemployed and employed individuals
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Figure 6.1 depicts the cost of search and the returns of search as a function of search
intensity for an unemployed individual. The returns of search are a straight line. The
gains of search, i.e. the difference between returns and cost are maximal if the slopes are
equal, which is at s„ in the picture. In this particular case s„ is positive and consequently
the optimal search intensity s;, is positive. If the marginal returns of search rise due to
an increase in the effectiveness of search parameter au, the intensity of search at which
marginal cost of search and marginal returns of search are equal will rise as well. This is
because, due to conditions (6.2), the marginal cost of search rises with search intensity.
The higher marginal returns of search are indicated by the dotted line, and the point at
which slopes are equal is s,,. In figure 6.2 the situation is depicted in which it is optimal
not to search. Here the gains of search at any positive intensity of search are lower than
the gains of search at a search intensity of zero: The marginal cost of search are higher
than the marginal returns of search at a zero search intensity.
According to equations (6.4) and figures 6.1 and 6.2, there is a positive relationship
between search intensity and marginal returns of search. Given that marginal cost of
search are positive, this relation is implied by the condition in (6.2) that states that
cx"(s) 1 0. In the empirical implementation, this is a testable implication. The linearity
of the returns of search, together with the curved cost of search function, guarantee that
the marginal cost - marginal returns equation has a unique solution, and uniqueness is
what we need to arrive at an estimable relationship. However, linearity of the returns of
search is by no means necessary for a unique solution, and the implied positive relation-
ship between optimal search intensity and marginal returns of search does not depend
on these shapes of the cost and returns of search functions either. If we choose a returns
of search specification with decreasing marginal returns, together with a cost of search
specification that satisfies (6.2), uniqueness and the positive relationship between search
intensity and marginal returns of search are maintained. The same holds for decreasing
marginal returns and a linear cost function. To test for the positive relationship be-
tween marginal returns and search intensity, we need either a linear returns of search
function and a curved cost of search function, or a linear cost of search function and a
curved returns of search function, otherwise there is no unique solution (i.e. no solution
or multiple solutions) for the marginal cost - marginal returns equation if the positive
relationship is not satisfied. Given the fact that our information on search intensity, that
is contained in the dataset, partly consists of qualitative variables (binary indica,tors) of
which scale is not identified, it makes little sense to test for the presence of decreasing
marginal returns of search. Therefore, we maintain the linear returns specification and
the curved cost of search function. The expression for the marginal returns of search that
we find at the right hand side of (6.4) will depend on the specific functional forms that
are chosen. However, irrespective of the chosen functional forms, marginal returns will
be decreasing in the reservation wage. As the reservation wage depends, among other
things, on current income (benefit income for unemployed individuals and wage income
for employed individuals) this implies that there is always a negative relation between
current income and marginal returns, irrespective of the functional forms chosen.
As the reservation wage is an important determinant of the marginal returns, we now
will consider the reservation wages and their relationship with search intensity in more
detail.
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Figure 6.1: Determination of optimal search intensity
Above we have introduced the reservation wages, i; and a(w) for unemployed and
employed individuals respectively, which characterize the job acceptance decision, i.e. a
job offer with a wage above the reservation wage rate will be accepted. In a similar way,
we can define a so called search reservation wage ye for employed individuals and y„ for
unemployed individuals. The search reservation wage is the income value at which the
individual is indifferent between searching or not, i.e, it is the income value for which
marginal cost of search and marginal returns of search at a search intensity of zero are
equal:
aZ~~ f~[W(~) - W(y:)~dF(~) - ~:(0), z- e, u (6.5)v
Note from (6.4) that the marginal returns of search are decreasing in t; and a(w) for
unemployed and employed individuals respectively. Consequently, if ~ 7 yu the marginal
returns of search will be smaller than the marginal cost of search at a zero search intensity
and it will be optimal not to search. If, in contrast, ~ G yu, the individual can increase
expected gains by choosing a positive intensity of search. The same holds for employed
individuals for whom we have to compare a(w) and ye.
The following relations ca,n be defined:
3ui() 4~ yu ~~
sé(w) ~ 0 t~ ye 1 cx(w)
s:-6 ~ yuG~ (6.6)
u
Se(w) - U e~ ye G cx(w)
As a'(.) is a positive function of wage income, there is a direct relation between the
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~u(s)
(1 t a„s)~„ r~[W(x) - V]dF(x)
Figure 6.2: An optimal search intensity of zero
0
current wage income and the decision of whether or not to search. As the reservation
wage a(w) for employed rises with turnover cost k, higher cost of turnover implies lower
marginal returns to search and therefore a decreased incentive to search.
For the employed individual we have seen that there is a negative relation between
the present wage and the intensity of search. To say something about the determinants
of the reservation wage ~ of unemployed individuals we write the Bellman equations in
a simpler form:
pV - wu(b ~ F~) - G,(su) ~- (1 ~- a„su)~,.1f [W(x) - W(f ) ]dF(x)
(P f a)W(w) - u(w f {~) - ce(se(w)) (6.7)
f(1 ~ aes~(w))ae!~w)[(W(x) - W(a(w))]dF(x) ~ w
The reservation wage ~ is implicitly defined by V- W(~) or
wu(b f P) - c,.(S;.) f(1 t ausu)~u ff [W(x) - W(~)1dF(x) - (6.8)
u(~ ~ F~) - ce(Sé(f )) f(1 f aesé(~))~ela(e)[W(x) - W(a(~))]dF(x)
From this equation, little insight is gained at first sight and therefore we start by looking
at some special cases. Suppose that v- 0, w- 1, ae - .~,,, k- 0, ae - a„ and c„(.) -
ce(.). This is the standard case treated by Mortsensen ( 1986). It can easily be seen that
under these conditions s;, - sé(~) and ~- b. That is, in the absence of any differences in
the cost functions and job offer arrival rates, if cost of turnover are zero and if individuals
have no preference for a certain labour force state, the reservation income ~ is equal to
the benefit income. Any job offer with a wage income that is only one guilder higher
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than the benefit income will be accepted by the individual, knowing that once he has got
a job, he can continue searching under the same conditions as when he was unemployed.
Therefore, cost of search and expected future returns have no influence on the reservation
income, which is fully determined by current income. For the decision whether to search
or not this means that if the benefit income is above the sea,rch reservation income y„
the unemployed individual will not search at all.
Now we relax the restriction w- 1, but the other restrictions remain active. Then
the reservation income is defined by u(~ -F P) - wu(b -}- Ic). If the individual prefers
being unemployed over being employed at the same income, w exceeds one and as a
consequence f~ b. Now there is a certain threshold. The individual will not simply
accept any job with a wage that is only one cent higher than the benefit income. He needs
to be compensated for the loss in utility he incurs by changing to the less preferable state
of employment. The reverse holds for the case of disutility of unemployment, w C l,
in which ~ C b. Note, that the reservation wage is still determined by current period
characteristics as in both states still the same search conditions hold.
Now we relax the assumptions ae -~,,, c„(.) - c~(.) and k- 0, allowing for differences
in the arrival rates and the cost functions. Then the reservation wage is defined by:
u(~ -1- p) - wu(6 f F~) - [(1 t ausu)~u IF [W (~) - W(~)1 dF(~) - c,.(su)]
- [(1 t ~es~(~))ae.fd~e1~W(x) - w(a(f))1dF(~) - ~~(sé(f))]
(s.s)
Note, that both sides are zero if there are no differences in the arrival rates and cost
functions and if turnover costs are zero. On the right hand side we see the difference of the
expected gains of search (returns minus costs) while unemployed and the expected gains
of search while employed at the reservation wage. If the expected gains of search while
unemployed are higher than the expected gains of search while employed, the reservation
wage rate ~ will be higher than in the restricted case that we described just before. The
individual is less eager to accept a job, knowing that once he has accepted a job he enters
a state in which the conditions of search are less favourable. The reverse holds for the
case in which the expected gains of search while employed are higher than the expected
gains of search while unemployed. Then we find the reservation wage to be lower than
in the restricted case. Note that as higher cost of turnover tends to reduce the gains
of search while employed, the reservation wage ~ for unemployed will be higher as well.
Finally, note that a positive layoff rate Q has no consequences for the reservation wage ~.
A positive layoff rate decreases the value of employment, but the value of unemployment
is decreased as well as the returns of search while unemployed depend on the expected
value of employment.
Until now the reservation wage rate a(w) for employed individuals has only been
defined implicitly by the relation W(a(w)) - W(w) -~ k. From the defining relation it
can be derived that
~ u(w f f~) P-f Q f( 1 f txese(a(w)))~eF(a(~(w)))
~(w) - u~(~(w) f l~) P t a f ( 1 ~ aesë(w))~eF(a(w))
(6.10)
It is not straightforward to solve this differential equation. Van den Berg ( 1992) proposes
to use a Taylor expansion around zero costs of turnover, making use of the relation
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a(w) - w q k- 0. In the present context this Taylor expansion is




with sé` - max{O,sé(w)},
e'e(sé(w)) - ae~el~[W(~) - W(w)]dF(~) (6.12)
u
6.3 Empirical specification
6.3.1 A reduced form specification for jointly modelling the
search decision and the wage equation
From the analysis in the preceding section it has become clear that there is a one to
one relation between the current wage and the decision whether or not to search. The
higher the current wage income is, the less likely it will be that an individual will search
for a job. Apart from the relation between the search decision and the distribution of
observed wages, there is a relation between the employment decision and the distribution
of observed wages. Only wage offers that are higher than the reservation wage rate are
observed. To make inference with respect to the parameters of the wage offer distribution,
we have to take into account that there could be correlation between the observed wages,
the employment decision and the search decision. In this section, a reduced form wage-
search-employment model is estimated. The estimates of the wage equation, obtained in
this subsection, can be used in the estimation of the structural model of unemployment
duration and job tenure that is described in section 6.3.2.
Before the model is specified, some sample statistics are presented. The data are from
the Dutch Socio Economic Panel. The first wave in the panel in which information on
individual search behaviour was gathered is that of October 1987, and it is this particular
wave that we use to look at the relation between wages, employment and search.
First of all the sample is restricted to individuals who are either employed or un-
employed. This selection has been made on the basis of occupational variables in the
sample: every individual is asked to report his or her occupation in each month of the
past six months, i.e. they are asked whether they were employed, or in full time edu-
cation, in the forces, disabled, unemployed etc. After having selected the employed and
unemployed individuals, we looked at the questions about search. The first question is
"Are you searching for a paid job at the moment, or if you already have a paid job, are
you searching for a different one?" The answers that the respondent can give are "Yes,
I am searching seráously", "Yes, I am thinking about it", and "No". The two different
possibilities to answer "yes" provide two different positive levels of search. If the respon-
dent has answered positively to this first question, some additional questions have to be
answered. The first one is "Kave you been looking for work in the past two months?",
to which the respondent can answer yes or no. By "looking for work" in this context
is meant responding to an advertisement, placing an advertisement, gaining information
from employers, relatives or the employment office, screening the advertisements etc.
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The second question is "How many times have you applied for a job in the past two
months?" By "applying for a job" is meant writing a letter of application, making a
phone call, etc. The final question which gains information about the intensity of search
is "Are you registered at the employment o,~ice?" For an individual with a positive in-
tensity of search four indicator variables sl, s2i s3 and sq can be constructed:
if searching seriously
if not
if looking for work in the past two months
if not
if registered at the employment oflice
if not
number of applications in the past two months
These four variables are indicators for the unobserved intensity of search. In the next
subsection, the unobserved intensity of search is modelled by a latent variable, after
which the relation between the latent variable and the indicators defined here is spec-
ified. For the purpose of the present section, it is sufficient to know whether one is
searching or not. Respondents who answered the first question negatively are treated as
non-searchers. Moreover, individuals who answered "Yes, I'm thinking about it" to this
first question, but who neither looked for a job, nor applied for a job in the past two
months, nor registered themselves at the employment ofl'ice, are treated as non-searchers
as well. All individuals for whom at least one indicator s~ is positive are classified as
searchers. The sample consists of 3016 male individuals. Table 6.1 shows the percent-
ages of searchers, nonsearchers and employed, unemployed in the sample. We see that
12.4qo of the employed individuals is searching, whereas for the unemployed individuals
the percentage is much higher, namely 79.7. In table 6.2 we report the means of various
weekly after tax income variables. Positive non-labour income is the mean of non-labour
income restricted to those individuals who have non-zero non-labour income. The same
holds for positive benefit income. In the context of the theoretical model, the differences
in income between employed and unemployed individuals can be an explanation for the
fact that many more unemployed individuals than employed individuals are searchers.
There is a considerable difference between the mean wage of employed searchers and the
mean wage of employed non-searchers. The mean wage of searchers is lower than the
mean wage of non-searchers, which is in accordance with the theoretical model in the
previous section, which predicts a negative relation between the current wage and the
decision to search. Moreover, the non-labour income of searchers seems to be lower than
that of non-searchers, which may be another incentive for them to search. For the unem-
ployed individuals there is not much difference between the benefit income of searchers
and non-searchers. If we restrict ourselves to individuals with a positive benefit income,
the mean benefit income for non-searchers is even lower than for searchers. Moreover,
non-labour income for non-searchers is lower than for searchers. At first sight this seems
to be in contrast with the theory in the preceding section in which benefit income was
shown to be an important determinant of the reservation wage rate, and consequently
an important determinant of the search decision in (6.6), i.e. given everything else, the
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Table 6.1 Sample Statistics, October 1987
PI'o employed . 92.6
~o unemployed . 7.4
~lo searchers . 17.4
~o non-searchers : 82.6
searchers
PÍounemployed . 33.8
01'o employed . 66.2
non-searchers
~ounemployed . 1.8
01o employed . 98.2
employed
~o searchers . 12.4
~o non-sea,rchers : 87.6
unemployed
PJo searchers . 79.7
~o non-searchers : 20.3
higher the benefit income, the less likely it is that one searches. There is, however, an
alternative explanation for the fact that non-searching individuals tend to have lower
income levels than searching individuals. The fact that these unemployed non-searchers
have a low mean non-labour income may be due to the fact that these individuals have
been unemployed for quite a long time and therefore they have been using up their assets.
Having been unemployed for a long time implies that their expected returns of search
are probably low, i.e. their a„ is low. Frotn (6.5) it can be derived that a low value of .~,,,
given the marginal cost, leads to a low value of y,,, which is the threshold value for the
reservation wage, above which no search will take place. So even if the individuals have
low income variables, they can be observed to be non-searching because low marginal
returns of search lead to a low threshold y,,. Now the wage-search-employment model
will be specified. It is assumed that wages are lognormally distributed. The model is:
ln w- r~'x i- v (6.13)
y~ - ázl ~ ut (6.14)
yz - Q'z2 f u2 (6.15)




.F. - ~v,yt 1 Uutus (6.16)
QvuZ Ou„~Z 1
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Table 6.2 Means of the weekly income variables
employed
wage . 620.81
wage of searchers . 533.45
wage of non-searchers . 633.19
non-labour income . 18.49
non-labour income searchers . 14.85
non-labour income non-searchers . 19.01
positive non-labour income . 54.58
positive non-labour income searchers . 44.43
positive non-labour income non-searchers : 56.00
unemployed
benefit income . 203.26
benefit income searchers . 202.87
benefit income non-searchers . 204.76
non-labour income . 41.07
non-labour income searchers . 45.69
non-labour income non-searchers . 22.91
positive benefit income . 286.42
positive benefit income searchers . 288.38
positive benefit income non-searchers . 279.22
positive non-labour income . 168.85
positive non-labour income searchers . 179.71
positive non-labour income non-searchers . 114.57
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Table 6.3 The wage equation
estimate standard error
~1 const -10.372" 0.889
~21og(age) 9.018" 0.500
~3 square of log(age) -1.188" 0.0701
r~4 educl -0.476" 0.0332
ns educ2 -0.398" 0.0294
r~s educ3 -0.333" 0.0262
~~ educ4 -0.133" 0.0309
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Equation (6.14)is the employment equation: y~ ~ 0 for employed individuals and yi G 0
for unemployed individuals. Equation (6.15) is the search equation with y2 ~ 0 for
searchers and y2 G 0 for non-searchers. The variances of the error terms of the employ-
ment and the search equation have been normalized to one. The vectors x, zl and z2
contain exogenous individual characteristics. Included in the vector x are log(age) and
its square, as well as four education dummies, educl, educ2, educ3 and educ4, with educl
the lowest level of education. The highest level of education has been excluded. Included
in the vectors zl and z2 are the sum of non-labour income and benefit income, the log-
arithm of family size, log of age and log of age squared, the four education dummies,
three sectoral dummies, secl, sec2 and sec3, the regional dummies regionl, region2 and
region3, and a dummy for marital status which is one if married and zero if not. Secl is
a dummy for education in the technical sector which includes chemistry, physics, mathe-
matics and biology, sec2 refers to economic and administrative education, sec3 is general
education and the fourth sector, which serves as reference sector and is not included as a
dummy, is the service sector. Regionl is a dummy for the strongly industrialized western
part of the Netherlands, Region2 is the east in which there is a mixture of industry and
agriculture, Region3 is the south of the Netherlands with some larger companies and
agricultural industry and the fourth region, which is the region of reference for which no
dummy variable is included, is the remaining part with a sizeable agricultural sector.
Table 6.3 presents the parameter estimates of the wage equation. The double asterisks
indicate that the parameters are significant at the 5Plo level. A single asterisk indicates
significance at the lOol'o level. The age earnings profile reaches its maximum at the age
of 44. There is a nice increasing pattern in the parameter estimates of the education
dummies, i.e. the higher the level of education, the higher the wage income. Table 6.4
presents the parameter estimates of the employment equation (6.14). Parameter ~Z of
non-labour income is significantly negative. Being married and living in the western part
of the Netherlands both have a significantly positive effect on the probability of being
employed. Educl, the education dummy associated with the lowest level of education,
is significantly negative, wheras educ2, the lowest but one level of education, is signifi-
cantly negative at the l0~l0 level. Log family size enters positively and significantly at
the 10~0 level. Table 6.5 shows the parameter estimates of the search equation. Both
age parameters, Q4 and Ql~ are significant and the probability of searching is maximal
at the age of 25, that is, search rises with age until the age of 25, aíter which it falls.
The dummy variables educ3 and region3 are negatively related to search and the relation
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Table 6.4 The employment equation
estimate standard error
al const -4.493 3.928
a2 ~ -0.00168" 0.000366
CY31og(fs) 0.123' 0.0696
o-41og(age) 3.354 2.218
as nationality 0.123 0.141
as educl -0.665" 0.229
~~ educ2 -0.363' 0.201
~s educ3 -0.112 0.200
a9 educ4 -0.00995 0.214
alo secl,technical -0.0604 0.131
all sec2, econ. adm. -0.635 0.157
a12 sec3, general -0.205 0.152
~i3 marital status 0.650" 0.100
a14 regionl (west) 0.260" 0.129
~ls region2 (east) 0.0266 0.133
a~s region3 (south) 0.204 0.142
a1~ square of log(age) -0.501 0.311
Table 6.5 The search equation
estimate standard error
pl const -13.322" 3.836
~3Z ~ 0.00104" 0.000357
Qa log(fs) -0.0530 0.0573
(i41og(age) 8.265" 2.188
~5 nationality -0.110 0.133
~36 educl -0.00303 0.153
Q~ educ2 -0.147 0.125
ps educ3 -0.200 0.115
Qy educ4 0.0256 0.126
Qlo secl,technica.l -0.129 0.0840
QI1 sec2, econ. adm. -0.0718 0.0977
Q12 sec3, general -0.0559 0.0975
Qla marital status -0.313" 0.0805
Q14 regionl (west) -0.110 0.0980
(ils region2 (east) -0.00105 0.103
p~s region3 (south) -0.209" 0.106
QI~ square of log(age) -1.289" 0.312
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Table 6.6 The covariances
estimate standard error
Q„ (wage) 0.412" 0.00184
v,,,,, (wage-employment) -0.0482 0.0324
Q,,,,, (wage-search) -0.0260 0.0166
v,,,,,, (employment-search) -0.858" 0.0204
between being married and search is negative as well. Table 6.6 contains the covariances
of the error terms. The wage-employment covariance is not significant. The covariance
Q„u, of wages and the search decision is negative and insignificant. Remarkable is the
significance of the age variables in both the wage equation and the search equation.
Wages rise with age until the age of 44, whereas search falls with age after the age of
25, so there is a wide range of ages in which wages are rising and search is falling with
age. This result is in accordance with the structural model, which implies that there
is a negative relation between the search decision and the current wage. Finally, look-
ing at the covariance Qu,,,2 between the error terms of employment and search we see
that there is a significant and sizeable negative correlation between the search decision
and the ernployment decision, which is in accordance with the large difference in search
percentages for employed and unemployed searchers in table 6.1.
In the theoretical model in the preceding section it can be seen from (6.4) that different
search equations for the different labour force states arise if there are differences in the
arrival tates ~„ and ae, the cost functions cu(.) and ce(.) or if there are non-zero cost
of turnover. With so many sources of possible differences, it is hardly believable that
employed and unemployed individuals have the same search equation. Therefore, we
repeat the above exercise, but now with different search equations for different labour
force states.
Now the model becomes
ln w - ~7'x ~ v (6.17)
yi - ázr ~ ur (6.18)
ye - Qeze ~- ue (6.19)
y,. - Quzu -I- u„ (6.20)
The covariance matrix of the disturbances is
z
Qv Qvu, avu~ ~
~, - ?vu, 1 Qu,u~ Uu,u~
~vu~ Qu,u~ 1 ~
~ Qu,uu ~ 1
(6.21)
Equation (6.18) is the employment equation. Equation (6.19) is the search equation for
employed individuals and equation (6.20) is the search equation for unemployed indi-
viduals. Note, that the covariances between the disturbances of search and employment
and of search and unemployment are not identified. In the case of cross section data,
they do not appear in the likelihood function at all. In table 6.7 the estimates of
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Table 6.7 The wage equation
estimate standard error
pl const -10.315" 0.902
r~21og(age) 8.984" 0.507
r~3 square of log(age) -1.183" 0.0710
~4 educl -0.476" 0.0334
~5 educ2 -0.400" 0.0294
~s educ3 -0.333"' 0.0262
r~~ educ4 -0.134'" 0.0310
Table 6.8 The employment equation
est.irnate standard error
a~ const -5.824 4.082
az ~ -0.00173" 0.000347
a31og(fs) 0.118 0.0755
a4 log(age) 4.133' 2.301
as nationality 0.131 0.144
as educl -0.645" 0.229
a~ educ2 -0.320 0.199
as educ3 -0.102 0.197
a9 educ4 0.0484 0.211
alo secl,technical -0.0490 0.138
all sec2, econ. adm. 0.0203 0.166
a12 sec3,general -0.198 0.155
ai3 marital status 0.649" 0.106
ai4 regionl (west) 0.295" 0.135
a~s region2 (east) 0.0397 0.137
aIS region3 (south) 0.185 0.148
al~ square of log(age) -0.617` 0.323
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Table 6.9 The search equation,
Employed individuals
estimate standard error
~iel const -16.440" 5.699
Qez F~ 0.000681 0.000554
Qe3 log(fs) -0.0531 0.0618
~e41og(age) 10.098" 3.308
ies nationality -0.0950 0.149
J3es educl -0.0187 0.183
Qe~ educ2 -0.105 0.133
~ies educ3 -0.195 0.120
,Oes educ4 0.0567 0.129
Qeio secl, technical -0.129 0.0856
Qell sec2, econ. adm. -0.0658 0.100
Qelz sec3, general -0.0528 0.102
Qer3 marital status -0.325" 0.0915
fiela regioni (west) -0.0895 0.105
Qe~s region2 (east) -0.00187 0.108
~iels region3 (south) -0.229" 0.112
pe1~ square of log(age) -1.558" 0.482
Table 6.10 The search equation,
Unemployed individuals
estimate standard error
~iul const -12.448 54.753
Qiz ~ 0.00166 0.00748
Qi3 log(fs) 1.384 1.041
~iu4log(age) 8.948 42.156
,0„s nationality - 0.0518 0.784
Q,~s educl - 0.264 4.587
Q„~ educ2 - 0.723 3.556
Q„s educ3 - 0.199 1.292
Q„s secl, technical 0.313 1.159
Q,~~o sec2, econ. adm. -0.340 1.024
Q„11 sec3, general - 0.541 2.368
Q„lz marital status 0.0438 3.895
Qi13 regionl ( west) -0.397 1.169
,Qi14 region2 ( east) - 0.192 0.451
Q„15 region3 ( south) - 0.0940 1.036
Quis square of log(age) - 1.426 6.434
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Table 6.11 The covariances
estimate standard error
o„ (wage) 0.411" 0.00194
~,,,,, (wage-employment) -0.0458 0.0418
v,,,,~ ( wage-search) - 0.0260 0.0172
a,,,,,,, ( employment-usearch) - 0.304 6.608
o,,,,,~ ( employment-esearch) - 0.883" 0.129
the wage equation are given. There is hardly any difference with the estimates in table
6.3. In table 6.8 the estimates of the employment equation are given. The parameter
az of ~ is significantly negative at the 507'0 level. In table 6.9 are the estimates of the
search equation for employed individuals. There are some differences as compared to the
estimates in table 6.5. Non-labour income is no longer significant. The age variables still
play an important role and the relation between age and search is maximal at the age
of 26. As before, the dumy variables for marital status and region3 have a significant
negative effect on the probability of searching while being employed. Table 6.10 presents
the search parameter estimates for the unemployed individuals. There are clearly differ-
ences between the results in this table and those in 6.5 and 6.9. None of the variables
is significant. The large standard errors are due to the low number of observations on
non-searching unemployed individuals. Because of the low number of observations we
combined the higher two levels of education into one class and consequently the dummy
variable educ4 has disappeared from the equation. For this reason, the first model is not
nested in the second and therefore a likelihood ratio test for the hypothesis that there is
no difference between the two specifications is not valid. Nervertheless, it may be use-
ful to look at the likelihood ratio test statistic to obtain an indication of the difference
between the models. The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic 18.9. There are 17
restrictions (17 in the parameters of the search equation, 1 in the covariance structure
and -1 because of the combination of two education level dummy variables in the search
equation for the unemployed) and the critical value at the 5QI'o level is 27.6, which implies
that the hypothesis of no difference between the two models is not rejected. This is
mainly due to the limited explanatory power of the search equation for the unemployed
individuals. The estimates of the parameters of search equation in first model, in which
there is no difference between employed and unemployed individuals, seem to be largely
determined by the observations on employed individuals. Finally, table 6.11 shows the
parameter estimates of the covariances. The covariance between the wage and employ-
ment error terms is insignificant, whereas the correlation between wages and search again
is insignificantly negative.
6.3.2 Estimating a structural model of duration and search
intensity
It ís well-known that there is a close link between labour market transitions and the
duration of labour market states. In the case of a stationary model, the duration of being
in a certain labour market state is exponentially distributed and its parameter can be
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derived from the search model as the product of the job offer arrival rate and the job ac-
ceptance proba,bility. In the present case we have a two state model in which three types
of transitions may occur: Transitions from unemployment into employment with transi-
tion rate 9„e(s„), job to job transitions with transition rate Bee(se), and transitions from
employment into unemployment with transition rate ~, which is just the layoff rate from
section 6.2. Ideally, the arguments s„ and se are the observed search intensity variables
for unemployed and employed individuals respectively. Unfortunately, search intensity
is not an observed variable. In the preceding subsection, we defined four observed indi-
cators s~, s2i s3 and s4 for tbe intensity of search. In the present section, the unobserved,
latent, search intensity variables su and se are allowed to be four dimensional vectors
of (unobserved) search variables, i.e. s„ -(sul i Su2i Su3~ Su4)' and se -(se~, Sey, Se3i Se4)'i
in which each component corresponds to one of the observed indicators. Later on, a
relation between the observed instruments sj and the latent variables will be specified.
First the distribution of unemployment duration t„ and job tenure te are given for the
case of a flow sampling scheme. The density of the latent search intensity vector while
employed, conditional on the wage, and the density of the latent search intensity vector
while unemployed are denoted by fe(se) and f„(s„) respectively. Explicit expressions
for those will be given later on. Note, that in the first subsection estimates for the
pa.rameters of the wage offer distribution have already been obtained, while accounting
for correlation with the employrnent decision and the search decision. As a consequence,
we will condition on the observed wages throughout.
The relation between the transition intensities Blle(su) and BeC(se) and the search
model is:
Bue(su) - (1 -f- a'usu)~uF(~) (6.22)
Bee(Se) - (1 } aeSe )~eF(a(w)) (6.23)
with a;, -(aul, a„2, a„3,auq) and aé - (aer, Q'e2, aeg, aeq). Note, that the parameters au
and ae1 that determine the influence of search intensity on the transition intensities, can
be identified by the duration data.
Now, the density functions of unemployment duration t„ and job tenure te, conditional
on search intensity s„ and se and the wage rate w are:
fu(tulSu) - Bue(Su)exp{-Bue(Su)tu},~ G tu G 00
fe(teI Se) - eee(Se) exp{-(9ee(Se) ~- ?)te}, O G Ee G 00
job to job transitions (6.24)
Ïe(telSe) - Uexp{-(BCe(Se) ~ U)te},0 G te G 00
employment to unemployment transitions
The joint density of duration and the latent search intensity vector can be obtained
by multiplying by the marginal density of search intensity, f„(s„), for unemployed in-
dividuals, or by the density of search intensity conditiona] on the wage for employed
individuals, which we shall simply denote by fe(se).
Before we can derive the likelihood contributions, the relation between the latent
search intensity variables and the indicators has to be explained. For this purpose, cost
of search functions c,,(s) and ce(s) are specified for unemployed and employed persons
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~Si-ryul9~ - ~ ryujq~ (6.25)
ryou~j eXp ry0u, rya`,7 eXp -70u, .J 7
Ce(S) - ~j-1 Ce7ls7)
cejÍsi) - 7ot,j eXp ry0e, - ryoe,j exp -ry0e,.l`S,-rye,4~ `
ry-Ll (6.26)
1 7
in which you,j, ryot,j, yuj and ryej are parameters and q is a vector of individual charac-
teristics. Note, that at a zero search intensity vector the cost of search is zero. The
regularity conditions ( 6.2) on first and second order derivatives are now assumed to hold
for the partial derivatives of the cost function. The regularity conditions for the second
order derivatives of the cost of search functions are satisfied if ryo,,,j and ryoe,j are posi-
tive, j - 1, ..., 4. The positivity conditions on yoe,j and ryo,,,j will not be imposed in the
estimation.
The marginal cost - marginal returns condition ( 6.4) now becomes
Luj(Su]) - Ru)~
~ej Sej w - Rej(w)f.Í - 1,2,3,4
with
(6.27)
R„j - auj.~uf~ [W(x)-V]dF(~)
(6.28)
Rej(w) - atj~e f(w)[W (~) - W(a(w))l dF(x),j - 1, 2, 3, 4
Solving equations (6.27) and (6.28) for each j, using the specification of the cost of search
functions in (6.25) and (6.26), we obtain
Sui - ryuj4 f ryo,..j ln ~i - 7uj9 f ryo,.~i]Quj f in g(~,., ~)] (6.29)
Sej(w) -?'e;9 f ryot,; ln Rej(w) - ryej9 f ryo,t[Qt; -f- ing(~t~a(w))] (6.30)
with
g(.1, w) -,~ f~[W(~) - W(w)] dF(x) (6.31)
w
Qui - ln(aui) (6.32)
Qej - In(atj) (6.33)
Note, that 7o,,,j and 7ot,j determine the effect of the marginal returns of search on search
intensity. According to the theory specified in section 6.2, the relation between optimal
search intensity and the marginal returns of search should be positive. In the empirical
applica.tion we can test for the sign of this relation.
No explicit expression for the integrand on the right hand side of (6.31) exists and
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therefore, we need an approximation. The integrand is approximated by 3
(P f Q) [W(x) - W(w)] .-; u(x -~ P) - u(w f l~) (6.34)
The function g(a, w) is approximated by g(~, w), with
9(~, w) - P~ Q J~,~
~u(x f P) - u(w ~ F~)] dF(x) (6.35)
The advantage of this approximation over e.g. a Taylor expansion is that this function
has the same derivative properties as the original, i.e. a higher wage leads to lower
returns.
Now assume that suj and se~(w) are the solutions to
cu;(sui) - ~ui9(~u,~) (6.36)
Cej(Se7(w)) - ae7g(~eia(w))
Then the latent search intensities s„j and sej are assumed to be linked to s"uj and sej(w)
in the following way:
Suj - Su7 } EuJ~ Sej - SeJlw) } EeJ
suj - suj if suj ~ 0, sej - sej if se~ ~ 0 (6.37)
su~ - 0 if suj C 0, sej - 0 if sej C O
wlt}1 Eu -(Eul i Eu2~ Eu3i Eu4)~ ~ N(~, .F..u) and Ee -(Eeli Ee2i Ee3i Ee4)~ ~ ÍV(~, ~e). TÍle
relation with the observed indicator becomes:
suj - 1 if suj 1 0, s„a - su4 if su4 ~ 0 (6.38)
- 0 if suj - 0, j- 1, 2, 3, - 0 if s„4 - 0
For non-searchers, s„~ - 0, j- 1, 2, 3, 4. The same holds for employed individuals. The
variances of EZj, z- e, u, j - 1, 2, 3, are normalized to one.
For all of the four search indicators we observe whether or not it is positive, but if it
is positive, its value is only observed for s4i the number of applications. Therefore we
have to integrate out the unobserved values. Let fu(su) denote the density function of
s,,, which is normal according to (6.37) and fé (se) denotes the density of se. Then the
joint density of unemployment duration and the indicator vector becomes:
Ju(tuiSu) - t {' {'
f fA(s)f B ue(IuSu)exp{-Bue(Iusu)tuJJu(S4ISulisu2isu3)Ju(Sulisu2isu3)dsuldsuzdsu3
1fSqi~
.f fB(s').~.f Bue(lusu)exp{-B ue(lusu)tulfu(SuliSu2isu3iSu4)dsurdsu2dsu3dsu4
if s4 - 0
(6.39)
3Note that the integrand can be written as (p } v) [W(x) - W(w)] - u(a f p) - u(w f p) -
[c~(s~(x)) - co(se(w))] ~ (1 f ~ese(x))~e .~a(a)[W(x) - W(a(x))]dF(x) - (1 f ~~s~(w))~e f~wl[W(ï) -
W(n(w))]dF(i) If sé(x) - s~(w) is small, but not equal to zero, this expression can be approximated
by: (p f o) [W(x) - W(w)] ~ u(x {- p) - u(w -} ~) -~ (s~(x) - sé(w)) {-c~(s~(w)) -~ Re(w)} The term in
brackets is the difference between the marginal cost of seazch and the marginal returns of search, which,
in the case of non-zero optimal search intensity, is zero.
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A(s) and B(s) are three and four-dimensional regions of integration, respectively, which
depend on the value of the indicator s. The bounds of integration are (-oo, 0) if s; - 0
and (0, oo) if s~ - 1. I„ is a four-dimensional indicator function, with lu; - 0 if s„; G 0
and I,,; - 1 if s„~ 1 0, indicating that if there is no search, there is no effect on the job
offer arrival rate. For employed individuals the density becomes
J( ~e(tef Se) -
J JA(s)J BeelleSe)exp{-(Bee(Iese) }a)te~fe(S4ISel~se2ise3)fe(Selise2~se3)dseldse2dse3
ifs4~0
.~.fB(s) f f Bee(Iese )exp{-(B ee(Iese) ~ a)teJJulSeliSe2ise3ise4)dseldse2dse3dse4
ifs4-0
(job to job transitions)
f fA(s) f Q exp{-(Bee(lese) }~)te)fe ( S4ISe1 i Se2i Se3)f ~(Sel ~ Se2t Se3)dSeldSe2dse3
lf Sq 1 0
f fB(a)f f Qexp{-(Bee(lese) } Q)teJfulselise2ise3ise4)dseldse2dse3dse4
ifs4-0
(employment to unemployment transitions)
(6.40)
Ie is a three-dimensional indicator function with Ie; - 0 if se; G 0 and Ie; - 1 if se; ~ 0.
To evaluate the likelihood contribution, we need to calculate three and four-
dimensional integrals of normally distributed random variables. This problem can easily
be handled by using the smooth recursive conditioning algorithm (SRC) for simulat-
ing multidimensional integrals over normally distributed random variables and applying
simulated maximum likelihood (SML) as described in BSrsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou
(1993).
The endogeneity of search intensity has consequences for the joint density in the case
of a stock sampling scheme. The derivation of the joint density of duration and search
intensity, conditional on backward recurrence times is given in appendix B.
The reservation wage for unemployed individuals can be calculated by solving ~ from
the implicit equation (6.8). The solution can be used to determine search intensity
equation. To calculate the transition intensity B„e(s„), su is replaced by s„ in (6.8).
For employed individuals, the reservation wage a(w) is calculated by means of the
Taylor approximation (6.11), where sé'(w) is replaced by se in the ca,lculation of the
conditional distribution of duration .
In the estimation of the structural model the following approach will be followed. First
of all the parameters of the wage distribution will be fixed to the parameters obtained by
the estimation of the reduced form model, described in the previous subsection. From the
structural model in section 6.2 it has become clear that a structural specification of the
distribution of observed wages would depend, in a complicated way, on the employment
situation and the search decision. For a structural model of the wage parameters, it is not
enough to know the labour market state and the income variable at the point of sampling:
Information about previous labour market states is also required. Although the use of
reduced form estimators of the wage parameters will lead to inefficient estimators of the
remaining model parameters, in practice the gains of estimating the wage parameters
6.3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 1 ~3
structurally will not outweigh the cost that is due to the intractibility of the model.
A joint model of duration and search intensity will be estimated, conditional on the
wage. The parameters a,,, ~e, ~,,, ~e, ry,,, rye, ryo,,,, ryo,e, w, Q and k can be obtained by
the (simulated) maximum likelihood principle.





The cost of turnover can be parametrized as:
k - ó'c (6.42)
in which S is a parameter vector and c is a vector of individual characteristics. a„ and




in which z is a vector of individual characteristics and n;,, and ~ce are parameter vectors.
To restrict the number of parameters we assume that
ryu; - ~,,;?',.,d„i - 1,7 - 1,2,3,4 (6.44)
rye; -~eirye, ~ei - 1, ~- 1, 2, 3, 4
where ~9„~ and r9e~ are sca,lars. The economic argument in favour of this type of restriction
is that the four measures s~ are all indicators for search effort. The restriction implies
that there is a single index, ryuq for unemployed and ryéq for employed individuals, which
specifies the effect of individual characteristics on cost of search. Suppose, that there is
a variable called "search effort", which is a weighted sum of the latent variables s„~ and
se„ for unemployed and employed individuals respectively. Then the structural equation
for this variable would be of the same form as (6.29)-(6.30)-(6.37), i.e. linear in q and
and log-linear in R„ or Re, and the cost of search function of this variable would be of
the same form as c„~(.) and ce~(.) in (6.25) and (6.26).
6.3.3 Data and estimation results
Table 6.12 provides sample statistics of the sample of employment search spells as
well as the sample of unemployment search spells. Table 6.13 presents sample statistics
for spells of non-searchers. In the sample we only consider single spells of employment
and unemployment. This is done for several reasons. First of all, to relax the effects
of the stationarity assumption. If we would estimate a multiple spell model, we would
have to assume that the individual characteristics in the transitions intensities are the
same throughout all spells of employment and unemployment, which is rather unrealistic.
Second, the indica.tors of search intensity are only observed twice a year, in the months
in which the survey is conducted. Therefore, for shorter spells which are in between the
survey months, search intensity is not observed. Third, using a multiple spell model it
would not be possible anymore to condition on the wage rate, which makes the model
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Table 6.12 Sample statistics, searchers
Employed
variable mean standard deviation
age 32 7.8
family size (persons) 3.2 1.3
education level mode 3
Dutch nationality 96.6Q1o
region 1 (industrialized west) 44.4qo
region 2 (east) 24.8e1o
region 3 (south) 20.8~0
region 4 (agricultural) lO.Oqo
married 65.6~0
sector of educatíon 1(technical) 28.6qo
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 17.4~0
sector of education 3(no specialization) 27.6aIo
sector of educa,tion 4(services) 23.4qo
Unemployed
variable mean standard deviation
age 31 11.7
family size ( persons) 3.0 1.6
educa,tion level mode 1
Dutch nationality 92.3~0
region 1 (industrialized west) 37.2~0
region 2 (east) 27.9~0
region 3 (south) 23.4~0
region 4 ( agricultural) 11.5PIo
married 35.5oIo
sector of educa,tion 1(technical) 24.4~0
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 10.6~0
sector of education 3(no specialization) 52.6qo
sector of education 4(services) 11.2qo
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Table 6.13 Sample statistics, non-searchers
Employed
variahl~~ mean standard deviatiou
age 38 10.7
family size (persons) 3.3 1.3
education level mode 3
Dutch nationality 96.4~0
region 1 (industrialized west) 43.Oo1'o
region 2 (east) 23.8~10
region 3 (south) 23.1qo
region 4 (agricultural) 10.1~0
married 76.6oI'o
sector of education 1(technical) 34.4~0
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 17.8qo
sector of education 3(no specialization) 27.7qo
sector of education 4(services) 19.3~0
Unemployed
variable mean standard deviation
age 47 15.4
family size ( persons) 2.4 1.2
education level mode 1
Dutch nationality 95.OPIo
region 1 ( industrialized west) 42.5010
region 2 (east) 35.OaIo
region 3 (south) 5.O~o
region 4 ( agricultural) 17.5qo
married 57.5oI'o
sector of education 1(technical) 17.5PIo
sector of education 2(economic~administrative) 10.0~Io
sector of education 3(no specialization) 50.O~o
sector of education 4(services) 20.O~o
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intractable. The following sampling scheme is used. All individuals who are either
employed or unemployed, are sampled from the survey wave of October 1987. In addition,
all individuals who are employed or unemployed in April 1988, and whose spell started
after October 1987, have been sampled from the wave of April 1988. Finally, all spells
of individuals who are unemployed in October 1988, and whose spell started after April
1988 have been added. In all cases we have to correct for the fact that we do not observe
spells in between the survey months, which can be done by using the stock sample density
for all observations, which is derived in appendix B.
The total sample of spells of employed searchers consists of 500 observations. 127 of
these spells are completed spells. The observation period ends in October 1988. The
sample of spells of unemployed searchers consists of 312 observations. 139 of these spells
are completed spells. For the spells of unemployed individuals, the observation period
ends in April 1989.
The sample of spells of non-searchers consists of 2806 observations, which can be
divided into 2766 employment spells and 40 unemployment spells. For the employed,
171 job to job transitions occur, whereas 165 transitions into unemployment take place.
The number of unemployment spells that is completed is 13.
Comparing spells of searchers and spells of non-searchers we can say that 33~10 of the
non-search unemployment spells ends with a transition into employment, whereas the
number is 45oI'o for search unemployment spells. For the non-search employment spells
6~o ends with a job to job transition, whereas 25~0 of the sea.rch employment spells
ends with a job to job transition. 6~0 of the non-search employment spells ends by
a transition into unemployment whereas the number is 4~o for the search employment
spells. In the vector z in (6.43) the following characteristics are included: A constant
term, log of age and log of age squared, the three sectoral dummies secl, sec2, and
sec3, that have already been described in section 6.3.1, the regional dummy variables
regionl, region2 and region3, the three education dummies educl, educ2 and educ3, a
dummy for marital status and a dummy for nationality. There are too few observations
to make the layoff rate Q dependent on individual characteristics. In the vector q, which
contains characteristics of the cost of search functions in (6.25) and (6.26), we include the
logarithm of family size, a dummy variable for marital status, as well as the logarithm of
age and its square. In the turiiover cost k in (6.42) we include two age dummy variables:
ageduml for individuals aged 30 or lower, and agedum2 for individuals aged between
30 and 45. Two dummy variables are included which are concerned with the training
period required for the worker's present job. If an individual had to spend much time
to get settled in his present job, turnover cost is likely to be higher than in absence of
a training period. The first dummy variable is called trainperl, which is equal to one if
there is no training period or if the respondent does not know the length of the training
period. The second dummy, trainper2, is for persons with a training period with a length
that is less than six months. The reference group includes those individuals who have a
job for which a training period is required that is half a year or longer.
The estimation results of the structural model are reported in the tables 6.14 through
6.20. The rate of time preference p has been fixed, such that on a yearly basis the discount
rate is 5qo. The number of replications used for simulating probability integrals by means
of the smooth recursive conditioning algorithm is 20. In the table a double asterisk
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indicates significance at the 5~0 level, whereas a single asterisk indicates significance at
the 10010 level.
First we discuss the parameters ~e which establish the part of the job offer arrival
rate for employed individuals t}iat is determined by the demand side of the labour mar-
ket. The estimates are presented in table 6.14. The dummy variable sec2 (parameter
xes), which corresponds with the economic and administrative sector, has a significantly
positive effect on ~e. As the reference sector is the sector of services, this implies that
individuals with an economic or administrative education have a significantly higher job
offer arrival rate than individuals in the service sector. The education dummy educl
is significant. 13oth age variables, log(age) and its square, are significant determinants
of the arrival rate. The values of the estimates indicate that ae falls with age at an
increasing rate.
The parameter estimate of the layoff rate Q is small but significant.
Comparing the parameter estimates of the effectíveness of search parameters aer, ae2
and ae4, which determine the effectiveness of search of respectively attitude, screening
and nLrmber of applications, we see that attitude has a large effect on the probability of
getting a job offer as compared to the remaining two search instruments. In comparing
the effectiveness of the three search instruments, the scale of the variables has to be taken
into account, i.e. the va,riances of the attitude and screening variables are normalized
to one, whereas the variance of the application instrument has been estimated. Even
after accounting for scale, the effect of the number of applications on the number of
job offers remains surprisingly low. The standard errors of áe2 (screening) and áe4
(applications) are high relative to the parameter estimates. Note that a formal test for
cre~ - 0 is not possible: Under the null, marginal returns of search would always be zero
and consequently nobody would search. The fact that individuals are making use of the
search instruments indicates that at least they expect search to be effective.
The estimates of the cost of search function parameters for employed individuals,
ye„j- 1, ..., 5 are presented in table 6.15. The characteristics that are related to the
household composition do not play any role. The age variables (parameters yeq and
ryE~) are significant. The cost of search falls with age until the age of 30, after which it
rises. The parameters yoe,~ which determine the effect of marginal returns of search on
the intensity of search are all positive and significant, which is in accordance with the
regularity conditions that are assumed to hold in the economic model.
The estimates of the cost of turnover parameters, ór, ..., ós, are presented in table 6.16.
Note, that the cost of turnover, as it has been introduced here, only serves as a relaxation
of the functional form of the transition intensity Bee(se), as no data on reservation wages
are available.4 This means that we have to be careful in interpreting the estimates of
turnover costs. None of the cost of turnover parameters are signifiantly different from
zero.
T}~e arrival rate parameters au for unemployed individuals can be found in table
6.18. The age parameters are significant. The estimates suggest that .~„ rises with age,
which seems counter-intuitive. Living in the southern part of the Netherlands (region 3,
parameter n,ii9) adds positively to the job offer arrival rate. The parameter estimate of
9Van den Berg (1992) uses data on reservation wages to estimate the turnover costs by minimizing
the squared difference between observed reservation wages and their theoretical expressions.
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the education dummy variable educ2 is significantly positive.
The utility parameter w exceeds one, but is not significantly different from one, which
means that we cannot say that there are differences in utility levels associated with the
two different labour market states.
As for the employed individuals, we see that the attitude variable influences the
arrival rate strongly. For unemployed individuals the number of applications has much
more effect than for the employed individuals. Being registered at the employment
office seems to be the least effective instrument of search. Comparing the parameter
estimates with the standard errors, we see that the standard errors for attitude, screening
and applications are low as compared to the the estimates. For the employment office
parameter this is not the case.
The estimates of the cost of search parameters ryu„j - 1, ..., 5, are shown in table 6.19.
Family size has a significant and positive effect on the intensity of search. The larger
the family, the more effort is spent on search. In the extended search model of Burdett
and Mortensen (1978) cost of search arises from a loss in utility, as a higher intensity of
search implies that less time can be devoted to leisure. From this point of view, having a
larger family affects preferences such that the individual is willing to alloca.te less time to
leisure and more time to search. Cost of search is increasing with age. The parameters
ryou,~, that determine the efE'ect of marginal returns of search on search intensity, all are
significantly positive, which again is in accordance with the assumptions underlying the
economic model.
In conclusion we can say that, for both unemployed searchers and employed searchers,
the theoretical result that marginal returns of search should increase the intensity of
search, is not rejected by the estimation results. For employed individuals, search inten-
sity varies with age: it increases with age until the age of 30, after which it decreases.
For unemployed persons, family size is an important determinant of search intensity. If
we consider the measure of search intensity to be a proxy for time spent on search, the
significance of family size can be explained in terms of allocation of time to search ac-
tivities and leisure. For both employed and unemployed individuals, the attitude seems
to be an important determinant of search intensity in terms of effectiveness of search.
For employed individuals, the number of applications does not seem to be very effec-
tive, whereas for unemployed individuals the number of applications is effective. Being
registered at the employment office is the least effective instrument of search for the
unemployed individuals.
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~cet (const) -9.757" 1.558
kez (log(age)) 4.720" 0.877
~ea (square of log(age)) -0.967" 0.136
xe4 (secl) 0.023 0.168
~e5 (sec2) 0.343` 0.187
~es (sec3) -0.005 0.194
~ce~ (region 1) 0.205 0.198
~ce8 (region2) -0.034 0.220
ke9 (region3) 0.097 0.214
~eto (educl) 0.503" 0.238
~ett (educ2) 0.308' 0.178
~etz (educ3) 0.031 0.162
~et3 (marital status) 0.055 0.148




~et (attitude) 25.739 4.092
~ez (screening) 0.156 0.161
~e4 (applications) 0.0022 0.0028
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Table 6.15 Estimates of the structural model
Employed individuals
The cost of search function
estimate standard error
COST OF SEARCH INDICATOR yeq
ryet (constant) -21.40" 4.612
rye2 (log(family size)) -0.041 0.060
rye3 (marital status) 0.075 0.080
rye9 (1og(age)) 11.70" 2.967
-yes (square of log(age)) -1.722" 0.393
EFFECT OF RETURNS OF SEARCH ON SEARCH INTENSITY
ryOe,~ (attitude) 0.087'" 0.043
ryoe,2 (screening) 0.176" 0.044
~yOe,a (applications) 0.864" 0.177
PARAMETER ,9e
~9e2 (screening) 0.849" 0.109
~9e4 (applications) 1.452"' 0.683




b~ (constant) -9.641 9.044
b2 (ageduml) 190.0 241.3
b3 (agedum2) -109.7 226.0
b4 (trainperl) 385.8 285.0
bs (trainper2) 247.2 278.7
Table 6.17 Estimates of the structural model
Employed individuals
Parameters of error distribution, Ee
estimate standard error
ae,12 (covariance attitude-screening) 0.936" 0.009
oe,14 (covariance attitude-applications) 1.938" 0.067
ve,24 (covariance screening-applications) 2.097" 0.063
Qe,4 (standard deviation applications) 2.248'" 0.072
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~c„~ ( const) 4.336" 1.840
ki2 (log(age)) -2.638" 0.752
ki3 (square of log(age)) 0.453" 0.174
ku4 (secl) 0.341 0.509
~c„s (sec2) 0.581 0.630
~ci6 (sec3) 0.284 0.467
Ku~ (regionl) - 0.291 0.462
k„8 (region2) - 0.278 0.455
~cu9 (region3) 1.051" 0.478
~ulo (educl) 0.635 0.525
~ull (educ2) 1.199" 0.498
~„12 (educ3) 0.542 0.504
~cuia ( marital status) 0.312 0.414




~„t (attitude) 23.999 8.232
au2 (screening) 0.341 0.154
~„3 (employment office) 0.097 0.056
a„4 (applications) 1.507 0.506
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Table 6.19 Estimates of the structural model
Unemployed individuals
The cost of search function
estimate standard error
COST OF SEARCH INDICATOR -yuq
ry„1 (constant) - 1.906" 0.314
ryi2 (log(family size)) 0.168" 0.021
y„3 (marital status) -0.030 0.029
ryu4 (log(age)) - 0.665" 0.261
y„s (square of log(age)) 0.025 0.039
EFFECT OF RETURNS OF SEARCH ON SEARCH INTENSITY
7o,.,i ( attitude) 0.450" 0.024
y~,2 (screening) 1.523" 0.349
ryo,,,3 (employment office) 1.857" 0.349
ryo,.,a ( applications) 1.291" 0.222
PARAMETER ,9„
~9u2 (screening) 1.478" 0.494
~9i3 (employment office) 1.366" 0.437
~9„4 (applications) 1.043" 0.361
Table 6.20 Estimates of the structural model
Unemployed individuals
Parameters of error distribution, Eu
estimate standard error
~,,,12 (covariance attitude-screening) -0.091" 0.017
vu,13 (covariance attitude-employment office) 0.183' 0.107
~,,,14 (covariance attitude-applications) -2.679" 0.292
~,,,23 (covariance screening-employment ofFice) 0.292" 0.107
~u,34 (covariance employment office-applications) 0.380 0.396
~,,,24 (covariance screening-applications) 2.400" 0.264
Q,,,4 (standard deviation applica,tions) 4.384" 0.314
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6.4 Conclusions
We have specified an empirical version of the search model of Mortensen (1986), in
which the intensity of search is a choice variable for the individual. A higher level of
search intensity increases the job offer arrival rate, but at the same time cost of search
rises. The individual chooses the intensity of search on the basis of a comparison of
marginal returns of search with marginal cost of search. We allowed for differences in
arrival rates between the state of employment and the state of unemployment. This
means that there are differences in search conditions for different labour force states.
We have seen that these differences in search conditions affect the reservation wage for
individuals in the state of unemployment. The better the search conditions in the state
of unemployment, as compared to the search conditions in the state of employment, the
higher the reservation wage for individuals in the state of unemployment.
If cost of turnover is zero, the reservation wage in the employment state is equal to
the present wage. Positive turnover cost raises the reservation wage in the employment
state. As higher cost of turnover deteriorates the search conditions while employed, the
reservation wage for unemployed persons rises as well.
According to the assumptions underlying the economic model, higher marginal returns
of search should increase the intensity of search. In the empirical application, we have
tested for this implication of economic theory and it could not be rejected.
In the empirical model we used data on job duration and unemployment duration
and several indicators of search intensity to estimate the model parameters. The cost
of search for employed persons is largely determined by age patterns. Cost of search
decrease until the age of 30, after which it increases. For unemployed persons family
size is a significant determinant of cost of search. A larger family leads to a lower cost
of search and consequently to a higher intensity of search. Cost of search is increasing
with age for unemployed persons.
We have not found significant evidence in favour of differences in preferences with
respect to different labour market states.
Estimates of the arrival rat.P reveal evidence about the relative effectiveness of different
search instruments. For both employed and unemployed persons, the search intensity
indicator that measures the individual's attitude towards search strongly influences the
arriva] rate. This may be partly due to the possibility that the attitude variable picks up
search intensity channels that cannot be assigned to one of the remaining three indicators
of search. Rather surprisingly, we found that the number of applications has not much
effect for employed individuals. For unemployed individuals the number of applications
has a stronger effect on the arrival rate. Being registered at the employment office is the
least effective search instrument for unemployed persons.
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6.A The Bellman equations
First the expression of the value function, V, for unemployed individuals is derived.
We consider the events in a small time interval of length Ot. At present, the individual
is unemployed, is earning a benefit income of b and a non-labour income ~. The within
period utility flow in a time interval with length ~t is wu(b f p)Ot. If the individual is
searching during Ot, the cost of search is c„(s)~t. The current period contribution to
V is (wu(b f p) - c„(s))Ot. At the end of the interval ~t he may or may not obtain
a job offer. The number of job offers obtained in an interval of length ~t is Poisson
distributed with parameter (1 ~- a„s)~„Ot, so the probability of receiving a job offer is
e-i'f~u'la~o`(1 -f a„s)~„~tf o(Ot), whereas the probability of receiving no job offer is
1- e-~~fau'la~oc(1 -F a„s)a„Ot ~ o(Ot). If a job offer is obtained with wage income x a
choice can be made between accepting the job with value W(x) or rejecting with value
V. Therefore, the expected future value is Es max[V,W(x)]. In the absence of a job offer
the value remains equal to V. The discount factor is e-vo`. The value function becomes:
V- max,~o [(u(b ~- p) - c„(s)) Otf
.e-vni fe-(1}aue la„ne(1 f a„s)~„OtE~max[V, W(x)] (6.A.1)
}(1 -le-(1}auala~~t(1 ~ Q'.uS)nu~t)V~] ~ O(Ot)
Rearranging terms yields:
1-e-P~` V -Ot
max,~o [wu(b f p) - c,~(s) f e-lv}I'faL'la~lo`(1 f a„s)~„{Es max[V, W(x)] - V}]
(6.A.2)
Letting Ot -~ 0:
pV - mao [wu(b -F p) - c„(s) -F (1 -} a„s)a„{E~ max[V, W(x)] - V}] (6.A.3)
Replacing the expectation sign by the integral over the wage distribution yields the first
equation of (6.3).
For individuals who are currently working at wage w the value function is denoted by
W(w). The current period contribution to the value function is (u(w ~- p.) - ce(s))Ot.
At the end of interval Ot four events may occur. With probability (e-1'}a''la'o`(1 -{-
cres).~~~t f o(~t))(1 -o0t) - e-1'fa''~a~oc(1 f ~es)ae0t -}-o(Ot) a job offer with wage x
is obtained by the individual, while he is not laid off. If he accepts, he has to pay turnover
costs k. The alternatives are, to remain in his present job or to become unemployed.
The value for the event is max[V, W(x) - k, W(w)]. The second event is that of getting
a job offer and being laid off. Now the alternative of remaining in his present job
disappears. The probability of the event is (e-1'}a''la'oc(1 -}- aes)~e0t -1- o(Ot))QOt -
o(Ot) with value max[V,W(x) - k]. The third event is that of neither getting a job
offer, nor being laid off. The probability is (1 - e'~lta~'la'o`(1 -}- a~s).~e0t d- o(Ot))(1 -
QOt) - 1- e-1'fa~'la~o`(1 -F aes)~e0t - e-1'}"`'laao`(1 -}- aes).~e0t -1- o(Ot) with value
max[V,W(w)] - W(w). Finally, he may be laid off without getting a job offer. This




maxs~o [(u(w ~- ~) - ce(s))Ot
~e-vo~ ~e-(ita~e)a~v~(1 -1- ~es)~e~Ex max[V, W(x) - k, W(w)]~
(1 - e-l~taesla~oa(1 ~ cres)ae~t - a~t)W(w) ~- Q~tV}] -~ o(~t)
Rearranging terms, dividing by ~t and letting Ot -~ 0 yields
(P f ~)W(w) -
maxs~o [u(w ~ tC) - ce(s) d- aes {Ex[V, W(~) - k, W(w)] - W(w)} ~- ~V]
This is the equivalent of the second equation in (6.3).
(6.A.4)
(6.A.5)
6.B The stock sample density
The stock sample density of duration and search intensity, conditional on the back-
ward recurrence time is derived. The analysis is based on Ridder (1984). The subindices
e and u, indicating the labour force state, will be suppressed. Let f(t ~s, w) denote the
flow conditional density of duration, conditional on search intensity and the wage. To
reduce the necessary notation, search intensity is treated as a observed continuous non-
negative random variable here. The extension to multidimensional variables of the type
in section 6.3.2 is straightforward. Let f(s~w) denote the density of search intensity
conditional on the wage, and let g(w) denote the marginal density of observed wages.
Then the joint flow density of duration, search intensity and observed wages is
f(t~s, w) f(s~w)g(w), 0 G t C oo, 0 G s C oo (6.B.1)
Now assume that the inflow rate into the given labour force state is i(-p, I), in which -p
denotes the time of inflow into the state, if the point of sampling is taken as reference,
and 1 is calendar time. The stock density is the flow density, conditional on entrance at
p time units ago, and conditional on duration t exceeding the backward recurrence time
p. Then the joint stock density of duration, backward recurrence time, search intensity
and observed wages is: 5
~(ih te s, w) - o0 00
oto(~Pel).F(t~s,w).f (s~w)9(w)
f0 f0 f0 z( P,~)F(p~s`,w) f (s~w)g(w)dwdsdy
0 C p G oo (6.B.2)
pGtCoo
OGsCoo
We are interested in the stock density of duration and search intensity, conditional on
the wage and the backward recurrence time, i.e.
h(t, s~P, TU) - h(R t, s' w)
~(P, w)
(6.B.3)
SNote, that we treat the subsample of employment spells and the subsample of unemployment
spells as two separate samples here. T~eating them as one sample changes the selectivity correction
in h(p, t, s, w), but leaves the final result, i.e. the density conditional on backward recurrence times,
u~iaffected.
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in which ~ ~
h(p, w) - f f h(p, t, s', w)dtds
0 p
Combining (B.3) and ( B.4) with ( B.2) yields the required density:
h(t,s,~P,w)-
oof(t~s,w)f(s~T~)







The essays in this thesis deal with different aspects of microeconometric modelling of
the labour market. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 concentrate on static models of labour supply,
whereas in chapters 5 and 6, labour market transitions are modelled.
Chapter 2 presents three method of simulated scores (MSS) estimators that extend
the method of simulated moments (MSM) estimator by McFadden (1989) to models with
mixed discrete-continuous variables. The estimators are obtained by solving a system
of moment equations that are derived from the score vector of the likelihood function.
The moment equations are written such that simulators for probabilities and derivatives
of probabilities enter the equations linearly. Consequently, simulation errors, which are
defined as the difference between the simulators and the probabilities that are simu-
lated, are averaged out over individuals, which implies that the parameter vector that
solves the moment conditions is a consistent estimator, even if a fixed, finite number
of replications is used in the calculation of the simulators. This is a property which is
not shared by the simulated maximum likelihood estimator (SML), which is obtained
by inserting simulated probabilities into the likelihood function. For consistency of the
latter method, both sample size and number of drawings should tend to infinity. Lerman
and Manski (1981) applied this method while using a frequency simulator. They found
that a large number of replications was required to reduce the bias, that is introduced by
using SML, to acceptable limits. Recently, interest in the SML method has been renewed
by the application of SML in the context of multidimensional Probit and Tobit models.
Bdrsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) propose the use of smooth simulators for the ap-
plication of SML, instead of using frequency simulators. They simulate multidimensional
normal probability integrals by means of the smooth recursive conditioning algorithm
(SRC). They show that the application of SML to a multidimensional Probit model, sim-
ulating the probabilities by means of SRC, already yields small biases for ten drawings,
whereas with twenty replications the bias has been reduced so far that a further increase
in replications does not result in any further improvement. In the implementation of
SRC the convenient properties of the normal distribution are exploited. Moreover, the
applicability of the method depends on the explicit availability of integration bounds.
The reason for application of frequency simulators, however, is the absence of explicit
expressions for the bounds of integration. The motivation for the construction of MSS
estimators in chapter 2 is to provide methods of estimation by simulation that ate able to
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cope with frequency simulators as well as general non-normal probability distributions.
The MSS methods are applied to a simple neo-classíca,l model of labour supply in
which the number of working hours and the wage rate are modelled simultaneously. The
simplicity of the model allows for comparison of the MSS methods with the maximum
likelihood estimator (ML), as well as with SML. Both Monte Carlo and empirical results
are presented. The Monte Carlo study shows that the MSS estimators perform satisfac-
torily, even if a small number of drawings to simulate the response probabilities, is used.
The Monte Carlo study also shows that the MSS methods outperform smooth simulated
maximum likelihood if a small number of drawings is used in the simulation of the re-
sponse probabilities. In the empirical application, substantial differences appear in the
estimation results obtained with different estimation methods. These differences are also
revealed in the computed wage elasticities of hours and participation. The differences
are attributed to the simplicity of the model, which ignores issues like fixed cost of work,
taxation and demand side restrictions.
In chapter 3, one of the MSS estimators developed in chapter 2 is applied to a more
sophisticated neo-classical labour supply model, which incorporates a piecewise linear
and possibly non-convex budget set. Coherency conditions on parameters and supports
of error distributions are imposed for all observations. Three stochastic error terms are
introduced to present respectively optimization and reporting errors, stochastic prefer-
ences and heterogeneity in wages. The performance of the MSS estimator is compared
with some more conventional estimation methods that are proposed in the literature.
Monte Carlo, as well as empirical results, obtained with the various methods of esti-
mation, are presented. The results show large variation of outcomes across estimation
methods. The ordering of estimated wage and participation elasticities, obtained by ap-
plying the methods of estimation to real data, is by and large the same as for the Monte
Carlo data. The results seem to show the importance of a correct (utility consistent)
treatment of the stochastic structure of the model. The performance of the MSS esti-
mator opens possibilities for further sophistication of the model. In particular, one may
be interested in the introduction of fixed cost of work, like cost of childcare, travelling
expenses etc., which generates an entry barrier. The MSS method seems to be well suited
for handling these kind of additional complications.
Chapter 4 presents a model of labour supply in which individuals are faced by demand
side restrictions. It is based on models by Dickens and Lundberg (1985), Tummers and
Woittiez (1991) and Van Soest, Woittiez and Kapteyn (1990). In these papers the
individual is assumed to be offered a random number (possibly zero) of job offers. The
job offers carry the same gross wage rate, but may have different numbers of weekly
working hours. The job yielding the highest level of utility is selected and its level of
utility is compared with the utility level of not working, after which the participation
decision is made. The probability of obtaining a job offer is assumed to be the same for
every individual, irrespective of age, level of education, etc. Moreover, the gross wage
rate is the same for every job offer, which differs from job search theory (Mortensen
(1986)), where the wage rate differs across job offers and hours of work usually are not
taken into consideration. The model that is presented in chapter 4 extends the Dickens
and Lundberg (1985) model by allowing wages to vary across job offers. Moreover, the
job offer probability depends on individual characteristics. A likelihood ratio test rejects
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the hypothesis that the probability of receiving a job offer is independent of individual
characteristics. The estimates of the utility parameters in the extended model, in which
the distribution of the number of job offers depends on individual characteristics, are
estimated very imprecisely. As a result, preferences are largely dominated by the random
component in the utility function. Due to the assumption that all job offers arrive at a
given point in time, while the actual number of job offers is not observed, the data on
the endogenous variables, hours and wages, apparently contain too little information for
obtaining precise estimates of both offer probabilities and utility parameters. To improve
on the performance of the model, it is proposed to drop the assumption that job offers
arrive at a given point in time and replace it by introducing a sequential arrival scheme of
job offers. Data on unemployment duration can then be used as an additional source of
information in the estimation of the model parameters. This calls for further extension
of the model with elements of job search theory and this extension is the subject of
chapter 5.
Chapter 5 presents a model of sequential job search, in which a job consists of a wage
component and an hours component. Two variants of the model are presented. The
first assumes that once a job offer with a specific wage rate is obtained, the individual
is allowed to determine the number of working hours by himself. The second variant
assumes that a job offer is a package consisting of a wage rate and a number of working
hours. For the first model it is derived that there exists a reservation wage strategy.
The individual accepts job offers with a wage rate that exceeds the reservation wage
rate. The reservation wage rate is determined by the benefit level, the job offer arrival
rate, the wage distribution, as well as by optimal labour supply, which depends on the
determinants of the utility function. After the acceptance of a job, labour supply is
determined in a way that is comparable to the neo-classical labour supply models in
chapters 2 and 3. The difference with the neo-classical model is that in the latter model
there is no separation between the participation decision and the labour supply decision.
In the present model, this separation is introduced in a structural way, as labour supply
depends on preferences only, whereas participation depends on preferences as well as
on the job offer arrival rate. The assumptions underlying the second model imply that
a reservation utility strategy is followed. Specific attention is paid to the stochastic
specification of the model and various sources of randomness are introduced. Data on
unemployment duration and after unemployment spell job characteristics are used to
estimate the model. This model is the proposed extension of the model in chapter
4. Some plots, based on residual analysis, reveal that the second model with hours
constraints outperforms the model without hours constraints. The plots also show the
presence of positive duration dependence of the hazard rate. Because of the complexity
of the models, we have abstained from taking into account the tax system, as was done
in chapter 3. Although it is in principle possible to incorporate the tax system, the
practical implementation would become more burdensome, both in terms of tractability
of quantities like the reservation wage, and in terms of required computing time.
Chapter 6 presents a structural model of job search in which the job offer arrival
rate is endogenous. Individuals can influence their job offer arrival rate by varying their
search effort. The optimal amount of search effort is determined on basis of a compari-
son of marginal returns of search and marginal cost of search, under the restriction that
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search effort is non-negative. In case of a corner solution, it is optimal not to search.
The model studies the search behaviour of both unemployed and employed individuals.
We allow for differences in search conditions for unemployed and employed individuals,
and it turns out that these differences play an important role in the determination of
the reservation wage rate of unemployed persons. In taking the job acceptance decision,
unemployed individuals take these differences in search conditions into account. Search
effort requires an operational definition and several indicators of search effort are avail-
able in the dataset. In the model, search effort is allowed to be a vector, of which each
component is related to a specific indicator appearing irr the dataset. The presence of
four indicators of search intensity in the dataset requires the evaluation of up to four-
dimensional probability integrals in calculating the maximum likelihood estimator. A
multivariate normal distribution is specified for the underlying error structure of the four
search effort indicators. Beca,use of the assumed normality, together with the presence
of explicitly defined integration regions, the present model fits perfectly in the smooth
simulated maximum likelihood (SSML) framework of Bórsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou
(1993), and we use the smooth recursive conditioning algorithm to simulate the multidi-
mensional normal probability integrals. Estimation results show that there is a positive
effect of expected returns of search on optimal search intensity, which is in accordance
with the predictions of the economic model. For both employed and unemployed indi-
viduals, the individual's attitude towards search turns out to have substantial influence
on the probability of getting a job. For employed individuals, age patterns are a signif-
icant determinant of the cost of search, whereas for unemployed individuals, variables
associated with household composition significantly influence cost of search. The em-
phasis in this study is on detecting the influence of search intensity on unemployment
duration and job tenure, as well as on the determination of cost of search characteristics.
For these purposes, the present model specification, based on the model of Mortensen
(1986), is amply sufficient. However, one may want to proceed and model jointly the
decision on time spent on labour supply and time spent on search, as in the model of
Burdett and Mortensen (1978). It is clear that for an empirical implementation of the
latter model, which would amount to a combination of the chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis,
more detailed information about search intensity is required. One would need data on
search intensity in terms of the weekly amount of hours spent on search activities.
Although there are several links between the models appearing in the various chapters,
a higher degree of integration of the models may be desirable. In each of the chapters, one
specific issue of microeconometric modelling of labour market behaviour is highlighted
and in each of the chapters the importance of incorporating this specific issue is stressed.
Ideally, one would like to build these several issues into one model. In doing this, we
will likely be hampered by the complexity that will arise in the implementation of such a
model: Even with rather simple specifications of error distributions and utiltity functions
models may become intractable, either because we cannot obtain explicit functional
relationships, or because numerical methods of evaluation require substantial amounts
of computing time.
Throughout this thesis, simulation estimators have been proven to be useful tools
in the empirical implementation of structural models of the labour market. Two basic
simulation estimators have been used. The first estimator i, the method of simulated
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scores (MSS). The attractiveness of this estimator is that it is consistent for a fixed
number of drawings. It is suitable for the use of both frequency simulators and smooth
simulators. The second estimator is simulated maximum likelihood (SML), which is not
consistent for a small, fixed number of drawings. Implementation of this method while
using frequency simulators has proven not to be very succesful. However, recent work
shows that SML with smooth multivariate normal probability simulators, performs well
in practice, even with a limited number of replications like ten. Frequency simulators
are useful for models with complicated, implicitly defined choice sets. A disadvantage of
the frequency simulator is its discontinuity, which makes standard optimization routines,
based on gradient methods, inappropriate. Non-gradi,ent methods are usually costly in
terms of computing time. The SRC simulator turns out to be a convenient simulator for
the simulation of multivariate normal probability integrals. Whether the SRC simulator
will be a practical solution for every arbitrary multivariate distribution and whether it
still performs well in combination with SML in the case of non-normal distributions, is
scope for further research.
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Samenvatting
In dit proefschrift worden structurele modellen van arbeidsmarktgedrag van indi-
viduën geformuleerd en geschat. Alle modellen zijn geformuleerd op basis van economi-
sche gedragsveronderstellingen, zoals nutsmaximalisatie onder inkomensrestricties. In
de hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4 komen statische arbeidsaanbodmodellen aan bod. De hoofd-
stukken 5 en 6 bespreken modellen waarin transities tussen verschillende arbeidsmarkt-
toestanden mogelijk zijn. Deze modellen zijn gebaseerd op de zoektheorie.
Verscheidene bronnen van onzekerheid worden in de modellen opgenomen, waaronder
onzekerheid ten aanzien van individuele preferenties en meet- en optimalisatiefouten.
De parameters van de modellen worden geschat met behulp van econometrische tech-
nieken. Hierbij wordt veelvuldig gebruik gemaakt van de zogenaamde simulatieschatters.
Simulatieschattingsmethoden zijn gebaseerd op momentenmethoden en maximale aan-
nemelijkheidsmethoden, maar zij verschillen van deze methoden doordat integralen, die
verdelingsmomenten representeren, vervangen worden door sommen die berekend wor-
den met behulp van kansgetallen welke uit een kansverdeling getrokken worden. Er zijn
verschillende redenen waarom men simulatoren voor kansen zou willen gebruiken. Ten
eerste kan het economische model dermate ingewikkeld zijn dat expliciete uitdrukkingen
voor het integratiegebied van de kansintegralen niet bestaan. Dit integratiegebied komt
overeen met een bepaalde keuzeverzameling welke door het model gedefiniëerd wordt.
Doorgaans is het echter wel mogelijk om kansgetallen te trekken uit de in het model
gespecificeerde verdeling, om vervolgens na te gaan of inen zich wel of niet in het be-
treffende keuzegebied bevindt. Door deze procedure herhaaldelijk en voor verschillende
individuën uit te voeren kan een frequentie bepaald worden welke als benadering voor
de kans gebruikt kan worden. Ten tweede kan men modellen tegenkomen waarin het
aantal keuzemogelijkheden of het aantal kansvariabelen zo hoog is dat de dimensie van
de te berekenen kansintegralen te hoog is om de schattingsprocedure met behulp van
numerieke integratiemethoden binnen een praktisch aanvaardbare computertijdsperiode
te berekenen. Twee simulatieschatters worden gebruikt: de methode van gesimuleerde
scores en de methode van gesimuleerde maximale aannemelijkheid.
Hoofdstuk 1 bevat een inleidend overzicht van het proefschrift.
In hoofdstuk 2 worden verscheidene simulatieschatters geïntroduceerd welke gebaseerd
zijn op het simuleren van de scorevector van de aannemelijkheidsfunctie. Een voordeel
van de score simulatieschatters is dat zij consistent zijn, zelfs als het aantal trekkingen dat
gebruikt wordt om kansen te simuleren eindig is. Dit in tegenstelling tot de methode van
gesimuleerde maximale aannemelijkheid waarbij de gesimuleerde kansen worden ingevuld
in de oorspronkelijke aannemelijkheidsfunctie. Voor deze laatste methode geldt dat het
aantal trekkingen naar oneindig moet gaan voor het verkrijgen van consistente schatters.
177
178 SAMENVATTING
De simulatieschatters worden toegepast op een eenvoudig neo-klassiek arbeidsaanbod-
model. Om de werking van de schatters te bestuderen worden zij toegepast op Monte
Carlo dataverzamelingen. De scoreschatters blijken bevredigend te functioneren, zelfs
indien slechts een beperkt aantal trekkingen gebruikt wordt om de kansen te simuleren.
De methode van gesimuleerde maximale aannemelijkheid blijkt meer trekkingen nodig
te hebben om tot goede resultaten te komen. Vervolgens worden de schattingsmethoden
toegepast op een steekproef van getrouwde vrouwen in Nederland in 1985. De verschil-
lende methoden blijken resultaten te genereren die behoorlijk van elkaar verschillen. Dit
komt met name tot uitdrukking in de schattingen van de loonelasticiteiten van arbeids-
aanbod en participatie. De verschillen worden geweten aan de eenvoud van het model,
waarin geen rekening gehouden is met zaken als vaste kosten van arbeid, het belasting-
stelsel en restricties aan de vraagzijde van de arbeidsmarkt.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een uitgebreider arbeidsaanbodmodel geformuleerd. Hierin
wordt tevens het belastingstelsel opgenomen. Als gevolg hiervan is de inkomensre-
strictie stuksgewijs lineair en mogelijk niet-convex. Er wordt een coherentierestrictie
opgelegd die moet bewerkstelligen dat de endogene variabelen eenduidig uit het model
oplosbaar zijn, en het verband tussen deze coherentierestrictie en de regulariteitsvoor-
waarden voor de nutsfunctie wordt benadrukt. Het model bevat meerdere toevalsvari-
abelen. Er is een toevalsvariabele geïntroduceerd in de preferentiestructuur, meet- en
optimalisatiefouten in uren komen voor en er wordt rekening gehouden met heteroge-
niteit in lonen. Het model is dusdanig gecompliceerd dat geen expliciete uitdrukkin-
gen voor het integratiegebied van de kansintegralen voor handen zijn. Daarom worden
de responsiekansen gesimuleerd met behulp van frequentiesimulatoren. De in hoofd-
stuk 2 beschreven scoreschatters zijn uitermate geschikt voor de toepassing van fre-
quentiesimulatoren. Verscheidene in de literatuur bestaande schattingsmethoden, welke
gebaseerd zijn op benaderingen of vereenvoudigingen van het oorspronkelijke model wor-
den vergeleken met de score simulatieschatters. Het betreft hier het verwaarlozen van het
toevalselement in de preferenties en het schatten met instrumentele variabelen, waarbij
de inkomensrestrictie wordt gelineariseerd. De schattingsmethoden worden met elkaar
vergeleken in een Monte Carlo studie, waarbij het met name opvalt dat er grote ver-
schillen voorkomen in de schattingen van de loonelasticiteiten. De score simulatieschatter
blijkt parameterschattingen te genereren die aanmerkelijk dichter bij de ware parame-
terwaarden liggen dan de benaderingsmethoden. De instrumentele variabelen schatter
maakt geen gebruik van de coherentierestrictie. Bij controle achteraf blijkt dat voor
de instrumentele variabelen schattingen niet alle individuën aan deze coherentierestric-
tie voldoen, terwijl voor de overige methoden, waarbij de coherentierestrictie gedurende
de schattingsprocedure wordt opgelegd, deze restrictie niet bindend blijkt te zijn. De
resultaten van de Monte Carlo studie benadrukken het belang van het in acht nemen
van de volledige structuur van het model, in plaats van het gebruik van benaderingen.
Hierna worden de methoden toegepast op een empirische dataset. Ook hier komen weer
verschillen in de loonelasticiteiten tussen de diverse methoden naar voren.
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft een arbeidsaanbodmodel waarin individuën geconfronteerd
worden met restricties aan de vraagzijde van de arbeidsmarkt. Er wordt veronder-
steld dat iemand op een gegeven tijdstip een door toeval bepaalde hoeveelheid banen
krijgt aangeboden, waarbij een baan gekarakteriseerd wordt door een loonvoet en een
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vast aantal arbeidsuren per week. De baan die het hoogste nutsniveau oplevert wordt
geselecteerd en vervolgens wordt dit nutsniveau vergeleken met het nut van niet werken,
waarna de acceptatiebeslissing wordt genomen. De kansverdeling die het aantal aange-
boden banen beschrijft is afhankelijk gemaakt van individuele eigenschappen. Een toets
verwerpt de hypothese dat deze afhankelijkheid niet geldt.
Hoofdstuk 5 breidt dit model uit met elementen uit de zoektheorie. Er wordt uitge-
gaan van werkloze individuën die op zoek zijn naar een baan, waarbij een baan wordt
gekenmerkt door twee eigenschappen, namelijk de loonvoet en het aantal arbeidsuren
per week. Twee modellen worden in beschouwing genomen. In het eerste model wordt
aangenomen dat als iemand een baan met een gegeven loonvoet aangeboden heeft gekre-
gen, hij vervolgens zelf mag bepalen hoeveel uren per week hij wil werken. In dit geval
kan worden aangetoond dat er een reserveringsloon bestaat. Alleen een aanbod met een
loon dat hoger is dan het reserveringsloon wordt geaccepteerd. In het tweede model
bepaalt de werkgever zowel het loon als het aantal arbeidsuren. Nu bestaat er een
reserveringsnutsniveau. Alleen loon-uren combinaties die een hoger nutsniveau oplev-
eren dan het reserveringsnutsniveau worden geaccepteerd. De modellen worden geschat
met gegevens over geaccepteerde uren en lonen en gegevens over de werkloosheidsduur.
Een vergelijking van beide modellen vindt plaats aan de hand van residuele analyse.
Hieruit blijkt dat het tweede model de data beter beschrijft dan het eerste.
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt een zoekmodel geformuleerd waarin individuën zelf de kans
op een baanaanbod kunnen beïnvloeden door hun zoekintensiteit te variëren. Een
hogere zoekintensiteit (bijvoorbeeld aantal sollicitaties) leidt tot een hogere kans op een
baanaanbod, maar tevens tot hogere zoekkosten. Marginale opbrengst en marginale
kosten van zoeken worden met elkaar vergeleken om de optimale zoekintensiteit te
bepalen. Hierbij wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen zij die werkloos zijn en zij die zoeken
terwijl zij een baan hebben. De dataset bevat verschillende indicatoren die informatie
bevatten over de zoekintensiteit. Er is een indicator die informatie geeft over de houding
van zoekenden, i.e. zoekt men serieus, of zoekt men minder serieus, er is een variabele die
aangeeft of inen de personeelsadvertenties bijhoudt en er is een variabele die aangeeft
of inen al dan niet staat ingeschreven bij het arbeidsbureau. Verder is Pr informatie
over sollicitatieaantallen. Met name de houdingsvariabele blijkt van invloed te zijn op
de aanbodkans. Opmerkelijk is dat voor werkenden het aantal sollicitaties weinig effect
lijkt te hebben. Voor werklozen is dat wel het geval. Voor werklozen is ingeschreven
staan bij het arbeidsbureau het minst effectieve zoekinstrument. Het economische model
voorspelt dat een hogere marginale opbrengst van zoeken leidt tot een hogere zoekinten-
siteit. De empirische resultaten onderschrijven dit. De zoekkosten van werkenden lijken
te variëren over de levenscyclus, terwijl voor werklozen de gezinssituatie eveneens een
rol speelt.
Hoofdstuk 7 geeft een overzicht van de voorgaande hoofdstukken, waarbij enige con-
cluderende opmerkingen geplaatst worden.
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